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Abstract
Snapshot of the state of asylum seekers’ rights in the United States and the UK at the time
it was written. It provides an overview of U.S. and UK obligations to asylum seekers under
international human rights law. The Comment also discusses the basics of U.S. and UK domestic
law and procedure relevant to claims for asylum. The author advocates that the United State and
the UK adopt a comprehensive approach to preserve asylum seekers’ rights and concludes that
domestic law should not become a pretext for human rights violations of asylum seekers in the
post-September 11th world.
ALIENATING "HUMAN" FROM "RIGHT": U.S. AND UK
NON-COMPLIANCE WITH ASYLUM OBLIGATIONS UNDER
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INTRODUCTION
"Let the terrorists among us be warned," said the U.S. Attor-
ney GeneralJohn D. Ashcroft in a speech at the U.S. Conference
of Mayors on October 25, 2001.1 "If you overstay your visas even
by one day, we will arrest you. If you violate a local law, we will
work to make sure that you are put in jail and kept in custody as
long as possible." 2
The U.S Attorney General's statement conflates terrorist sta-
tus with immigrant status.' It reflects the blurring of meanings
of "terrorist" and "asylum seeker"4 occurring in the United States
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Comment; and to my mother for the vision, the example, and the perspective.
1. See Dan Eggen, Tough Anti-Terror Campaign Pledged; Ashcroft Tells Mayors he Will
Use New Law to Fullest Extent, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 2001, at Al. Ashcroft also stated:
"Some will ask whether a civilized nation, a nation of laws and not of men, can use the
law to defend itself from barbarians and remain civilized. Our answer unequivocally is
yes." Id. See also Karen Masterson, Ashcroft is Ready to Unleash Power; Anti-Terror Bill
Awaits Bush OK, Hous. CHRON., Oct. 26, 2001, at 1; Scott Fornek, Rumsfeld: "I Think
We're Going to Get bin Laden; Secretary Changes His Tune; Anthrax at State Department? CHI.
SuN-TIMES, Oct. 26, 1001, at 3.
2. Eggen, supra note 1; Masterson, supra note 1; Fornek, supra note 1.
3. See Nancy Chang, The USA Patriot Act: What's so Patriotic About Trampling on the
Bill of Rights?, in RIGHTS ON THE LINE: CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE USA
PATRIOT ACT AND OTHER ANTI-TERRORISM MEASURES, Reader for Continuing Legal
Education Program 2 (Jan. 26, 2002) (commenting on Attorney General conflating
terms immigrant and terrorist in his speech).
4. This Comment understands the term "asylum seeker" to mean an individual
applying for refugee protection while in the United States or the United Kingdom
("UK") or at the borders of either of the two countries. This meaning is synonymous
with the term "asylee" under U.S. law. See Immigration and Naturalization Service
[hereinafter INS], Basic Law Manual, in REFUGEE ASSISTANCE TRAINING, COMMUNITY
OUTREACH LAw PROGRAM, Reader 7 (June 13-14, 2001) [hereinafter BLM] (distinguish-
ing between three categories of persons who may seek to enter United States because of
persecution). These are refugees, or individuals applying for refugee protection while
outside of the United States; withholdees, or individuals asking not to be returned to a
specific country or countries; and asylees. Id. From a legal perspective, the adjudica-
tion of refugee and asylum claims in U.S. courts are very similar. Id. at 8. In the UK,
the law has in the past distinguished between asylum seekers and refugees but today,
this distinction is only relevant in specific cases and irrelevant with regard to immigra-
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and the United Kingdom ("UK") 5 today.6 Additionally, the state-
ment underscores the dubious effects the recent U.S. and UK
anti-terrorism measures have on asylum seekers' rights.7
These developments are a far cry from the humanitarian
ideals,' which accompanied the establishment of the Office of
tion appeals. See IAN MACDONALD & NICHOLAS J. BLAKE, MACDONALD'S IMMIGRATION
LAw AND PRACTICE 372 (4th ed. 1995).
5. References to the UK in this Comment imply references to England, Northern
Ireland, Scotland, and Wales.
6. See American Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, Preliminary Lists of Anti-Arab
Hate Crimes, available at http://www.globalexchange.org/septemberl1/hateCrimes09l
301.html (quoting various hate mail received by organization, conflating "Arab" and
"terrorist"); Cathleen Falsani, Hate Groups Crank It Up, CHIC. SUN-TIMES, Nov. 11, 2001,
at 11 (discussing how white supremacists fuel anti-Muslim rhetoric); Peter Ford, Xeno-
phobia Follows US Terror, VILLAGE VOICE, Oct. 11, 2001 (describing xenophobia not only
in United States but world-wide); Rosalind Yarde, Demons of the Day, GUARDIAN, Nov. 12,
2001 (commenting that "Muslim," "terrorist," and "asylum seeker" stereotypes have be-
come interwoven and confused); David Williams & Ben Taylor, Asylum Seeker Who Helped
the Hitmen, DAILY MAIL, Sept. 19, 2001, at 7 (referring to asylum seeker running Islamic
fundamentalist organization in Britain).
7. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Re-
quired to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 802 (2001)
[hereinafter USA PATRIOT Act]; Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act of 2001 (c.
24) (Eng.), available at http://www.hmso.gov.uk/cgi-bin/htm-hl3?URL=http://www.
hmso.gov.uk/si/si2001/20014019.htm&STEMMER=en&WORDS=antiterror+&COL
OUR=red&STYLE=s#muscat-highlighterfirst match [hereinafter Anti-Terrorism Act
2001]; see also Amy Goldstein et al., A Deliberate Strategy of Disruption, WASH. POST, Nov. 4,
2001, at Al (stating that Department of Justice has detained more than 1,100 immi-
grants without charge, while only small number of these people are held as material
witnesses to September l1th events); Tom Brune, U.S. to Question Immigrants; Terror
Probe Seeks 5,000 Who Fit Profile, NEWSDAY, Nov. 14, 2001, at A62 (remarking that there
are rumors of instituting national identification cards and budget increases for FBI and
other federal agencies); Rachel Sills, 'Islamic Scum'Hate Mail Sent to Mosques, UK NEW-
SQUEST REG. PRESS, Oct. 6, 2001 (reporting dramatic increase of racist attacks against
Muslims in UK, including bomb threats against mosques, beatings, verbal abuse, and
gang assaults, targeting Arab and South Asian men and women); John Dillon, Don't
Hate Me Because IAm a Muslim, MIRROR, Oct. 24, 2001, at 41 (discussing backlash against
Muslims); Hamish MacDonell & David Scott, Blunkett Toughens Up Anti-Terror Laws,
SCOTSMAN, Oct. 4, 2001, at 11 (remarking on upsurge in anti-Muslim crime).
8. See Micheline Ishay & David Goldfischer, Human Rights and National Security: A
False Dichotomy, in THE HUMAN RIGHTS READER 377, 389, 397 (Micheline Ishay ed., 1997)
(stating that triumph over fascism set stage for global implementation of universal
rights worldwide); RICHARD CLAYTON & HUGH TOMLINSON, THE LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS
3 (2000) (asserting that international human rights law developed as part of new inter-
national order designed to ensure that atrocities of another world war would never
recur); Charles B. Keely, Changing International Refugee Policy and Practice: How Interna-
tional Regimes Emerge and Change, in IMMIGRATION TODAY 37, 39 (Lydio F. Tomasi & Mary
G. Powers eds., 2000) (remarking that human rights consciousness developed when
Western States realized that forced repatriation was not viable solution to refugee cri-
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the United Nations9  High Commissioner for Refugees
("UNHCR").° Nor do the new measures echo the promises the
United States and the UK made when they ratified the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights ("UDHR")," a the 1951 United Na-
tions Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees ("Refugee
Convention")1 2 and its 1967 Protocol ("Refugee Protocol"). 13 By
acceding to these international human rights instruments, the
sis). See generally JACK DONNELLY, THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1985) (discussing
nature of human rights and competing theories and approaches to human rights).
9. See EDWARD LAWSON, ENCYCLOPEDIA ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1482 (2d. ed. 1996) (stat-
ing that United Nations ("U.N.") was established on October 24, 1945 when fifty-one
original member countries ratified U.N. Charter, U.N.C.I.O. XV, 335 (June 26, 1945)).
The United Nations (U.N.) consists of six principal organs: the General Assembly, the
Security Council, the Secretariat, the International Court of Justice, the Economic and
Social Council, and the Trusteeship Council. Id. at 1482-83. Article 1 of the U.N. Char-
ter lists U.N. purposes and principles, including maintenance of international peace
and security, international co-operation in solving international problems, and respect
for human rights. Id.; HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 137 (2d ed. 2000) (explaining that Charter states U.N.'s basic pur-
pose of securing and maintaining peace); Ishay & Goldfischer, supra note 8, at 389
(remarking that in post Second World War years U.N. represented ideal of global im-
plementation of new vision of rights); ROGER STENSON CLARK, A UNITED NATIONS HIGH
COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 13-32 (1972) (outlining U.N. enforcement proce-
dures and techniques to promote and protect human rights).
10. See Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refu-
gees, G.A. Res. 428 [V] (Dec. 14, 1950), GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20, at 46-48, U.N.
Doc. A/1775 (1950) (authorizing establishment of Office of United Nations High Com-
missioner for Refugees ("UNHCR") and specifying that work of UNHCR will be entirely
non-political, but humanitarian and social). See also W.R. SMYSER, REFUGEES: EXTENDED
EXILE 42-44 (1987) (remarking that UNHCR stands at center of structure of refugee
protection and care being both conscience and agent of world community); Keely,
supra note 8, at 39 (explaining that UNHCR is U.N. agency charged with supervising
refugee protection); LAWSON, supra note 9, at 689-92 (summarizing UNHCR's man-
date).
11. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. (217) (III) (A) (Dec. 10,
1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
12. See 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, G.A.
Res. 429 [V], 189 U.N.T.S. 137 (Dec. 14, 1950) [hereinafter Refugee Convention]. Al-
though the United States is not a party to the Refugee Convention, by acceding to the
Refugee Protocol, it undertook obligations under Refugee Convention. See DANIEL G.
PARTAN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAw PROCESS 796 (1992) (explaining that by ratifying Ref-
ugee Protocol Relating to Status of Refugees ("Refugee Protocol") United States under-
took to apply substantive provisions of Refugee Convention).
13. See Refugee Protocol, G.A. Res. 2198 [XXI], 606 U.N.T.S., 267 (Dec. 16, 1996);
see also MACDONALD & BLAKE, supra note 4, at 374-75 (explaining that Refugee Protocol
expands rights of Refugee Convention to all refugees, not just those affected by events
occurring prior toJanuary 1, 1951); LAWSON, supra note 9, at 1272-74 (stating that pur-
pose of Refugee Protocol is to remove date contained in definition of refugees of Arti-
cle 1 and make Refugee Convention applicable to all refugees).
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United States and the UK bound themselves to respect the right
to seek asylum, 4 the international definition of a "refugee,' 1 5
and the principle of nonrefoulement.16
At the same time, stereotypes, xenophobia, and legislation
curbing asylum seekers' rights are hardly new trends in the his-
tory of asylum in the United States and the UK."v The recent
14. See UDHR, supra note 11, art. 14. Article 14 states: "Everyone has the right to
seek and enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution." Id.
15. See Refugee Convention, supra note 12, art. I(A) (2) (defining refugee). Article
I(A) (2) defines a refugee as any person who:
owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion, is
outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having
a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence
[as a result of such events], is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to
return to it.
Id.; see also Immigration and Naturalization Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414 § 101 (a) (42) (A), 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a) (42) (A) [hereinafter INA] (amending Refugee Convention defini-
tion). The INA defines refugee as:
any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in the
case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such
person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and
is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that coun-
try because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.
Id. Cf Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993, § 2 (C. 23) (Eng.) [hereinafter Im-
migration Act 1993] (retaining Refugee Convention definition in UK domestic law).
Section 2 states: "Nothing in the immigration rules: (within the meaning of the 1971
Act) shall lay down any practice which could be contrary to the [Refugee] Convention."
Id.
16. See Refugee Convention, supra note 12, art. 33(1). Article 33(1) states: "No
contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any manner whatsoever
to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account
of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion." Id.; see also SIR FRANCIS VALLAT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE PRACTITIONER 5
(1966) (explaining that international legal obligations are binding on States and any
deficiencies in domestic law do not excuse parties from breach); CLARK, supra note 9, at
14 (stating that treaties, once ratified, involve legally binding obligations); Louis Hen-
kin, Politics of Law-Making, in INTERNATIONAL LAw: CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY READ-
INGS 18 (Charlotte Ku & Paul F. Diehl eds., 1998) [hereinafter Politics of Law-Making]
(asserting that nations generally comply with their obligations under international law
for number of reasons); Tony Evans, Power, Hegemony, and the Universalization of Human
Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS FIFr YEARS ON: A REAPPRAISAL 7 (Tony Evans ed.,
1998) (describing how human rights became metaphor for being American). The
human rights rhetoric became part of a wider strategy to exploit U.S. position as global
giant and to gain access to world markets. Id. at 6-7.
17. See Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Book: Brimelow, Bork, Herrnstein, Murray and
D'Souza-Recent Conservative Thought and the End of Equality, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1929, 1952
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developments echo the anti-immigrant sentiments glimpsed in
the United States and the UK in the 1980s8 and abloom in these
countries in the 1990s.' 9 Although the United States and the UK
(1998) (reviewing range of books dealing with prejudicial attitudes toward immigrants);
Angelique Chrisafis, Under Siege-Britain has a Poor Record for its Treatment of Muslims,
GUARDIAN, Dec. 8, 2001, at 22 '(stating that UK has appalling record of fostering under-
standing of Muslims); Yarde, supra note 6 (citing history of xenophobia in UK); Steve
Platt, The Barbarous Coast, INDEPENDENT, March 4, 2000 (describing anti-immigrant feel-
ings abloom in media and among UK population); Daniel McGrory, Refugee Tide Causes
Wave of Unrest, TIMES OF LONDON, Aug. 5, 1999 (describing hostility toward asylum seek-
ers among people of Dover). See generally UNHCR, After the Terror: The Global Fallout, in
4 REFUGEES 4, 7 [hereinafter After the Terror] (claiming that asylum seekers are subjects
of considerable mistrust in many countries).
18. See Keely, supra note 8, at 42 (asserting that 1980s were turning point in U.S.
asylum law and policy); Kevin Costello, Without a Country: Indefinite Detention as Constitu-
tional Purgatory, 3 U. PA.J. CONST. L. 503 (2001) (stating that federal courts were forced
to draw lines in immigration law in 1980s when Fidel Castro allowed 125,000 Cubans to
emigrate to United States as part of Mariel Boatlift). The U.S. government at first en-
couraged and then opposed this informally arranged Cuban-sponsored boatlift from
Cuban port of Mariel to Florida. Id.; Birgitta I. Sandberg, Is the United States Government
Justified in Indefinitely Detaining Cuban Exiles in Federal Prisons?, 10 DICK. J. INT'L L. 383
(1992) (reporting history of Mariel Cubans). See also Dallal Stevens, The Case of UK
Asylum Law and Policy: Lessons from History?, in CURRENT ISSUES OF UK ASYLUM LAw AND
POLICY 9, 28 (Frances Nicholson & Patrick Twomey eds., 1998) (explaining that 1980s
were important period in development of asylum policy in UK); Anne Owers & Made-
line Garlick, Protection and Process: Towards Fair and Effective Asylum Determination Proce-
dures, in CURRENT ISSUES OF UK ASYLUM LAw AND POLICY 199, 201-03 (Frances Nichol-
son & Patrick Twomey eds., 1998) (showing that UK's asylum policy began to change in
1980s); Ann Dummett & Andrew Nicol, The Law and Human Rights, in SUBJECTS, CITI-
ZENS, ALIENS AND OTHERS 260-61 (1990) (explaining that during 1980s most Western
countries began to interpret their Refugee Convention obligations much more strictly).
The Western governments asserted that many asylum seekers were really economic mi-
grants fleeing from poverty. Id.
19. See INS, Toward INS 2000: Accepting the Challenge 8 (1994) available at http://
www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/aboutins/insmission/mission.htm (explaining that 1990s
heralded worldwide refugee crisis, which resulted from convergence of political and
economic instability in many parts of globe with increased development and availability
of international travel and communications); Peter Schuck, Immigration at the Turn of the
New Century, 33 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 1, 5 (2001) (distinguishing between push and
pull factors of population movements). Contemporary conditions, like better and
cheaper communications, sharpened many traditional migratory spurs, like population
pressures, persecution, and warfare. Id.; W. Michael Reisman, International Legal Re-
sponses to Terrorism, 22 Hous. J. INT'L L. 4 (1999) (discussing astonishing advances in
technology and transportation); Human Rights Watch,. 50 Years On: What Future For
Refugee Protection?, in HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 2001, at 509 (2000) [here-
inafter 50 Years On] (explaining that several factors changed political environment for
refugees in 1990s). In addition to coinciding with changes in communications and
transportation, the end of the Cold War made refugees lose their political and geopolit-
ical significance. Id. at 509-10. Refugees became scapegoats of domestic problems,
blamed for threatening security, draining countries' resources, and rising crime. Id. at
509.
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welcomed refugees after the Second World War,20 as the num-
ber of asylum seekers from non-European sources increased,
both countries feared that these movements might include ter-
rorists.2 ' The two countries were also concerned that economic
migrants were looking to misuse their asylum systems. 22 In re-
sponse, the United States and the UK set up complex asylum
determination procedures. 23  Commentators opine that ulti-
20. See Keely, supra note 8, at 3946 (describing U.S. liberal policy toward refugees,
permitting large resettlements of Indochinese in mid-1970s and boat people from
Southeast Asia in early 1980s); SMYSER, supra note 10, at 52-64 (discussing Indochinese
refugees' flight to United States); Owers & Garlick, supra note 18, at 201-03 (showing
that in post-war years, UK welcomed refugees fleeing Hungarian uprising in 1956, de-
fecting from Soviet Union, and leaving Vietnam and Chile in 1970s).
21. See Keely, supra note 8, at 42 (detailing both countries' fear of terrorist activi-
ties in response to growing number of asylum seekers from Third World countries).
The United States and the UK also expressed fear that the political opponents of devel-
oping country regimes would use them as bases for political opposition or military oper-
ation. Id.; SMYSER, supra note 10, at 93 (highlighting how generosity to refugees became
widely known while conditions in Asian and African countries deteriorated). Wars and
natural disasters in their home countries prompted new movements of refugees to go
West. Reisman, supra note 19, at 4, 20-30 (inferring that technology of transportation
advanced to point where it is increasingly easy to plan and implement destructive ter-
rorist actions); Lori Fisler Damrosch, Sanctions Against Perpetrators of Terrorism, 22 Hous.
J. INT'L. L. 63 (1999) (comparing deterrence of terrorism through force and sanctions).
See also S.C. Res. 1189, U.N. SCOR, 3915th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1189 (1998)
(expressing U.N. Security Council's declaration that suppression of acts of international
terrorism is essential for international peace and security and calling upon States to
adopt measures for security cooperation in accordance with international law).
22. See Kevin R. Johnson, Judicial Acquiescence to the Executive Branch's Pursuit of For-
eign Policy and Domestic Agenda's in Immigration Matters: The Case of Haitian Asylum Seekers,
7 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 4 (1993) (explaining that perception of Haitian asylum seekers as
economic migrants virtually precluded them from being able to obtain entry into
United States); Joyce A. Hughes & Linda R. Crane, Haitians: Seeking Refuge in the United
States, 7 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 747, 763 (1993) (discussing how migrants who are fleeing
economic conditions are not refugees under Refugee Convention definition). This lim-
itation is sharply criticized because it fails to acknowledge that governments routinely
impose economic sanctions against individuals for purely political reasons. Id.; C. Ran-
dall, An Asylum Policy for the UK, in STRANGERS AND CITIZENS, A POSITIVE APPROACH TO
MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES 212-13 (S. Spencer ed., 1994) (asserting that asylum seeking
and illegal entry became enmeshed when Haitian and Central American aliens were
perceived to include many economic migrants). Critics contended that these aliens
used asylum as a ruse to gain entry. Id.
23. See BLM, supra note 4, 1-14 (summarizing basic developments of U.S. law);
Stevens, supra note 18, at 9-34 (summarizing development of UK asylum system); see also
Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights [hereinafter LCHR], Is This America? The Denial
of Due Process to Asylum Seekers in the United States, Oct. 2000, available at http://www/
lchr.org/refugee/is-thisamerica.htm [hereinafter Is This America?] (detailing persis-
tent human rights violations of asylum seekers in United States); LCHR, Refugees Behind
Bars, Aug. 1999 [hereinafter Refugees Behind Bars] (critiquing detention practices in
United States); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 1998, available at http://
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mately, the U.S. and the UK asylum policies beginning in the
1980s aimed to deter asylum seekers from travelling to these
countries.24
Experts contend that the aftermath of the September 11th
attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon 25 exacer-
bates these developments. 26 The new anti-terrorism laws imple-
mented in the two countries threaten to circumvent the right to
seek asylum and the nonrefoulement principle in unprecedented
www.hrw.org/reports98/us-immig/Ins989-03.htm (reporting findings on extensive in-
vestigation of detention centers); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, REFUGEES: HuMAN RIGHTS
HAVE No BORDERS (1997) (discussing violations of asylum seekers' rights world-wide).
24. See Keely, supra note 8, at 37-51 (discussing factors that led to more complex
and restrictive asylum regimes in Western world); Costello, supra note 18, 509-10 (re-
marking on increasing willingness to deport aliens for specified offenses); Stevens,
supra note 18, at 27 (asserting that Immigration Act 1993 was first specific legislation on
asylum in UK). After subsequent legislation in 1996, 1998, and 1999, by the year 2000,
the number of asylum applications in UK reached 97,000, the largest of any European
country, meanwhile initial recognition rates dropped to five percent. Id. See generally
The Road to Refuge and Destination UK: Countries of Origin, BBC NEWS ONLINE, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/in-depth/world/2001 /road tojrefuge/for-
eign-land/map.stm (discussing recent immigration trends and issues); Destination UK:
Countries of Origin, BBC NEWS ONLINE, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/
static/in-depth/uk/2001/destination uk/default.stm (discussing immigration statis-
tics).
25. See Special Report, ECONOMIST, Sept. 15-21, 2001, at 15-21 (discussing events of
September 11th). See also Robert F. Turner, Legal Responses to International Terrorism:
Constitutional Constrains on Presidential Power, 22 Hous. J. INT'L L. 77, 78-79 (1999) (re-
flecting almost prophetically that many Americans had not died due to terrorist attacks
prior to September 11 th because of America's remarkably good fortune and stating that
Americans were simply lucky). See generally Christopher L. Gadouri, Should the United
States Officially Recognize the Taliban? The International Legal and Political Considerations, 23
Hous. J. INT'L L. 385 (2001) (providing overview of Taliban government and U.S. rela-
tions to it prior to September 11th events).
26. See Manuel D. Vargas, New Developments in Representing Non-Citizens Post-September
11, in RIGHTS ON THE LINE: CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE USA PATRIOT
ACT AND OTHER ANTI-TERRORISM MEASURES, Reader for Continuing Legal Education
Program 2 (an. 26, 2002) (describing general reassignment of law enforcement re-
sources to war against terrorism, including INS reassignment of more than half of its
investigators to searching for suspects); Eggen, supra note I (quoting Attorney General
vowing to step up detention efforts); Chrisafis, supra note 17 (discussing insidious
prejudice against all Muslims); MacDonell & Scott, supra note 7 (discussing Anti-Terror-
ism Act 2001). See generally Human Rights Watch, No Safe Refuge: The Impact of the Sep-
tember 11 Attacks on Refugees, Asylum Seekers and Migrants in the Afghanistan Region and
Worldwide, available at http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/refugees/afghan-bckIOl17
.htm [hereinafter No Safe Refuge] (remarking that Home Secretary announced plans to
place restrictions on entry into UK, to curb asylum seekers' appeal rights, and to insti-
tute new identity cards). The Home Secretary promised that the Home Office will soon
introduce new security measures, including enhanced arrest powers and ability to arrest
and interrogate anyone suspected or with knowledge of terrorist activities. Id.
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ways. 27  Scholars also warn that violations of asylum seekers'
rights may become a pretext for civil rights violations of regular
citizens.28
This Comment is a snapshot of the state of asylum seekers'
rights in the United States and the UK today. Part I of this Com-
ment overviews U.S. and UK obligations to asylum seekers under
international human rights law. Part II of the Comment dis-
cusses the basics of U.S. and UK domestic law and procedure
relevant to claims for asylum. Part III compares U.S. and UK
domestic legislation and analyzes how each country's laws fall
short of its international asylum obligations. Part III advocates
that the United States and the UK adopt a comprehensive ap-
proach to preserve asylum seekers' rights. This Comment con-
cludes that domestic law should not become a pretext for
human rights violations of asylum seekers in the post-September
11 th world.
I. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: A PRESUMPTION
OF INCLUSION
Experts define international human rights law as law to con-
27. See After the Terror, supra note 17, at 7 (remarking on increasing abuse of asylum
seekers' and refugees' rights world-wide); Amnesty International, Justice Not Revenge-
The Aftermath of 11 September, available at http://www.amnesty.org.uk/action/crisis/in
dex.shtml [hereinafter Justice Not Revenge] (claiming that events of September 1lth are
resulting in massive abuses of human rights around world); Amnesty International,
United States of America: Amnesty International's Concerns Regarding Post September 11 Deten-
tions in the USA, Sept. 25, 2001, available at http://web.amnesty.org/802568F7005
C4453/0/E7EA69A4BB5FA3B980256B7B006439B7?Open [hereinafter Amnesty Interna-
tional's Concerns] (expressing concern about increased detention of asylum seekers);
Terror Probe Detentions "Violate Rights", BBC NEWS ONLINE, Mar. 14, 2002, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/americas/newsid-1873000/1873365.stm
(critiquing arbitrary detention practices in aftermath of September l1th attacks).
28. See Chang, supra note 3, at 5-9 (remarking that anti-terrorism legislation per-
mitted FBI to infiltrate groups and diminish privacy rights); Jim McGee, An Intelligence
Giant in the Making; Anti-Terrorism Law Likely to Bring Domestic Apparatus of Unprecedented
Scope, WASH. PosT, Nov. 4, 2001, at A4 (contending that most controversial aspects of
U.S. anti-terrorist legislation involve civil liberties of U.S. citizens); John Lancaster &
Walter Pincus, Proposed Anti-Terrorism Laws Draw Tough Questions; Lawmakers Express Con-
cerns to Ashcrofl, Other Justice Officials About Threat to Civil Liberties, WASH. POST, Sept. 25,
2001, at A5 (discussing civil liberties concerns resulting from anti-terrorism legislation);
Linda Greenhouse, In New York Visit, O'Connor Foresees Limits on Freedom, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 29, 2001, at B5 (stating that following visit to World Trade Center site, U.S. Su-
preme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor predicted that people in United States are
likely to experience more restrictions on personal freedom than has ever been case).
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trol how States behave toward their own inhabitants. 29  Interna-
tional human rights law is contained in conventions, custom,
and general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.30
Under international law, treaty and customary law obligations
are binding upon the United States and the UK"1 A lack of pow-
erful enforcement mechanisms, however, permits the two coun-
tries to deviate from these international norms.32 Treaty reserva-
29. See Louis Henkin, Future of International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAw: CLAssic
AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS 551, 552 (1998) (stating that how State treats its own
inhabitants is now staple of international politics and law); Louis Henkin, Idealism and
Ideology, in How NATIONS BEHAVE 228 (2d ed. 1979) [hereinafter Idealism and Ideology]
(tracing international human rights ideology to end of Second World War); STEINER &
AISTON, supra note 9, at v (stating that human rights movement was born out of disas-
ters of Second World War); PETER MALANCZUK, AKENHURST'S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAw 207 (7th ed. 1997) (remarking that human rights vision was her-
alded by four freedoms). These were freedom of speech and expression; freedom of
religion; freedom from economic want; and freedom from fear of aggression. Id.
30. See Statute of the International Court ofJustice [hereinafter ICJ], 59 Stat. 1055,
1060, art. 38 (1945) [hereinafter ICJ Statute]. The Statute lists the following sources of
international law:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules
expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59 [which provides that "The decision of
the court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of
that particular case"] judicial decisions and the teachings of the most
highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for
determination of rules of law.
Id. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)] (stating that there are three
major sources of international law: treaties or international agreements; international
custom; and general principles common to major legal systems of world); CLARK, supra
note 9, at 13-14 (asserting that international law is ambiguous concept because there is
no clearly defined international legislature, executive, or judiciary behind it).
31. See VALLAT, supra note 16, at 5 (explaining that deficiencies in domestic law do
not excuse breach of international legal obligations); CLARK, supra note 9, at 14 (stating
that treaties are legally binding documents); Politics of Law-Making, supra note 16, at 18
(asserting that nations comply with international law obligations for number of rea-
sons).
32. See Politics of Law-Making, supra note 16, at 20 (claiming that major weakness of
human rights law lies in its weak enforcement); Idealism and Ideology, supra note 29, at
232 (contending that weak enforcement in human rights law is far greater problem
than in any other area of international law). Since a violation by a State of the rights of
its own inhabitants does not usually infringe national interests of other parties to the
agreement, they have no compelling interest to scrutinize the violating behavior and
call it into account. Id.; Charlotte Ku & Paul F. Diehl, International Law as Operating and
Normative Systems: An Overview, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY
READINGS 3, 4 (1998) (explaining that diffusion and lack of regulation are inherent in
system consisting of multiple sovereign actors). One way to respond to this weakness of
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tions and non-participation in custom creation further under-
mine the two countries' compliance with their international
obligations to asylum seekers.33
A. Treaties and Customary International Human Rights Law
Commentators discuss that there are two basic sources of
international human rights law: treaties and custom. 34 Interna-
tional treaties are multilateral35 or bilateral36 agreements be-
international law is institutional enforcement. Id.; John H.E. Fried, International Law-
Neither Orphan Nor Harlot, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY READ-
INGS 25, 26-27 (Charlotte Ku & Paul F. Diehl eds., 1998) (contending that international
law is continuously criticized for being weak and defenseless, vague and inchoate).
33. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 30, § 313 cmt. g (stating that declara-
tions, like understandings, modify obligations that State purports to enter under
treaty); § 313 cmt. g (stating that understanding is interpretation of agreement State
Party makes in treaty); § 313 (defining reservation, under international law, as unilat-
eral statement made by State when entering into treaty that limits or modifies legal
obligations undertaken by that State); SIR IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON
THE LAW OF TREATIES 77 (1973) (concluding that questions regarding distinction be-
tween declarations and permissible and impermissible reservations are among most
complex issues in law of treaties). See also Idealism and Ideology, supra note 29, at 228-29
(stating that governments submit to international scrutiny only reluctantly). Officials of
national governments tend to look at efforts to enforce human rights law as disruptive
of real international politics and detrimental to friendly relations between nations. Id.
Forces that induce compliance in international human rights law are necessarily differ-
ent from any other law because there is no other State that is the victim of another
State's human rights violations. Id. at 235-37; Ku & Diehl, supra note 32, at 13 (re-
marking that piercing of shell of State sovereignty is perhaps most dramatic in field of
human rights); Fried, supra note 32, at 37 (remarking that another problem related to
efficacy of international regime is that States are judges of their own lawful behavior);
Jarat Chopra & Thomas G. Weiss, Sovereignty is no Longer Sacrosanct: Codifying Humanita-
rian Intervention, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS 377
(Charlotte Ku & Paul F. Diehl eds., 1998) (arguing that supremacy of sovereignty over
law is no longer tenable).
34. SeeJohn King Gamble, Jr., The Treaty! Custom Dichotomy, in INTERNATIONAL LAW:
CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS 75-76 (Charlotte Ku & Paul F. Diehl eds., 1998)
(describing treaties and custom as principal sources of international law); Richard B.
Lillich, Invoking International Human Rights Law in Domestic Courts, 54 U. CIN. L. REv.
367, 368 (1985) (explaining that treaties and custom are two major sources of interna-
tional law); STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 9, at 104 (claiming that treaties have become
primary expression of international law and can serve number of purposes). At the
same time, treaties and custom are complexly interrelated and there is often a question
regarding the extent to which a treaty should be read in light of a pre-existing custom.
Id. at 71. Moreover, treaties may give birth to customary international law. Id. at 72;
PAUL REUTER, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF TREATIES 139 (Jose Mico & Peter Hag-
genmacher trans., 1995) (explaining that while treaties contribute to emergence of cus-
tomary international law, custom may be embodied in treaty).
35. See HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 70 (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW] (distinguishing multilateral treaties from other types of agreements); Ru-
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tween nations. 31 Scholars agree that international custom con-
sists of principles that nations observe out of a sense of legal obli-
gation or opinio juris.31
1. International Treaties
The international treaties significant in the asylum context
are the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
("ICCPR"), 9 the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights ("ICESCR"),4 ° and the Refugee Conven-
tion,4 1 amended by its Protocol.42 The Convention against Tor-
ture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment ("Torture Convention") is the right-specific treaty,
which pertains to asylum litigation.4" The regional treaties of
TER, supra note 34, at 35-38 (stating that most obvious means of classifying treaties is by
nature and number of parties). The number of parties is the most important factor in
treaty-making and multilateral treaties require specific long and short treaty-making
procedures. Id. at 60, 62-66; STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 9, at 104 (claiming that
multilateral treaties have become most effective, if not only, path toward international
regulation of number of contemporary problems).
36. See INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 35, at 71 (distinguishing bilateral treaties
from other types of agreements); REUTER, supra note 34, at 61-62 (reviewing long and
short bilateral treaty-making procedures).
37. See 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 2(1), U.N. Doc. A/
CONF 39/27, 63 A.J.I.L. 875 (1969) [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (defining treaty);
JAN KLABBERS, THE CONCEPT OF TREATY IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 40-41 (1996) (stating
that Vienna Convention has status of customary international law). See also VALLAT,
supra note 16, at 7 (remarking that treaties are agreements between two or more na-
tions); CLARK, supra note 9, at 14 (stating that treaties may be called covenants, agree-
ments, conventions, or protocols). Treaties are not to be confused with declarations
and recommendations, which do not impose binding legal obligations. Id.; REUTER,
supra note 34, at 29 (claiming that there is no precise nomenclature for international
treaties and they may be called agreements, conventions, or protocols). Further, the
meaning of most terms used in a treaty is extremely variable, changing from country to
country. Id.
38. See ICJ Statute, supra note 30, art. 38; CLARK, supra note 9, at 147 (explaining
that opiniojuris requires not only establishment of specific practice but subjective belief
by States that this practice is rendered obligatory by existing rule of law). Custom devel-
ops from resolutions, declarations, and unratified treaties, through repetition of the
same practice on the same matter in the same, or in diverse organizations. Id. at 143-
48. See also VALtAT, supra note 16, at 11-12 (describing custom as set of principles na-
tions perceive as binding).
39. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N.G.A. Res. 2200 A
(xxi), 999 U.N.T.S. at 171 & 1057 U.N.T.S. at 407 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICCPR].
40. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 993
U.N.T.S. at 3 (Dec. 19, 1966) [hereinafter ICESCR].
41. See Refugee Convention, supra note 12.
42. See Refugee Protocol, supra note 13.
43. See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
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relevance to asylum seekers are the American Convention on
Human Rights ("American Convention") 44 and the European
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
("ECHR") .45
a. The International Bill of Human Rights
The ICCPR and the ICESCR, together with the UDHR,
compose what is known as the Universal Bill of Human Rights.4 6
Although the ICCPR and the ICESCR do not explicitly mention
the right to seek asylum, protection of the right is implied in
these documents.47 Commentators agree that the two Covenants
transform the provisions of the UDHR into binding, detailed
rules of law.48 The UDHR guarantees the right to seek asylum
Treatment or Punishment, 23 I.L.M. 1027 (Sept. 1984), modified by 24 I.L.M. 535
(March 1985) [hereinafter Torture Convention]. Other right-specific treaties may be
relevant in particular contexts. See, e.g., International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination ("Anti-Discrimination Convention"), U.N.G.A.
Res. 2106 [XX] (defining and disallowing racial discrimination on all grounds); United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child ("CRC"), U.N.G.A. Res. 44/25 (defining
and forbidding discrimination against children on all grounds); Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination. Against Women ("CEDAW"), U.N.G.A. Res.
34/180 (defining and disallowing discrimination against women on all grounds).
44. See American Convention on Human Rights, "Pact of San Jose," Aug. 27, 1979,
Vol. 1144, 1-17955 (entered into force July 18, 1978) [hereinafter American Conven-
tion].
45. See European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov.
4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter ECHR].
. 46. See STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 9, at 141 (referring to UDHR and two Cove-
nants as Universal Bill of Rights); LAWSON, supra note 9, at 812 (stating that this Bill also
consists of Optional Protocol and Second Optional Protocol to ICCPR, which aims at
abolition of death penalty).
47. See ICCPR, supra note 39, pmbl. (citing UDHR and its ideal of free human
beings enjoying civil and political freedom and freedom from fear and want). Individu-
als are responsible for promoting and observing the ICCPR rights, which embody the
UDHR principles. Id.; ICESCR, supra note 40, pmbl. (recognizing that UDHR ideals
may only be achieved if everyone enjoys his or her economic, social, cultural, civil, and
political rights). See also MALANCZUK, supra note 29, at 215 (remarking that ICCPR and
ICESCR translate UDHR into enforceable rule of law as well as provide for monitoring
systems); INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 35, at 989 (explaining that ICCPR spells out
specific UDHR rights in greater detail).
48. See Hurst Hannum, Human Rights, in UNITED NATIONS LEGAL ORDER 327 (Os-
car Schachter & Christopher C. Joyner eds., 1995) (describing two Covenants as most
comprehensive statements of conventional human rights law yet adopted); STEINER &
ALSTON, supra note 9, at 237 (explaining that two Covenants transformed UDHR provi-
sions into binding documents); INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 35, at 989 (noting that
ICCPR created binding legal obligations and as result, required enforcement machin-
ery).
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and freedom from torture. 49 As a result, these rights are pro-
tected through a series of civil, political, social, economic, and
cultural rights enumerated in the two Covenants. 50
The ICCPR defines the civil and political rights it aims to
protect, including non-derogable guarantees 51 like recognition
as a person before the law52 and prohibitions against torture53
and deprivation of life.54 Additionally, the ICCPR establishes a
monitoring organ, the Human Rights Committee, which re-
ceives State Party complaints and issues General Comments.55
The ICESCR imposes a duty on States Parties to secure
equal treatment in social and cultural rights, including self-de-
termination,56 adequate living standard, 57 health, 58 family,59 and
49. UDHR, supra note 11, arts. 14, 5.
50. See ICCPR, supra note 39; ICESCR, supra note 40; STEINER & ALSTON, supra
note 9, at 237 (explaining that two Covenants encapsulate provisions of UDHR); Han-
num, supra note 48, at 327 (contending that ICCPR and ICESCR provisions represent
basic human rights norms).
51. See ICCPR, supra note 39, art. 4. Article 4(1) states, in relevant part:
In time of public emergency that threatens the life of the nation and the exis-
tence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present Cove-
nant may take measures derogating from their obligations . . .to the extent
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such mea-
sures are not inconsistent with their obligations under international law.
Id. Article 4(2) lists non-derogable guarantees. Id. See also LAWSON, supra note 9, at
348 (defining derogation as refusal or failure of State Party to fulfill obligation under
treaty).
52. See ICCPR, supra note 39, art. 16. Article 16 states: "Everyone shall have the
right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law." Id.
53. See id. art. 7. Article 7 states: "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In particular; no one shall be sub-
jected without his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation." Id.
54. See id. art. 6(1). Article 6(1) states: "Every human being has an inherent right
to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his
life." Id.
55. See id. part IV. See also MALANczuK, supra note 29, at 215 (asserting that this
reporting system lacks teeth because it can only lead to conciliation attempt and there
is no judicial body entitled to make judicial decision). The various reservations States
Parties make when they accede to the ICCPR further undermine its effective implemen-
tation. Id. Although the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR permits complaints by indi-
viduals, neither the United States nor the UK have ratified it. See United Nations Treaty
Series, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/part
I/chapterIV/treaty6.asp#N8 (citing list of parties which ratified Optional Protocol). See
also Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, G.A. Res. 2200 A (XXI), art. 1 (Dec. 16, 1966).
56. See ICESCR, supra note 40, art. 1. Article 1 states, in relevant part: "All peoples
have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development." Id.
57. See id. art. 11. Article 11 states, in relevant part: "The States Parties to the
present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for
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development.6" The ICESCR does not mandate immediate com-
pliance and the States Parties may aspire to achieve the ICESCR
goals progressively, to the maximum of available resources.61
There is no provision for interstate complaints and the Commit-
tee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ("ICESCR Commit-
tee")6 2 submits annual reports on State Parties' activities to the
U.N. Economic and Social Council ("ECOSOC").63
b. The Refugee Convention and the Refugee Protocol
The Refugee Convention,64 as modified by the Refugee Pro-
toco16 5 provides a definition of refugees, 66 creates exemptions
from the definition, and sets out circumstances when a person
may cease to be a refugee. 67 The Refugee Convention lists a se-
ries of rights to be accorded to refugees, including access to
himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the con-
tinuous improvement of living conditions." Id.
58. See id. art. 12. Article 12 states, in relevant part: "The States Parties to the
present Covenant, recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest at-
tainable standard of physical and mental health." Id.
59. See id. art. 10. Article 10 states, in relevant part: "The widest possible protec-
tion and assistance should be accorded to the family, which is the natural and funda-
mental group unit of society, particularly for its establishment and while it is responsi-
ble for the care and education of dependent children." Id.
60. See id. art. 2.1 (determining that persons in need have claims upon wealthy
nations for assistance)-. Article 2.1 states:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually
and through international assistance and cooperation, especially economic
and technical, to the maximum of available resources, with a view to achieving
progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Cove-
nant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legisla-
tive measures.
Id.
61. See id. art. 2.1.
62. See arts. 16-25 (referring to creation and powers of Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights ("ICESCR Committee").
63. See STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 9, at 248 (discussing ICESCR Committee's
functions); INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 35, at 1014 (noting that functions of
ICESCR Commmittee are substantively similar to those of ICCPR Human Rights Com-
mittee); CLAYrON & TOMLINSON, supra note 8, at 92 (describing functions of ICESCR
Committee); MALANCZUK, supra note 29, at 215-16 (claiming that ICESCR, although
relevant, has been unhelpful in asylum litigation because enforcement mechanisms are
virtually non-existent). The ICESCR merely has a reporting system and is formulated as
a program, not a list of binding obligations. Id.
64. See Refugee Convention, supra note 12, art. I(A).
65. See Refugee Protocol, supra note 13.
66. See Refugee Convention, supra note 12, art. 1(A).
67. See id. art. 1 (D)-(F) (listing persons to whom Convention does not apply).
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courts, 68 employment," and housing," provided that the refu-
gees fully conform to the laws and regulations of their respective
host countries." The Refugee Convention contains an absolute
prohibition against refoulement.72 This prohibition does not ap-
ply to individuals considered dangerous to the security of the
receiving country.73
c. The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
The Torture Convention7 1 obligates States Parties to take ef-
fective measures to prevent torture,7 5 not to expel or return indi-
viduals to States where they are likely to be tortured,76 and to
ensure that all torture constitutes criminal offense under domes-
68. See id. art. 16. Article 16 states, in relevant part: "A refugee shall enjoy in the
Contracting State in which he has habitual residence the same treatment as a national
in matters pertaining to access to the courts, including legal assistance." Id.
69. See id. art. .17. Article 17(1) states: "The Contracting States shall accord to
refugees lawfully staying in their territory the most favorable treatment accorded to
nationals of a foreign country in the same circumstances, as regards the right to engage
in wage-earning employment." Id.
70. See id. art 21. Article 21 states:
As regards housing, the Contracting States, in so far as the matter is regulated
by laws or regulations or is subject to the control of public authorities, shall
accord to refugees lawfully staying in their territory treatment as favorable as
possible and, in any event, not less favorable than that accorded to aliens gen-
erally in the same circumstances.
Id.
71. See id. art. 2. Article 2 states: "Every refugee has duties to the country in which
he finds himself, which require in particular that he conform to its laws and regulations
as well as to measures taken for the maintenance of public order." Id.
72. See id. art. 33(1). See also id. art. 32 (providing reasons for expulsion). Refu-
gees lawfully on States Parties' territories have a right not to be expelled save on
grounds of national security or public order. Id. Even if they are expelled, the expul-
sion process must comply with due process of law, and provide for the possibility of
appeal and representation before a competent authority. 'Id..
73. See id. art. 33(2). Article 33(2) states: "The benefit of the [nonrefoulement] pro-
vision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds
for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having
been convicted by a final judgement of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger
to the community of that country." Id.
74. See Torture Convention, supra note 43.
75. See id. art. 2. Article 2 states, in relevant part: "Each State Party shall take
effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture
in any territory under its jurisdiction." Id.
76. See id. art. 3(1). Article 3(1) states: "No State Party shall expel, return
("refouler) or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds
for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture." Id.
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tic law.77 The Torture Convention defines torture broadly to in-
clude physical and mental pain or suffering78 and all rights
under the Torture Convention are non-derogable v9 The Tor-
ture Convention mandates that States Parties submit reports to
the monitoring Committee against Torture every four years to
demonstrate State compliance.8 °
2. Regional Treaties
The United States is party to the Charter of the Organiza-
tion of American States ("OAS"), 8 which drafted the American
Convention.82 The UK is part of the Council of Europe,8" which
77. See id. arts. 4-7. Articles 4-7 mandate that each State Party ensure that all acts of
torture are offences under its criminal law (art. 4); take necessary measures to establish
jurisdiction over offences related to torture; (art. 5); take violators of Article 4 into
custody (art. 6); and prosecute these violators (art. 7). Id.
78. Id. art. 1. Article 1 defines torture as:
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is inten-
tionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a
third person information or confession, punishing him for an act he or a third
person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or
coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of
any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or
with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in
an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from,
inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.
Id. See also Immigration Officer Academy, Asylum Officer Basic Training, Lesson Two: In-
ternational Human Rights Law, in REFUGEE ASSISTANCE TRAINING, COMMUNITY OUTREACH
LAW PROGRAM, Reader 17 (June 13-14, 2001) [hereinafter Immigration Officer Acad-
emy, Lesson Two] (asserting that because only States are parties to Torture Convention,
definition of torture is limited to severe harm inflicted by officials or individuals acting
in official capacity). For the purposes of determining whether an individual is a refu-
gee, torture may also include acts by non-government actors. Id.
79. See Torture Convention, supra note 43, art. 2(2) (providing that "no excep-
tional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal
political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of
torture").
80. See id. arts. 21-22. Article 21 permits complaints by States against other States.
Id. art. 21. Article 22 allows complaints by individuals against States. Id. art. 22.
81. See LAWSON, supra note 9, at 1112 (defining Organization of American States
("OAS") as regional intergovernmental organization developed out of International
Union of American Republics); STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 9, at 868-69 (indicating
that OAS is part of regional Inter-American human rights system); INTERNATIONAL LAW,
supra note 35, at 1033 (stating that OAS was concerned with human rights since Second
World War).
82. See American Convention, supra note 44.
83. See LAWSON, supra note 9, at 310 (defining Council of Europe as regional inter-
governmental organization which endeavors to promote unity among its members to
facilitate economic and social progress).
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sponsored the drafting of the ECHR.s4 The two regional treaties
play significantly different roles in the United States and the UK
respectively.8 5
a. The American Convention on Human Rights
The American Convention builds upon guarantees embod-
ied in the American Declaration. 6 Unlike either the ICCPR or
the ECHR, the American Convention grants individuals the
right of asylum.8 7 Unlike the ECHR, the American Convention
prohibits refoulement.8 s Additionally, the American Convention
guarantees the rights to life;" freedom from torture and inhu-
mane treatment;9 ° liberty; 1 and fair trial." It grants expanded
84. See ECHR, supra note 45.
85. See MALANCZUK, supra note 29 (referring to OAS as regional system less effec-
tive than European regional model); Cecilia Medina, The Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Reflections on a Joint Venture,
in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 871 (Henry J. Steiner & Philip Alston
eds., 2000) (critiquing Inter-American Commission as ineffective); David Harris, Re-
gional Protection of Human Rights: The Inter-American Achievement, in INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 874 (HenryJ. Steiner & Philip Alston eds., 2000) (outlining
enforcement shortcomings of Inter-American Commission of Human Rights ("Inter-
American Commission") and OAS). Cf Giorgio Sacerdoti, The European Charter of Fun-
damental Rights: From a Nation-State Europe to a Citizens'Europe, 8 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 37-38
(2002) (stating that ECHR was modem Magna Carta of human rights and democracy in
Europe).
86. See American Convention, supra note 44; INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 35, at
1034 (claiming that American Convention is substantially similar to ICCPR). Some
terms of the American Convention are significantly different from the ICCPR, however.
Id. Meanwhile, the American Declaration is substantially similar to the UDHR. Id. The
American Declaration, unlike the UDHR, contains articles pertaining to individuals'
duties to the State. Id.
87. See American Convention, supra note 44, art. 22.7. Article 22.7 states: "Every
person has the right to seek and be granted asylum in a foreign territory, in accordance
with the legislation of the state and international conventions, in the. event he is being
pursued for political offences or related common crimes."! Id.
88. See id. art. 22.8-22.9. Article 22.8 provides:
In no case may an alien be deported or returned to a country, regardless of
whether or not it is his country of origin, if in that country his right to life or
personal freedom is in danger of being violated because of his race, national-
ity, religion, social status, or political opinions.
Id. art. 22.8. Article 22.9 states: "The collective expulsion of aliens is prohibited." Id.
art. 22.9.
89. See id. art. 4. Article 4 provides, in relevant part: "Every person has the right to
have his life respected. The right shall be protected by law and, in general, from the
moment of conception. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life." Id.
90. See id. art. 5(1)-(2). Article 5(1) provides: "Every person has the right to have
his physical, mental, and moral integrity respected." Id. Article 5(2) states: "No one
shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment or treat-
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authority to the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights
9 3
to review State violations of the American Convention and the
American Declaration.94
b. The European Convention for the Protections of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
The ECHR9 5  is the first comprehensive international
human rights treaty ever drafted.96 The rights granted by the
ECHR include, in Article 3, a non-derogable guarantee against
torture, and inhuman and degrading treatment or punish-
ment.97 The guarantee has a broader scope than the Refugee
Convention right because it does not require mistreatment
ment. All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with respect for the inherent
dignity of the human person." Id.
91. See id. art. 7 (declaring that every person has right to personal liberty and se-
curity). Article 7(3) guarantees that no one shall be subject to arbitrary arrest or im-
prisonment. Id. Articles 7(4)-(7) ensure due process in detention. Id.
92. See id. art. 8 (declaring that everyone has right to presumption of innocence
and to be heard by independent and impartial tribunal).
93. See id. arts. 33-51 (establishing Inter-American Commission and detailing its
functions and procedures); STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 9, at 871 (commenting on
development of Inter-American system); INTERNATIONAL Law, supra note 35, at 1035
(stating that Inter-American Commission was created in 1960 and elevated to status of
organ in 1970). The Inter-American Commission still reflects the tension between its
activist and judicial roles. Id. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights ("Inter-
American Court") is the second organ responsible for States' Parties' adherence to the
American Convention. Id. at 1035-36.
94. See Medina, supra note 85, at 871 (analyzing how Inter-American Commission
functions); Harris, supra note 85, at 874 (outlining Commission's and OAS's enforce-
ment mechanisms). See also INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 35, at 1035-36 (stating that
United States never recognized jurisdiction of Inter-American Court); American Con-
vention, supra note 44, art. 62 (declaring that State Party may recognize jurisdiction of
Inter-American Court on case-by-case basis). Id.
95. See ECHR, supra note 45.
96. See STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 9, at 786 (explaining that ECHR is very im-
portant in development of human rights law because it preceded UDHR and was first
treaty to establish international complaints procedure and international court); INTER-
NATIONAL LAw, supra note 35, at 1026 (noting that ECHR established more comprehen-
sive and often more effective human rights program than that of U.N.); Clive Walker &
Russell L. Weaver, The United Kingdom Bill of Rights 1998: The Modernization of Rights in
the Old World, 33 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 497, 504 (2000) (claiming that ECHR is most
important instrument of international law to emanate from Council of Europe).
97. See ECHR, supra note 45, art. 3. A number of cases have analyzed the mean-
ings of terms "torture," "inhuman treatment or punishment," and "degrading treat-
ment or punishment." See e.g., Soering v. UK, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 439, para. 88 (1989);
Chahal v. UK, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 413, para. 79 (1987); Ireland v. UK, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep.
25 (1979).
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based on the five enumerated grounds.9" The decision in D v.
UK showed that the touchstone of the conduct prohibited by
Article 3 is interference with human dignity.99 Other provisions
of the ECHR include the right to life;1 °° the right to liberty, in-
cluding freedom from unlawful detention;" 1 the right to a fair
trial;10 2 and respect for private and family life.' 0  The machinery
supervising implementation of the ECHR consists of the Euro-
pean Commission of Human Rights ("European Commis-
98. See ECHR, supra note 45, art. 3. Cf Refugee Convention, supra note 12. See
also Alison Stanley, Safe Harbour-The Effects the New Legislation Will Have on Immigration
Issues, 97 LAw SOCIETYs GAZETEr 32 (2000) (claiming that otherwise well-founded ap-
plicant can be excluded from protection of Refugee Convention on number of
grounds). The Refugee Convention includes special persecution criteria, procedural
requirements for assessment of risk of ill treatment, and prohibition on dilution of
protection by exclusion or derogation. Id.; Walker & Weaver, supra note 96, at 506
(explaining that number of Article 3 cases initiated profound changes in UK law).
99. See 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 423 (1997) (showing that Article 3 is violated by sending
gravely ill person to country where there is no adequate health provision). There is an
absolute prohibition on expulsion of a convicted drugs smuggler, suffering from termi-
nal stages of AIDS, where medical facilities to permit him to die in dignity are unavaila-
ble in his homeland. Id. See also East African Asians v. UK, 3 Eur. H.R. Rep. 76 (1981)
(showing that discrimination on basis of race can amount to violation of Article 3);
Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. UK, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 471 (1985) (showing that
serious discrimination on grounds of race, sex, or, potentially, sexual orientation can
amount to degrading treatment within meaning of Article 3); Chahal v. UK, 23 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 413, para. 78 (1987) (holding that once ECHR Article 3 risk is shown, State
may not refoul individual). The State cannot take into account any balancing issues,
such as risk to public order or the individual's immigration history. Id.
100. See ECHR, supra note 45, art. 2 (stating that everyone's right to life is pro-
tected by law).
101. See id. art. 5.1 (requiring that power to detain must be clear, precise, and
foreseeable). States must put in place adequate safeguards against arbitrary detention
and give proper reasons for detention. Id. There should be a presumption of liberty
and a speedy and effective right of review, with legal assistance where necessary. Id.
102. See id. art. 6. Article 6 ensures a fair public trial, presumption of innocence,
and a right to legal counsel. Id. See also INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 35, at 1030
(noting that Article 6 claims come before European Court of Human Rights ("Euro-
pean Court") frequently). In response to Article 6 challenges, the European Court has
found that any unreasonable delays in trial violate Article 6(1). Id.; Stanley, supra note
98, at 32 (stating that to date, European Court ruled that immigration rights do not
raise issues under Article 6).
103. See ECHR, supra note 45, art. 8 (proclaiming, in relevant part, that everyone
has right to respect for his private and family life, home, and correspondence). See also
Stanley, supra note 98, at 32 (explaining that Article 8 guarantee is particularly useful in
cases of deportation or removal and family reunion). Article 8 rights are not absolute
and the State can justify a breach under Article 8(2), where doing so is necessary for the
prevention of disorder or crime. Id.
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sion");1° 4 the European Committee of Ministers; 11 5 and the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights ("European Court").1 °6
3. International Custom
Critics assert that international custom shapes the core of
international human rights law.' 07 Custom often forms the basis
for treaties, while treaties sometimes give birth to custom. 108
The right to seek asylum and freedom from torture are recog-
nized principles of international customary law. 10 9
104. See ECHR, supra note 45, arts. 20-37 (describing set up and functions of Euro-
pean Commission).
105. See id. art. 32 (describing set up of European Committee of Ministers). The
Committee of Ministers decides by two-thirds vote whether there is a violation of the
ECHR and this decision is binding on States parties. Id.
106. See id. arts. 38-56 (describing functions of European Court). Complaints by
individuals and States first come before the Commission. See id. arts. 27-30. See also
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 35, at 1029 (charting in detail enforcement mecha-
nisms under ECHR); STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 9, at 797-801 (commenting on
structure of European regional system and recent reform). If the Commission's at-
tempt to reach a friendly settlement fails, the Commission may transmit a report of its
opinion on the case to the Council of Ministers or the European Court. See ECHR,
supra note 45, arts. 30-31, 47-48. Articles 30-31 explain how the European Commission
refers reports to the Committee of Ministers. Id. Articles 47-48 outline European
Court's jurisdiction. Id.
107. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 30, § 102 (2) (defining opinio juris);
CLARK, supra note 9, at 147 (explaining that opinio juris requires establishment of spe-
cific practice and subjective belief by States that this practice is part of legal obligation).
See also Politics of Law-Making, supra note 16, at 21 (explaining that process of making
customary international law is informal, haphazard, even partly unintentional and at
Worst, consent and acquiescence can be bought by political pressure or other circum-
stances); Future of International Law, supra note 27, at 552 (arguing that although tradi-
tionally customary law is made over time on basis of opinio juris, today's customary law
no longer results from long practice, but can be made purposefully and quickly).
108. See STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 9, at 71 (claiming that treaties and custom
are complexly interrelated). There is often a question regarding the extent to which a
treaty should be read in the light of a pre-existing custom. Id. Moreover, treaties may
provide foundation for developing customary international law. Id. at 72; REUTER,
supra note 34, at 139 (explaining that while treaties contribute to emergence of custom-
ary international law, custom may be embodied in treaties).
109. See STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 9,- at 69-71 (remarking that right to seek
asylum amounts to customary norm); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir.
1980) (holding that torture is renounced by international consensus that recognizes
basic human rights); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 775 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (stating that international law confers fundamental right upon all people to be
free from torture).
2002] ALIENATING "HUMAN" FROM "RIGHT" 1355
B. Application of International Human Rights Law in the United
States and the United Kingdom
Under international law, every treaty is binding upon the
parties to it.l a° International custom is binding upon all na-
tions.1 11 At the same time, States may adopt declarations, 112 un-
derstandings,1 13 and reservations"' to limit treaty application. 115
Nations may opt out of a developing international custom by
clearly and consistently indicating their intent not to be bound
to it.",
1. The United States
In the United States, self-executing international treaties
form part of domestic law. 17 The Refugee Convention and the
Torture Convention are the human rights treaties of most signif-
icance to asylum seekers in this country.1 1 8 Critics agree that the
110. See Vienna Convention, supra note 37, arts. 24-25; VALLAT, supra note 16, at 5
(stating that any deficiency in domestic law will not excuse treaty breach); CLARK, supra
note 9, at 14 (stating that treaties, once ratified, involve legally binding obligations);
KLABBERS, supra note 37, at 2 (stating that treaties are considered relatively clear and
reliable source of international law).
111. See Politics of Law-Making, supra note 16, at 18 (explaining that all nations
accept some international customary law as price of membership in international soci-
ety). International customary law provides nations with a number of benefits: it keeps
international society running, contributes to order and stability, and provides a basis for
common enterprise. Id.; VALtAT, supra note 16, at 5 (explaining that international law
is potentially binding on all nations).
112. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 30, § 313 cmt. g (defining declarations).
113. See id. (defining understandings).
114. See id. § 313 cmt. a (defining reservations).
115. See id. § 313 cmts. See also STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 9, at 106-07 (stating
that traditional treaty rules require acceptance by all parties). Pervasive lack of unanim-
ity with regard to international human rights treaties raises the question of their valid-
ity. Id.
116. See id. § 313 cmt. d (stating that in principle State that indicates its dissent
from practice while law is still in development is not bound by that rule of law even after
it matures); INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 35, at 66 (explaining that States may opt
out of developing international customary law obligation).
117. See Lillich, supra note 34, at 368 (explaining that self-executing treaty when
implemented by Congress supercedes all inconsistent state and local laws); PARTAN,
supra note 12, at 224-25 (referring to Vienna Convention on Treaties to conclude that
treaties are binding legal instruments); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 30, § 102 cmt.
f (stating that treaties may create obligations enforceable domestically and may contrib-
ute to customary international law).
118. See Immigration Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified in
various sections of 8 U.S.C.) [hereinafter 1980 Act] (codifying Refugee Convention via
Refugee Protocol into U.S. law); Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998,
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United States is bound to respect customary right to seek asylum
and freedom from torture. 119
a. Status of International Law
The United States Constitution provides that international
treaties are part of the "supreme law" of the land.120  The caveat
is whether a particular treaty is self-executing. 121  Whether a
Pub. L. 105-227, § 2242(b) [hereinafter Foreign Affairs Act of 1998] (adopting Torture
Convention into U.S. law).
119. See Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (holding that international
custom can form part of U.S. domestic law); Beth Stephens, The Law of Our Land: Cus-
tomary International Law as Federal Law After Erie, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 393, 394 (1997)
(arguing that customary international law is part of U.S. law); RESTATEMENT (THIRD),
supra note 30, § 102(2) (stating that customary international law results from general
and consistent practice of States (generality) followed by them from sense of legal obli-
gation (opiniojuris)). See also STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 9, at 69-71 (remarking that
right to seek asylum is customary norm which all nations should abide by); Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that torture is universally re-
nounced by international consensus that recognizes basic human rights); Tel-Oren v.
Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (stating that international law
confers fundamental right to be free from torture); VALLAT, supra note 16, at 5 (ex-
plaining that international legal norms are binding on States and any deficiencies in
domestic law do not excuse parties from breach).
120. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (stating that "all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding"). Article II, section 2 of the U.S.
Constitution qualifies article VI by providing that ratification by two-thirds of the Senate
is necessary to authorize the President to enter into international treaties. See U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 2. See also Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Laughing at Treaties, 99 COLUM. L.
REv. 2154 (1999) (arguing that text, structure, and doctrine of Constitution clearly con-
fer on treaties status of domestic law); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 30, § 111 (stat-
ing that courts in United States are bound to give effect to international law and inter-
national agreements, except that non-self-executing agreements will not be given effect
of law in absence of necessary implementation).
121. See STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 9, at 1025 (defining self-executing treaties
as treaties that create individual legal rights and obligations enforceable in U.S. courts
without legislative implementation). Treaties that require implementing legislation are
considered non-self-executing, and are not enforceable in U.S. courts until Congress
passes legislation to implement them. Id. See also Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130
U.S. 581, 600 (1889) (holding that self-executing treaties can be deemed equivalent of
legislative acts). The last expression of sovereign will must control. Id.; Foster v. Neil-
son, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829) (determining that self-executing treaties are equivalent to
legislative acts); Lillich, supra note 34, at 368 (stating that treaties that are self-executing
are considered federal law and trump prior inconsistent statutes under last-in-time prin-
ciple); Martin S. Flaherty, History Right7 : Historical Scholarship, Original Understanding,
and Treaties as "Supreme Law of the Land", 99 COLUM. L. REv. 2095 (1999) (arguing that
careful examination of history shows that framers intended treaties to be self-execut-
ing). Cf John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the
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treaty is self-executing depends on the intent of the parties;
whether the treaty terms address obligations to the legislature or
require legislative action; and whether the treaty confers a cause
of action on the individual seeking its enforcement. 122
The United States Constitution does not specifically men-
tion custom as the supreme law of the land. 123 Critics claim that
U.S. courts are bound to construe domestic statutes consistently
with international obligations where there is no conflicting
treaty, judicial precedent, or controlling executive or legislative
act. 12 4 Generally, U.S. courts consider international law when
adjudicating asylum seekers' claims. 125
Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 1955 (1999) (contesting view that treaties are
generally self-executing and enforceable).
122. See RESTATEMENT (THimRD), supra note 30, § 111 (stating that international
agreements of United States are not self-executing if they manifest intention not to
become effective as domestic law without implementing legislation; or if Senate, Con-
gress, or Constitution require implementing legislation); see also § 111 cmt. h (provid-
ing that intention of United States determines whether agreement is self-executing). If
the intention of the United States is unclear, the Senate's or congressional expression
must be taken into account. Id. See also STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 9, at 1026 (stat-
ing that specific types of treaties have traditionally been understood to be self-execut-
ing). Examples include bilateral treaties giving reciprocal rights to nationals of each
country. Id. Certain treaties cannot be self-executing and require implementing legis-
lation to become law of land. Id. See generally Carlos Manuel Vasquez, The Four Doctrines
of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM.J. INT'L L. 695 (1995) (arguing that separation of powers
concerns trigger designation of treaty as self-executing).
123. See U.S. CONST. art. VI.
124. See Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700 (contending that U.S. courts should pay
deference to international obligations); Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 117-18 (1804)
(holding that ambiguous statute must be interpreted so as to comply with international
law); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964) (confirming that
international law is federal law). See also Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States
Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and its Progeny, 100 HAiv. L. REv. 853, 865-66
(1987) (noting how incorporation of international law into U.S. domestic law has roots
in corresponding status of international law in English law and law of American Colo-
nies); Stephens, supra note 119, at 393 (arguing that international law is federal law and
thus enforceable in federal courts and binding on all states).
125. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880-81 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating that
where there is no treaty or controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision,
customs and usages of civilized nations become point of reference). The works ofju-
rists and commentators are evidence of these sources of law. Id. The United Nations
Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status Under Refugee Convention
and Refugee Protocol Relating to Status of Refugees (" UN. Refugee Handbook") has been cited
in numerous court decisions. See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987);
Perkovic v. INS, 33 F.3d 615 (6th Cir. 1994); Aguirre-Aguirre v. INS, 121 F.3d 521 (9th
Cir. 1997); Matter of Acosta, 19 I.&N. Dec. 211 (BIA 1985). See also Immigration Of-
ficer Academy, Lesson Two, supra note 78, at 6 (stating that U.S. courts consider gui-
dance provided by UNHCR). Moreover, the Attorney General mandated through regu-
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b. Treaty Obligations
The United States is bound to comply with the UDHR provi-
sions, by virtue of the UDHR's alleged status as customary inter-
national law. 126 The United States is a party to the ICCPR with
an explicit understanding that the Covenant is not self-execut-
ing.127 It is not a party to the ICSECR 1 28
The U.S. Immigration Act of 1980 ("1980 Act") codified the
Refugee Convention, as modified by the Refugee Protocol, into
domestic law. 129 It thus adopted the Refugee Convention's defi-
lation that all Asylum Officers be instructed in international human rights law. See 8
C.F.R. § 208(b) (creating Asylum Corps, corps of professional asylum officers who must
receive special training in international human rights law); Immigration Officer Acad-
emy, Asylum Officer Basic Training Course: Eligibility Part I, in REFUGEE ASSISTANCE TRAIN-
ING, COMMUNITY OUTREACH LAw PROGRAM, Reader 10, 13-14 (June 13-14, 2001) [herein-
after Immigration Officer Academy, Eligibility Part I] (instructing Asylum Officers to use
UNHCR Handbook as guide in determining asylum seekers' nationality, multiple nation-
alities, or statelessness as well as in defining what constitutes persecution); Immigration
Officer Academy, Asylum Officer Basic Training Course, Asylum Eligibility Part II: Well-
Founded Fear, in REFUGEE ASSISTANCE TRAINING, COMMUNITY OUTREACH LAW PROGRAM,
Reader 5-6 (June 13-14, 2001) [hereinafter Asylum Eligibility Part III (citing UNHCR
Handbook in determining whether asylum seeker's fear is well-founded).
126. See Lillich, supra note 34, at 54 (stating that UNHCR contributes to under-
standing of customary international law and is generally considered part of interna-
tional law); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 30, § 701 cmt. d (asserting that it is in-
creasingly accepted that States Parties to Charter are legally obligated to respect some
rights recognized in UDHR). Cf. Noam Chomsky, The United States and the Challenge of
Relativity, in HUMAN RIGHTS FIFY YEARS ON: A REAPPRAISAL 24, 24-58 (Tony Evans ed.,
1998) (critiquing persistent U.S. violations of number of UDHR provisions).
127. See STEINER & ALSTON, Supra note 9, at 1043-44 (citing extensive debates sur-
rounding ratification of ICCPR including Senate hearings; proposals by Bush adminis-
tration; and effects of reservations); Evans, supra note 16, at 11 (stating that U.S. ratified
ICCPR after years of procrastination and with many reservations, understandings, and
declarations).
128. See STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 9, at 1033 (indicating that there has never
been sustained debate in Senate or broader political arena about participation in
ICESCR); Chomsky, supra note 126, at 32-33 (stating that U.S. representative to U.N.
Commission for Human Rights emphasized in 1990 that civil and political rights are
U.S. priority and claimed that certain economic and social rights are preposterous,
empty vessels and even dangerous incitement).
129. See 1980 Act, supra note 118. See also Immigration Officer Academy, Overview
of the Asylum Process, in REFUGEE ASSISTANCE TRAINING, COMMUNITY OUTREACH LAW PRO-
GRAM, Reader 6-7 (June 13-14, 2001) [hereinafter Immigration Officer Academy, Over-
view of the Asylum Process] (listing number of regulatory bodies established in years be-
tween issuance of Interim and Final Regulations for implementing 1980 Act). These
included Central Office Refugee, Asylum and Parole Division ("CORAP") that oversees
adjudication of asylum applications, and Asylum Policy and Review Unit ("APRU") that
reviews certain asylum decisions forwarded by District Directors. Id.
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nition of a refugee and made nonrefoulement mandatory.13 ° The
U.S. statute modified the Convention definition, however, recog-
nizing refugee Status based on past persecution;13 persecution
on account of opposition to a coercive population control pro-
gram; 132 and included persons within a country of nationality or
last habitual residence.1 33 At the same time, the definition con-
tained mandatory bars to refugee status.1 3 1
The Torture Convention furnishes an independent form of
relief for asylum seekers in the United States. 135  The United
States consented to the Torture Convention with a significant
130. See 1980 Act, supra note 118.
131. See INA, § 101(a) (42) (B), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (42) (B). See also Arthur C.
Helton, Criteria and Procedures for Refugee Protection in the United States, in PRACTICING LAW
INSTITUTE, CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 1231-50 (2001)
(describing in detail steps in proving refugee status). Cf Refugee Convention, supra
note 12, art. 1, paras. (C)5-6, (focusing on well-founded fear of future persecution
only).
132. See INA, § 101(a)(42) (B), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). The provision reads:
a person who has been forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo involuntary
sterilization, or who has been persecuted for failure or refusal to undergo such
a procedure or for other resistance to a coercive population control program,
shall be deemed to have been persecuted on account of political opinion, and
a person who has a well-founded fear that he or she will be forced to undergo
such a procedure or subject to persecution for such failure, refusal or resis-
tance shall be deemed to have a well-founded fear of persecution on account
of political opinion.
Id. This provision was-added in 1996 by § 601 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, amending
various sections of 8 U.S.C. [hereinafter IIRIRA].
133. See INA, § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). Cf Refugee Conven-
tion, supra note 12, art. 1(A) (defining refugee only as person outside of his or her
country of last habitual residence).
134. See INA, § 101(a) (42) (A)', 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (stating that refugee
does not include any person who ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in
persecution of any person on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in par-
ticular social group or political opinion). See also INA, § 241(b) (3), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(b) (3) (listing classes of persons ineligible for withholding of removal). These
include persons who have participated in persecution of others; persons who have been
convicted of especially serious crime and constitute a danger to the United States com-
munity; persons who committed a serious non-political crime outside of the United
States; and persons who can reasonably be regarded 'as security risks to the United
States. Id. See generally Mark R. von Sternberg, Outline of Asylum Law for Presentation at
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, in REFUGEE ASSISTANCE TRAINING, COMMU-
NITY OUTREACH LAw PROGRAM, Reader 27-32 (une 13-14, 2001) (discussing ineligible
classes).
135. See Foreign Affairs Act of 1998, supra note 118 (adopting Torture Convention
into U.S. law). See also Dep't of Justice, Interim Regulation, 64 FED. REG. 8478 (1999)
(permitting individuals to seek relief under Torture Convention); von Sternberg, supra
note 134, at 32-34 (discussing Torture Convention as source of relief).
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understanding regarding the standard of proof."3 6 An asylum
seeker qualifies for this type of relief upon showing that it is
more likely than not that she will be tortured upon return to a
particular country.137
Although the United States has not ratified the American
Convention, commentators argue that the American Convention
clarifies obligations of all Parties to the OAS.138 The American
Commission is one of the few bodies which actually undertakes
criticizing the United States.13 9 Experts discuss that the reviews
of the American Commission have little effect on the U.S. asy-
lum activity or policy today.
140
2. The United Kingdom
Unlike the United States' monist approach to international
human rights treaties, the UK has a dualist approach. 141 The
136. See 136 CONG. REC. at S17, 491-92 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (understanding
phrase "where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of
being subjected to torture" in Article 3 to mean "if it is more likely than not that he will
be tortured"). See also U.S. Dep't of Justice, Operating Polocies and Procedures Memoran-
dum No. 99-5: Implementation of Article 3 of the UN Convention Against Torture, in REFUGEE
ASSISTANCE TRAINING, COMMUNITY OUTREACH LAw PROGRAM, Reader 27-32 (June 13-14,
2001) (introducing Torture Convention and requirements for claim under it).
137. See Foreign Affairs Act of 1998, supra note 118; STEINER & ALSTON, supra note
9, at 1048 (stating what is required to qualify for relief); INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note
35, at 1033-34 (noting that American States are legally bound to respect rights of indi-
vidual and principles of universal morality as enunciated in American Charter and clari-
fied in American Convention).
138. See STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 9, at 869 (stating that American Convention
binds United States). Moreover, the American Declaration may be binding on the
United States as incorporated through the American Charter or as an indication of
customary international law. Id. See also Holly Dawn Jarmul, The Effect of Decisions of
Regional Human Rights Tribunals on National Courts, 28 N.Y.UJ. INT'L L. & POL'Y 311,
311-12 (1996) (outlining obligations of States Parties of OAS).
139. See Christina M. Cerna, International Law in the Americas: Rethinking National
Sovereignty in an Age of Regional Integration, 19 Hous. J. INT'L L. 731, 737 (1997) (stating
that United States is subject to jurisdiction of Inter-American Commission); Schuck,
supra note 19, at 1 (showing that U.S. asylum practices are influenced by regional mi-
gratory pressures). The social and political conditions in Central and South America
created a vast pool of poor and unemployed migrants headed for United States. Id.
140. See Cerna, supra note 139, at 737 (explaining that U.S. position in OAS is
atypical because it is superpower); Jarmul, supra note 138, at 311 (concluding that OAS
has not been effective in enforcement of its provisions in Member States, including
United States). See also Politics of Law-Making, supra note 16, at 18 (stating that interna-
tional human rights law must resort to different enforcement mechanisms than other
areas of law). These mechanisms include naming and shaming. Id.
141. See VALLAT, supra note 16, at 8-9 (stating that ratification of treaty in UK is
purely executive act, which requires no legislative authority and is prerogative of
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human rights treaties of greatest significance in the UK are the
Refugee Convention and the ECHR. 42 The UK courts consider
international customary law, which does not conflict with pre-
existing domestic legislation. 14 3
a. Status of International Law in the UK
Under UK domestic law, every international human rights
treaty requires ratification and enabling legislation to become
the law of the land. 4 4 Generally, the UKjudiciary will consider
international customary law when terms of a domestic statute are
ambiguous, common law is uncertain, and court discretion or
public policy is involved.145 Experts agree that the UK recog-
Crown). This approach is called "dualist" approach. Id. See also CLAYrON & TOMLINSON,
supra note 8, at 59-61 (discussing implementation of human rights instruments into
domestic law in UK); STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 9, at 1004-05 (contrasting monist
and dualist systems).
142. See Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993 (Eng.); Human Rights Act
1998 (Eng.) [hereinafter HRA]. See also CLAYrON & TOMLINSON, supra note 8, at 96
(asserting that ECHR is most pertinent document in UK human rights litigation). As of
June 30, 2000, UK appeared as respondent in 115 ECHR-based complaints. Id. at 74-75.
The UK also ratified the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhu-
man Treatment or Punishment ("European Torture Convention"), which aims to pre-
vent breaches of ECHR Article 3 by obligating the UK to permit visits to detention sites.
Id. The European Committee for Prevention of Torture and Inhuman Treatment or
Punishment submits reports alleging UK violations, to which the UK must respond in
writing. Id. See generally Sacerdoti, supra note 85, at 37-38 (stating that ECHR was first
international treaty providing for collective enforcement of number of human rights set
out in UDHR).
143. See Walker & Weaver, supra note 96, at 510 (discussing rule that UKjudges
prefer interpretation of issues that renders English law compliant with international
law); MACDONALD & BLAKE, supra note 4, at 42 (remarking that peculiar feature of UK
immigration law is that large proportion of it is administered by exercise of discretion);
VALLAT, supra note 16, at 4 (stating that principles of international customary law are
potentially binding on all nations).
144. See Vallat, supra note 16, at 8-9 (claiming that both ratification and enabling
legislation are necessary to give treaty force of law); STEPHEN GROSZ ET AL., HUMAN
RIGHTS: THE 1998 ACT AND THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION 1 (2000) (explaining necessity
of legislative requirement to give treaties in UK force of law). See also Walker & Weaver,
supra note 96, at 520 (discussing that British constitutional theory stresses concept of
Crown prerogative and parliamentary sovereignty rather than popular sovereignty of
rights).
145. See CLAYTON & TOMLINSON, supra note 8, at 70-71 (showing that attempts to
comply with international legal obligations may bring about executive actions, legisla-
tion, or various kinds of administrative measures). The ECHR, for instance, is consist-
ently used as a common law aid; a tool in statutory construction; a regulation of court
and administrative discretionary power; and a guide to public policy. Id. at 74-75;
Walker & Weaver, supra note 96, at 509-11 (maintaining that international law may
bring about new legislation and can assist in statutory interpretation); MACDONALD &
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nizes the international right to seek asylum and freedom from
torture.
146
b. Treaty Obligations
The UK is subject to the provisions of the UDHR by virtue
of the UDHR's status as customary international law.1 47 It is a
signatory to the ICCPR and the ICESCR, but neither Covenant
has a significant effect on UK domestic litigation. 14  The UK
Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993 ("1993 Act") incor-
porated the Refugee Convention, as modified by the Refugee
Protocol, into UK law, adopting the refugee definition without
modifications and acceding to the principle of nonrefoulement.'49
The UK consented to the Torture Convention with a number of
BLAKE, supra note 4, at 1 (asserting that conventions not incorporated into UK law
affect domestic legislation in varying degrees).
146. See GRosz, supra note 144, at 188-90 (discussing possibility of bringing asylum
claim); RICHARD GORDON Q.C. & TIM WARD, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS
AcT 56, 58, 66, 106 (2000) (discussing asylum claims adjudication in UK);John Fitzpat-
rick, Flight From Asylum: Trends Toward Temporary "Refugee" and Local Responses to Forced
Migrations, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 13, 14 (1994) (claiming that regionalization of UK law
brings into single framework previously disparate mechanisms concerning foreign pol-
icy, national security, justice, and home affairs). In this new framework, immigration
and asylum issues figure prominently. Id.
147. See VALLAT, supra note 16, at 5 (showing that international customary obliga-
tions are binding on UK courts); CLAYrON & TOMLINSON, supra note 8, at 90-91 (discuss-
ing role of UDHR in UK law); Walker & Weaver, supra note 96, at 510 (claiming that
UK judiciary makes effort to interpret domestic laws consistently with international
norms).
148. See CLAYrON & TOMLINSON, supra note 8, at 91 (noting that ICCPR is little
known to legal profession in UK and in 1984 UK government representative to U.N.
Human Rights Committee could not identify single case in which British courts re-
ferred to Covenant). Since then, the ICCPR was cited more frequently but almost with-
out impact, except for the Article 14(6) guarantee that in the event of a miscarriage of
justice the Secretary of State shall pay compensation to the victim. Id. Courts have
notably cited Article 7 (prohibition against torture), Article 14(1) (right to a full and
fair public hearing), and Article 26 (right to equal protection of law), but in conjunc-
tion with the UDHR. Id. at 92. Critics believe that the ICCPR will likely become impor-
tant with regard to rights not included in the ECHR, such as Article 13 (right of aliens
to be expelled lawfully); Article 14(5). (right of appeal and prohibition of double jeop-
ardy); and Article 26 (right to equal protection of the law and non-discrimination). Id.;
Walker & Weaver, supra note 96, at 505 (stating that prime protectors of human rights
in UK remain national and to extent, regional, rule-making authorities).
149. See Immigration Act 1993, supra note 142, § 2 (emphasizing that Refugee
Convention definitions remain as guide); see also Immigration Rules, part 11, para. 327
(providing that asylum applicant is person who claims that it would be contrary to UK's
obligations under Refugee Convention and Refugee Protocol to remove him). See gener-
ally MACDONALD & BLAKE, supra note 4, at 16-17 (discussing beneficial changes for asy-
lum seekers' rights contained in Immigration Act 1993).
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understandings and reservations, including a refusal to recog-
nize the Committee's competence to receive individual com-
plaints.150
Unlike the United States, which has largely ignored the
American Convention, 15 1 the UK has been highly receptive to its
obligations under the ECHR.152 Scholars opine that while the
terms of other human rights treaties remain -largely unknown in
the UK,15 3 the ECHR has played a major role in the UK gener-
ally, and in asylum adjudication specifically.154 Scholars opine
that the ECHR's significance reflects the regionalization of UK
asylum law and policy, as. introduced by the Treaty of the Euro-
pean Union ("Maastricht Treaty").
150. See United Nations Treaty Collection, Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, available at http://untreaty.un.org/
ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partl/chapterV/treatyl 2.asp (showing UK un-
derstandings and reservations). See also CLAYrON & TOMLINSON, supra note 8, at 96
(highlighting fact that UK authorized Committee to receive interstate complaints
under Article 21, but not individual complaints under Article 22).
151. See Cerna, supra note 139, at 737 (explaining lack of U.S. compliance under
OAS enforcement mechanisms); Jarmul, supra note 138, at 311 (remarking that OAS
has not effectively enforced Inter-American agreements among Member States, includ-
ing United States). See also Politics of Law-Making, supra note 16, at 18 (stating that
international human rights law resorts to specific enforcement techniques not common
in other areas of law).
152. See ECHR, supra note 45. See also MAcDONALD & BLAKE, supra note 4, at 455
(remarking on great importance ECHR plays in UK litigation); CLAYTON & TOMLINSON,
supra note 8, at 70 (asserting that ECHR is only treaty which had significant impact in
UK domestic courts even before enactment of HRA); MALANCZUK, supra note 29, at 219
(stating that ECHR is most sophisticated and practically advanced international system
in protection of human rights).
153. See CLAYTON & TOMLINSON, supra note 8, at 147-49. (remarking that human
rights treaties are generally not reflected in UK legislation or in court, and many are
promulgated under aegis of U.N.). The enactment of the HRA encouraged the UK
government to re-examine its existing human rights obligations, particularly under the
European Torture Convention, and to reconsider ratification of other human rights
instruments. Id. The government has focused particular attention on granting an indi-
vidual petition right under the ICCPR's Optional Protocol and the European Torture
Convention. Id. See also MAcDONALD & BLAKE, supra note 4, at 455 (remarking that
other international treaties are relatively unknown in UK).
154. See GRosz, supra note 144, at 188-90 (providing detailed look at ECHR, as
incorporated into -UK law by HRA, and addressing asylum specifically); GORDON &
WARD, supra note 146, at 56, 58, 66, 106 (addressing changes HRA brings to practice of
public law generally and nature ofjudicial review of asylum claims specifically); Walker
& Weaver, supra note 96, at 505-12 (explaining that while potential for invocation of
ECHR is tremendous, several considerations limited ECHR's actual use).
155. See Treaty establishing the European Community, O.J. C 340/3 (1997), incor-
porating changes made by Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union,
the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts, Oct. 2,
1364 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 25:1335
The Human Rights Act 1998 ("HRA") incorporated the
ECHR into UK law.1 56 The HRA became the only human rights
treaty to give individual UK citizens a right of petition. 157 Com-
mentators assert that the enactment of HRA heralded a human
rights-oriented approach in UK immigration and asylum deci-
sion-making and policies. 15 8 It allowed adjudication of human
rights by reference to a set of defined principles in a country
1997, O.J. C 340/1 (1997) [hereinafter Maastricht Treaty]. See also Dieter Kugelmann
Mainz, The Maastricht Treaty and the Design of a European Federal State, 8 TEMP. INT'L &
CoMP. L.J. 335 (1994) (describing Maastricht Treaty's aspirations). The Maastricht
Treaty established the policy that asylum matters were of common interest to all Euro-
pean Union Members and the Amsterdam Treaty transferred significant legislative and
judicial powers over asylum law and policy to Community competence. Id.; MAcDON-
ALD & BLAKE, supra note 4, at 9-10 (discussing that Maastricht Treaty was part of Mem-
ber States' quest for cooperation in creating common visa policy, common external
frontiers, and coordination in immigration rules and procedures); Owers & Garlick,
supra note 17, at 203 (claiming that UK's asylum law and policy formed part of burden-
sharing arrangements for managing refugee flows through Fortress Europe). See gener-
ally John J. Kavanagh, Attempting to Run Before Learning to Walk: Problems of the EU's Com-
mon Foreign and Security Policy, 20 B.C. INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 353 (1997) (critiquing EU's
common system); MACDONALD & BLAKE, supra note 4, at 10 (describing how, since their
inception, regional EU procedures are consistently challenged because States reach in-
ter-governmental agreements outside auspices of Community institutions). Although
the provisions of inter-governmental agreements are part of domestic law in some
Member States, they are not so in the UK. Id. In the UK, they are not susceptible to
domestic court review, and threaten to circumvent the absolute protection of nonrefoule-
ment and the effective asylum status on State-crafted terms. Id.
156. See HRA, supra note 142, §§ 2, 3(1), 8, 8(4). HRA section 2 provides that, to
the extent possible, the HRA must be read and given effect in a way compatible with the
ECHR. Id. § 2. HRA section 3(1) intimates that because there is no doctrine of prece-
dent in the UK, the decisions interpreting the ECHR are not binding on the UK domes-
tic courts. Id. § 3(1). HRA section 8 provides that although the HRA does not extend
to cases where both parties are private, courts still comply with the ECHR, including by
interpreting statutes in accordance with section 3(1) and by considering common law.
Id. § 8. HRA section 8(4) provides that the UK courts have the same remedies under
the HRA as under the ECHR. Id. § 8(4).
157. See id. § 7 (showing that anyone, if they are victim, as defined in decisions
under ECHR, may bring proceedings against public authority on ECHR grounds alone
and may rely on any ECHR rights in any legal proceedings). See also CLAYrON & ToM-
LINSON, supra note 8, at 70 (claiming that no other document gives UK citizens right of
petition).
158. See CLAYrON & TOMLINSON, supra note 8, at 42-46 (remarking that enactment
of HRA culminated long campaign for statutory Bill of Rights). This campaign began
in the 1970s and initially debate for and against Bill of Rights was prevalent in the
House of Lords. Id. Commentators likened the HRA to special documents like the
Magna Carta, Bill of Rights, and Statute of Westminster. Id. at 109; Walker & Weaver,
supra note 96, at 518 (remarking that enactment of HRA was proximately caused by
Labour Party's revised agenda, which emphasized policy of monitoring and promoting
human rights); Stanley, supra note 98, at 32 (discussing policy change favoring human
rights guaranteed by HRA).
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with no written constitution. 5 9
Critics of the HRA note that it became law through indirect
incorporation and therefore, has no legislative status. 160 Moreo-
ver, the HRA fails to incorporate Article 1, which obliges States
to secure the ECHR rights and freedoms to all citizens. 161 Fur-
ther, the HRA fails to incorporate Article 13, which promises an
effective remedy before a national authority to anyone whose
ECHR rights are violated. 162
159. See CLAYTON & TOMLINSON, supra note 8, at 66 (noting that enactment of
HRA marked turning point in UK legal and constitutional history). Moreover, the HRA
will have an unprecedented impact on the role of thejudiciary. Id. The UK courts will
for the first time acquire a constitutional role and will be decisive arbiters of conflicts
between human rights and public authorities. Id. In addition, the HRA came simulta-
neously with the most significant changes in immigration appeals system since its incep-
tion-the arrival of appeal rights. Id. As the HRA came into effect, section 65 of the
Immigration and Asylum Act of 1999 (c. 33) (Eng.) [hereinafter Immigration Act 1999]
came into force, providing the right of appeal on human rights grounds in immigration
and asylum cases. Id.; Stanley, supra note 98, at 32 (asserting that HRA presented major
shift in way adjudicators approach decision-making). Cf Walker & Weaver, supra note
96, at 499 (questioning whether HRA signifies dawn of new British radicalism and ana-
lyzing why HRA was enacted at this particular historical moment).
160. See HRA, supra note 142; .cf ECHR, supra note 45. See also CLAYT ON & TOMLIN-
SON, supra note 8, at 108-09 (stating that if domestic statute is inconsistent with HRA,
statute must prevail). Indirect incorporation means that the ECHR is justiciable in
courts by indirect route of making it unlawful for public authorities to act in a manner
incompatible with ECHR. Id. The government chose this type of incorporation out of
concern for parliamentary sovereignty. Id.; GRosz, supra note 144, at 7-10 (explaining
that HRA does not contain force of law provision and therefore forms new kind of non-
statutory or common law).
161. See ECHR, supra note 45, art. 1. Cf HRA, supra note 142. The HRA only
requires that public authorities act in accordance with ,Articles 2-12 and 14 of the
ECHR; Articles 1-3 of the First Protocol; and Articles 1 and 2 of the Sixth Protocol; and
it permits derogations and reservations. Id.
162. See CLAYTON & TOMLINSON, supra note 8, at 143-52 (listing extensive critiques
of HRA). Experts highlight ECHR's failure to guarantee due process or fair trial rights
before deportation; lack of minimum standards for detention outside of Article 3; and
lack of positive detainee rights, like access to counsel. Id. Further, experts allege that
the ECHR gives very limited protection to social and economic rights. Id. at 144-45.
The HRA grants the government widely drawn entitlement to restrict rights, employing
such notoriously vague references to national security, the prevention of disorder, or
the protection of health and morals. Id. See also Stanley, supra note 98, at 32 (asserting
that date for introduction of ECHR Article 5 guarantees of liberty and adequate deten-
tion standards is postponed). The manner in which the system will work in practice
remains to be seen. Id. For now, in an attempt to head off applications under Article 5,
section 44 of Immigration Act of 1999 provides for a system of routine bail hearings and
section 46 for a general presumption in favor of bail. Id. This is a step forward from
Immigration Act of 1971 ("1971 Act"), the fundamental legislation on which immigra-
tion law is built. Id. The 1971 Act contained extensive powers to arrest and detain
asylum seekers for an unlimited period and provided them with little protection. Id.;
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II. DOMESTIC LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND
THE UNITED KINGDOM: A PRESUMPTION
OF EXCLUSION
Commentators opine that the United States and the UK
make thorough use of the truism that individuals have the right
to be granted asylum but no right to seek it.163 Because, under
international law, the United States and the U.K. have no duty to
guarantee asylum, both countries manage to circumvent their
obligations to asylum seekers in distinct ways. 1 64 Experts discuss
that the new anti-terrorism legislation in the United States and
the UK exacerbates these systems' deficiencies and threatens fur-
ther human rights violations. 1
6 5
Walker & Weaver, supra note 96, at 524-27 (discussing desirability of ECHR as domestic
Bill of Rights).
163. See SMYSER, supra note 10, at 21-22 (asserting that in spite of expansion of
international protection functions, asylum right remains most jealously preserved pre-
rogative of States). During the preparatory negotiations for the UDHR, there were
proposals that Article 14 should read "everyone has the right to seek and to be granted
asylum" but this language was not accepted. Id. at 22. In the end, the balance at stake
is a State's need to control its borders and a refugee's need to find a safe haven. Id.;
Christine Chinkin, International Law and Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS FiFrY YEARS
ON: A REAPPRAISAL 105, 107 (Tony Evans ed., 1998) (remarking that sovereign equality
of States is foundational doctrine of international law). In any case, the international
legal system lacks procedural mechanisms for law enforcement. Id. at 117. See also
Fitzpatrick, supra note. 146, at 13 (outlining three specific responses to migration in
North America and Western Europe that resulted in erosion of access to asylum).
These responses were: onerous deterrents to asylum applicants; the more regularized
and formalized practice of granting temporary refuge; and internationally-monitored
"safe zone" within the country of origin of victims. Id. at 15-17.
164. See Thomas J. White Center on Law and Government, The Expedited Removal
Study: Report on the First Three Years of Implementation of Expedited Removal, NOTRE DAME J.
L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'v, at 144 (2000), available at http://www.uchastings.edu/ers
[hereinafter White], (discussing U.S. response to increased asylum applications and
addressing U.S. system's shortcomings); North Birmingham Race Partnership, Shattered
Homelands, Scattered Dreams (2001), available at http://www.iarp.org.uk/shattered.pdf
[hereinafter Shattered Homelands, Scattered Dreams] (outlining main features of UK asy-
lum system and presenting critiques of system).
165. See Vargas, supra note 26, at 2 (describing reassignment of law enforcement
resources to war against terrorism); Eggen, supra note 1 (quoting Attorney General
vowing to step up detention efforts); Chrisafis, supra note 17 (discussing insidious
prejudice against Muslims); MacDonell & Scott, supra note 7 (discussing Anti-Terrorism
Act 2001). See generally No Safe Refuge, supra note 26 (remarking that Home Secretary
announced plans to place restrictions on entry into UK, to curb asylum seekers' appeal
rights, and to institute new identity cards).
2002] ALIENATING "HUMAN" FROM "RIGHT" 1367
A. U.S. Laws and Procedures Relevant to Asylum Seekers
Scholars explain that the U.S. Constitution vests in Congress
virtually unfettered authority to promulgate, implement, and en-
force laws governing U.S. immigration policy. 166 In 1952, Con-
gress passed the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") 167
placing most of the laws regulating immigration into a single
statute. 16 8 The Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") is the
highest administrative body charged with interpreting and apply-
ing laws and regulations under the INA. 16' The BIA decisions
are subject to abuse of discretion review by the Attorney General
166. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.4 (granting Congress authority to promulgate uni-
form rule of naturalization of citizens). See also Alexandra E. Chopin, Disappearing Due
Process: The Case for Indefinitely Detained Permanent Residents' Retention of Their Constitu-
tional Entitlement Following a Deportation Order, 49 EMORy L.J. 1261, 1265-67 (2000)
(describing congressional plenary power in setting immigration policy); Edye v. Robert-
son, 112 U.S. 580, 591 (1884) (holding that congressional power to regulate immigra-
tion emanates from power to regulate commerce with foreign nations). The U.S. Su-
preme Court has given long-standing support to the congressional discretion to estab-
lish criteria for admitting and excluding foreign nationals. See, e.g., Harisiades v.
Shaughnessy, 343 U.S. 936 (1952) (upholding congressional act requiring deportation
of legal resident alien due to communist party membership); Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S.
67, 79-80 (1976) (upholding validity of statute denying medicare to certain alien re-
sidents).
167. See INA, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1-1646.
168. See id. See also Immigration and Nationality Act, available at http://www.ins.
usdoj.gov/graphics/lawsregs/INA.htm (explaining that INA was created in 1952 from
variety of statutes governing immigration law). By collecting and codifying these ex-
isting provisions, the INA reorganized the structure of immigration law. Id. Although
the INA stands alone as a body of law, it is also contained in Title 8 of the United States
Code. Id. See also Public Laws Amending the INA, available at http://www.ins.us-
doj.gov/graphics/lawsregs/AMENDINA.HTM .(citing. list of public laws amending
INA).
169. See U.S. Dept. ofJustice, Board of Immigration Appeals, available at http://www.
usdoj.gov/eoir/biainfo.htmINS (explaining that BIA is most important agency charged
with interpreting and applying immigration laws); INS, Making Immigration Law, availa-
ble at http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/lawsregs/MAKELAW.HTM (explaining that
BIA is separate agency within U.S. Department of Justice that issues appellate adminis-
trative decisions upon review of immigration cases). These decisions are binding on
the INS nationwide. Id. The Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS"), the De-
partment of Labor, and the Department of State issue regulations, which allow these
agencies to apply the general INA provisions to specific situations. See 8 C.F.R., available
at http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/IpBin/lpext.dll/inserts/slb/slb-I/slb-951 1 ?f=templates&
fn=document-frame.htm#slb-8cfr (citing list of INS regulations). The C.F.R. has the
force of law. Id.; U.S. Dep't Of Labor, available at http://www.dol.gov/dol/compli-
ance/comp-ina.htm (listing Department of Labor regulations); U.S. Dep't of State,
available at http://www.state.gov/search.htm (providing link to recent. Department of
State regulations).
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and the federal courts.
170
1. Domestic Legislation
U.S. legislation relevant to asylum evolved significantly over
the years. 71  Experts opine that the changes in U.S. asylum laws
were often harnessed to U.S. foreign policy objectives. 1 72 The
most significant amendments to the INA include the Illegal Im-
migration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
("IIRIRA") , 1 7 3 the Torture Convention,'1 74  and the USA PA-
170. See INA §§ 245A (f)(4), 210(e)(3); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1255A (f)(4), 1160(e)(3). See
also BLM, supra note 4, at 15-16 (indicating that BIA's decisions are subject to review by
Attorney General and federal courts); Robert Pauw, Judicial Review of "Pattern and Prac-
tice" Cases: What to do When the INS Acts Unlawfully, 70 WASH. L. REV. 779 (1995) (stating
that federal appeal courts are authorized to review BIA decisions on case-by-case basis).
171. See UNHCR, STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES: FIFryYEARS OF HUMANITARIAN
ACTION 173 (2000) [hereinafter STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES] (claiming that al-
though United States welcomed refugees during Cold War, its system was designed to
deal with relatively small number of asylum applications). When the United States
faced an influx of asylum seekers in the 1980s, it struggled to find the right balance
between refugee protection and immigration control. Id. See also Keely, supra note 8,
at 42 (claiming that 1980s marked turning point in U.S. asylum law); SMYSER, supra note
10, at 93 (describing how wars and natural disasters in Asian and African countries in
1980s prompted large scale asylum movements to Western world, including United
States). The Western countries were forced to respond by amending their immigration
laws. Id.
172. See Michael Cavosie, Defending the Golden Door: The Resistance of Ad Hoc and
Ideological Decision-Making in U.S. Refugee Law, 67 IND. L. J. 411, 412-13, 424-35 (discuss-
ing how in spite of congressional efforts to achieve contrary result, political and ideo-
logical concerns continue to influence development of U.S. refugee policy). See also
STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES, supra note 171, at 174 (explaining that U.S. executive
branch has considerable latitude in shaping refugee policy); Hughes & Crane, supra
note 22, at 761 (showing that politics play central role in granting of parole). Since at
least 1956, the President has used parole authority to inject political considerations into
immigration decisions. Id.
173. See IIRIRA, supra note 132. See also Gavan Montague, Note, Should Aliens be
Indefinitely Detained Under 8 U.S.C. § 1231 ? Suspect Doctrines and Legal Fictions Come Under
Renewed Scrutiny, 69 FORDHAM L. REv. 1439, 1443-44 (2001) (stating that IIRIRA made
three significant changes to prior law). IIRIRA removed the distinction between ex-
cludable and deportable aliens, making each one subject to single removal proceed-
ings; expanded offenses for which aliens can be removed or deported; and mandated
that aliens be removed within ninety days once they are determined to be removable.
Id.; Costello, supra note 18, at 510 (explaining that IIRIRA is considered harshest immi-
gration control measure in this century); Peter H. Schuck & John Williams, Removing
CriminalAliens: The Pitfalls and Promises of Federalism, 22 HARv.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 367, 371
(1999) (describing IIRIRA as policy failure).
174. See Torture Convention, supra note 43. See also von Sternberg, supra note 134,
at 32-34 (introducing Torture Convention as important alternative source of relief for
asylum seekers in United States); Immigration Officer Academy, Lesson Two, supra note
78, at 19 (comparing Torture Convention Article 3 with Refugee Convention Article 38
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TRIOT Act. 1 75
a. The Cold War Years
Throughout the Cold War years, the United States opened
its doors to refugees from the Communist block. 176 Experts ex-
plain that these refugees had political value and were therefore
guaranteed a warm welcome in the United States.1 77 From the
mid-1970s, the United States resettled large numbers of In-
dochinese refugees, as well as those fleeing from Romania,
Cuba, and Vietnam.17 1 Scholars explain that the resettlement
program was rooted in a sense of obligation toward former allies
and a fear that refugee flows could destabilize the remaining
non-communist countries.
79
prohibition on refoulement). Unlike the Refugee Convention, the Torture Convention
does not require torture to be tied to the five enumerated grounds and contains no
bars for criminals to obtain the Torture Convention protection. Id. Distinctions be-
tween the Torture Convention and the Refugee Convention provisions include motive
and standard of proof requirements. Id.
175. See USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56. See also Amnesty International's Con-
cerns, supra note 27 (discussing concerns about increased detention of asylum seekers);
Chang, supra note 3, at 5-9 (remarking that USA PATRIOT Act gave FBI power to di-
minish privacy rights); Lancaster & Pincus, supra note 28 (discussing civil liberties con-
cerns heralded by enactment of USA PATRIOT Act).
176. See Ira Kurzban, A CriticalAnalysis of Refugee Law, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV. 865, 872
(1982) (noting that prevalent norm is for Congress to tolerate Executive's inclination
to provide protection to refugees from countries hostile to Unites States); Hughes &
Crane, supra note 22, at 762-63 (indicating that United States routinely applies less
restrictive refugee admissions policy toward aliens from communist countries); Malissia
Lennox, Refugees, Racism, and Reparations: A Critique of the United States'Haitian Immigra-
tion Policy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 687, 712 (1993) (remarking that United States will tolerate
human rights violations so long as violator loudly denounces communism).
177. See STATE OF THE WORLD's REFUGEES, supra note 171, at 173 (claiming that
throughout Cold War years, political value of accepting refugees from communist coun-
tries guaranteed European refugees warm welcome); Lennox, supra note 176, at 712
(stating that refugees from communist countries had political value); 50 Years On, supra
note 19, at 509 (indicating that during Cold War, refugees from communist world had
political and geopolitical significance). Seegenerally National Immigration Forum, Immi-
gration Policy Handbook 2000, at 63-67 (2000) [hereinafter Immigration Policy Handbook]
(presenting chronology and cycles of U.S. immigration movements and demonstrating
preference for refugees from communist countries).
178. See Keely, supra note 8, at 39-46 (citing to large resettlements of Indochinese
and boat people from mid 1970s to early 1980s); SMYSER, supra note 10, at 52-64 (detail-
ing Indochinese refugees' flight to United States). See generally STATE OF THE WORLD's
REFUGEES, supra note 171, at 174 (explaining that late 1970s witnessed establishment of
Office of U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs and incorporation of Refugee Conven-
tion into U.S. law). PresidentJimmy Carter highlighted the promotion of human rights
as the centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy. Id.
179. See STATE OF THE WORLD's REFUGEES, supra note 171, at 174 (asserting that
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b. The early 1980s to the early 1990s
Scholars opine that the 1980 Act permitted the executive
branch significant latitude in shaping U.S. refugee policy.180 Ex-
perts explain that this latitude resulted in a system that pro-
moted U.S. foreign policy while trampling U.S. obligations
under the Refugee Convention.18' The widely critiqued discrim-
inatory treatment of Salvadoran, Guatemalan, 18 2 and Haitian asy-
lum seekers illustrates this point.'83
U.S. resettlement program was product of ties with countries in Southeast Asia and fear
of spread of communism); Keely, supra note 8, at 40 (showing that resettlement further
reinforced anti-communist sentiment and provided anti-communist propaganda value);
SMYSEk, supra note 10, at 52-64 (discussing reasons for U.S. open-armed policy toward
asylum seekers from Southeast Asia, including sense of obligation and anti-communist
agenda).
180. See 1980 Act, supra note 118. See also STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES, supra
note 171, at 174 (claiming that executive branch retained substantial discretion in shap-
ing refugee policy after implementation of 1980 Act); Doris Meissner, Reflections on the
U.S. Refugee Act of 1980, in THE NEW ASyLUM SEEKERS: REFUGEE LAW IN THE 1980S 57, 57-
58 (David A. Martin ed., 1988) (discussing that discretion granted to Attorney General
under 1980 Act raised concerns that executive power infringed on statutory power of
Congress to admit persons to United States). See generally Gregg A. Beyer, Affirmative
Asylum in the United States, 6 GEO. IMM.L.J. 253 (1992) (summarizing relevant proce-
dures and issues under 1980 Act).
181. See STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES, supra note 171, at 173 (claiming that
United States was not ready for mass flows of asylum seekers in 1980s and it imple-
mented policies which threatened to breach U.S. obligations under international law);
Costello, supra note 18, at 503 (showing that mass influx of asylum seekers forced U.S.
courts to draw strict lines in immigration legislation); 50 Years On, supra note 19, at 509
(contending that after Cold War refugees became scapegoats of domestic problems,
blamed for threatening security, draining resources, and rising crime).
182. See STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES, supra note 171, at 174 (suggesting that
U.S. discriminatory practices toward Salvadoran and Guatemalan asylum seekers were
reflection of U.S. foreign policy); Jeffrey L. Romig, Salvadoran Illegal Aliens: A Struggle to
Obtain Refuge in the United States, 47 U. PiTr. L. REv. .295 (1985) (discussing denial of
claims of asylum seekers from el Salvador); Hughes & Crane, supra note 22, at 781-82
(claiming that Salvadoran asylum seekers encountered resistance in pursuing their asy-
lum claims). Cf Am. Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh, 760 F. Supp. 796, 799 (declaring
that foreign policy and border enforcement considerations should not be relevant to
assessing asylum claim validity).
183. See STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES, supra note 171, at 176-77 (reviewing
allegations of bias in U.S treatment of Haitian as opposed to Cuban asylum seekers);
Janice D. Villiers, Closed Borders, Closed Ports: The Plight of Haitians Seeking Asylum in the
United States, 60 BROOK. L. REv. 841, 845-46 (1994) (describing U.S. policy toward asy-
lum seekers from Haiti as deeply ambivalent); Hughes & Crane, supra note 22, at 748
(asserting that Haiti is only country in world with which United States has agreement
permitting interdiction and repatriation). Haitians are significantly prejudiced by this
policy. Id.
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i. Salvadorans and Guatemalans
Beginning in the early 1980s, asylum seekers from el Salva-
dor and Guatemala fled to the United States seeking safe haven
from civil wars in their home countries.'84 The United States
denied the asylum claims of the majority of these applicants
maintaining that they did not qualify as refugees, but were in-
stead economic migrants. 8 5 Critics contended that these indi-
viduals were denied fair asylum procedures because they were
fleeing right-wing governments supported by the United
States.' 86 In 1985 advocacy groups challenged this biased treat-
ment in court.' 87 In 1990, the U.S. government agreed to settle
the case and to review the claims of Salvadoran and Guatemalan
applicants who were denied asylum between 1980 and 1990.188
184. See Miguel Helft, 2000 Miles and Counting, available at http://www.journal
ism.sfsu.edu/www/pubs/prism/oct95/2000.html (discussing flight of Central Ameri-
cans from civil war-torn countries to United States only to face denial of their claims by
INS); North America: Central Americans, 4 MIGRATION NEWS (1997), available at http://
migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/archive-mn/aug-1997-03mn.html (describing factors lead-
ing Guatemalans and Salvadorans to seek asylum in United States); Hughes & Crane,
supra note 22, at 782 (noting that civil war in el Salvador was force behind influx of
asylum seekers from that country into United States); FELIX ROBERTY MASUD-PILOTO,
WITH OPEN ARMs: CUBAN MIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES (1988) (discussing political
situation in el Salvador and reasons for migration of many Salvadorians to United
States).
185. See STATE OF THE WORID'S REFUGEES, supra note 171, at'174 (stating that U.S.
government maintained that majority of Salvadorian and Guatemalan asylum seekers
were either economic refugees or did not suffer or fear suffering persecution); Keely,
supra note 8, at 44 (asserting that asylum seekers from Central America were perceived
as economic migrants); Romig, supra note 182, at 295 (discussing discriminatory treat-
ment of Salvadoran asylum seekers and perception that they were economic migrants
rather than refugees).
186. See MASUD-PILOTO, supra note 184, at 120 (discussing how granting asylum to
Salvadorans would have suggested that United States, which was providing billions of
dollars in aid to el Salvador government, was supporting system that persecuted its na-
tionals); STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES, supra note 171, at 174 (explaining that U.S.
government did not grant Salvadoran and Guatemalan asylum seekers relief because
they fled from governments that United States supported); Hughes & Crane, supra note
22, at 782 (explaining that U.S. refusal to accept asylum seekers from' certain Central
American countries was politically motivated).
187. See Am. Baptist Churches, 760 F. Supp. at 796.
188. See id. This settlement coincided with the enactment of the Immigration Act
of 1990, which established a new system to determine asylum claims. See Immigration
Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-649, available at http://www.ins.gov/lpBin/lpext.dll/inserts/
publaw/publaw-2709?f=templates&fn=document-frame.htm#publaw-p101649. The Im-
migration Act of 1990 specifically designated El Salvador as a country from which per-
sons are entitled to Temporary Protected Status ("TPS"). See INA, § 244, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1254(a). TPS is a temporary immigration status granted to eligible nationals of desig-
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ii. Haitians
Haiti's long history of dictators, corruption, class and lin-
guistic divisions, prompted many Haitians to flee their country
and seek asylum in the United States. a89 Experts opine that the
U.S. pattern of exclusion Of asylum seekers from Haiti19° began
with the "Haitian Program" in the late 1970s 91 Critics contend
that a series of government policies through the '1980s and the
1990s circumvented fair asylum procedures and resulted in mul-
tiple instances of refoulment to Haiti. 1 2 The questionable U.S.
nated countries. Id. TPS gives temporary authorization to find employment and tem-
porarily precludes deportation. Id.; see also 8 C.F.R. § 244 (listing specific TPS eligibility
requirements and procedures).
189. See Hughes & Crane, supra note 22, at 750-55 (maintaining that uneasy politi-
cal situation in Haiti prompted Haitians to seek asylum in United States). See generally
CHARLES R. FOSTER & ALBERT VALDMAN, HAITI, TODAY AND TOMORROW: AN INTERDISCI-
PLINARY STUDY (1984) (outiining Haiti's troubled history); ROBERT DEBS HEINL, JR. &
NANCY GORDON HEINL, WRITTEN IN BLOOD: THE STORY OF THE HAITIAN PEOPLE (1978)
(presenting overview of Haiti's culture and history).
190. See STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES, supra note 171, at 176 (contending that
since 1970s U.S. government consistently restricted Haitian asylum seekers' access to
appropriate procedures); Hughes & Crane, supra note 22, at 765 (explaining that
through improper screening and arbitrary detention, U.S. government has consistenty
demonstrated its bias against Haitians); LAwYERs' COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, REFU-
GEE REFOULEMENT-THE FORCED RETURN OF HAITIANS UNDER THE U.S. HAITIAN AGREE-
MENT 49 (1990) (describing U.S. treatment of Haitian asylum seekers in violation of
Refugee Convention guarantees).
191. See STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES, supra note 171, at 176 (describing how
in 1978 U.S. government instituted "Haitian Program" aimed at deterring Haitian asy-
lum seekers from entering United States); Hughes & Crane, supra note 22, at 765-68
(relating how under "Haitian Program" asylum applications were subject to expedited
processing). The program was instituted by the Miami office of the INS, which was
faced with approximately 7,000 unprocessed Haitian asylum claims. Id.; Haitian Refu-
gee Ctr. v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442,' 511-13 (S.D. Fla. 1980), affd as modified sub nom.
Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1982) (remarking that "Haitian
Program" was instituted to eliminate backlog of asylum claims as rapidly as possible).
Not one of the Haitians processed during this'program was granted asylum. Id. The
program included such measures as holding simultaneous hearings involving the same
attorney and processing an average of fifty-five hearings per day. Id. The district court
found that the "Haitian Program" was discriminatory-while programs set up for other
asylum seekers allowed aliens to stay in the United States, the goal of the "Haitian Pro-
gram" was expedited expulsion. See Haitian Refugee Ctr., 503 F. Supp. at 514. Cases
from the Fifth Circuit illustrate the problems faced by Haitian asylum seekers between
1972 and 1980. See, e.g., Paul v. INS, 521 F.2d 194 (5th Cir. 1975) (upholding immigra-
tion judge's ruling that required applicants to prove fear of persecution beyond reason-
able doubt; refusal to take administrative notice of conditions in Haiti; and denial of
requests for asylum); Pierre v. United States, 547 F.2d 1281 (5th Cir.), vacated and re-
manded, 434 U.S. 962 (1977) (dealing with Haitian asylum seekers' claims of denial of
equal protection due to inability to assert claims for asylum in exclusion proceeding).
192. See Hughes & Crane, supra note 22, at 747, 785-86 (describing U.S. policies
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practices included detention procedures begun in the 1980s;193
interdiction under President Reagan's program, begun with a
1981 Executive Order;194 President Bush's Kennebunkport Or-
toward Haitian asylum seekers as unprecedented and harsh and citing number of in-
stances where Haitian asylum seekers were denied basic procedural safeguards); Hai-
tian Refugee Ctr. v. Nelson, 694 F. Supp. 864 (S.D. Fla. 1988), affd 872 F.2d 1555 (11th
Cir. 1999), affd sub. nom. McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., 498 U.S. 479 (1991) (denying
Haitian asylum seekers opportunity to challenge denial of asylum based on lack of Cre-
ole interpreters and witnesses); STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES, supra note 171, at 174
(summarizing series of steps U.S. government took to deny Haitian asylum seekers ac-
cess to U.S. and to undermine Refugee Convention guarantees).
193. See THOMAS A. ALEINIKOFF & DAVID A. MARTIN, IMMIGRATION PROCESS AND POL-
icy 412-13 (2d ed. 1991) (showing that in 1980s detention was revived to apply particu-
larly to Haitians); Hughes & Crane, supra note 22, at 768-69 (discussing that detention
practices in 1980s were primarily aimed at Haitians and Cubans); Louis v. Nelson, 544
F. Supp. 973 (S.D. Fla. 1982) affd in part, 711 F.2d 1455 (11th Cir. 1983), affd, 472 U.S.
846 (1985) (discussing how change in policy away from parole and to detention was in
part directed.at Haitians and made initially without any formal rule-making). See also
Haitian Ctrs. Council v. Sale, 817 F. Supp. 336 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (discussing fate of group
of asylum seekers from Haiti). These individuals were pre-screened and found eligible
for asylum but detained because they were HIV positive. Id. Eventually these asylum
seekers were not admitted into the United States, but merely paroled. Id.; see also INA,
§ 212 (d) (5) (A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (d) (5) (A) (showing that parole is specifically consid-
ered not being admitted to United States). See generally Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 343
U.S. 936 (1952) (upholding use of indefinite detention for excludable aliens).
194. See STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES, supra note 171, at 176 (describing how
in late 1981, following agreement with Haitian authorities, Ronald Reagan ordered U.S.
Coast Guard to interdict Haitian vessels and to return undocumented aliens on those
vessels to Haiti). Although the Reagan administration instructed the Coast Guard not
to return people who might be refugees, the procedures it put in place made it virtually
impossible for these individuals to apply for asylum. Id. In 1991, the Coast Guard be-
gan screening interdicted Haitians on a U.S. naval base in Guatanamo Bay, Cuba before
returning them to Haiti. Id. See also A.G. Miriam, International Law and the Preemptive
Use of State Interdiction Authority on the High Seas: The Case of Suspected Illegal Haitian Immi-
grants Seeking Entry into the U.S., 12 MD.J. INT'L L. & TRADE 211, 231 (1988) (explaining
that interdiction is novel and unprecedented instrument for U.S. enforcement of its
immigration laws); Jon L. Jacobson, At Sea Interception of Alien Migrants: International
Law Issues, 28 WILUAMETrE L. REv. 811 (1992) (analyzing policy of interdiction in con-
text of international law and discussing concerns interdiction raises); Haitian Refugee
Ctr. v. Gracey, 600 F. Supp. 1396 (D.D.C. 1985), affd, 809 F.2d 794, 838 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (upholding Reagan interdiction program on constitutional and statutory
grounds). A series of cases decided within a two-month time span dealt with denial of
attorney access to Haitians detained at Guatanamo Bay and with the issue of forced
repatriation. See Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, 789 F. Supp.' 1552 (S.D. Fla. 1991),
remanded949 F.2d. 1109 (llth Cir. 1991), cert. denied 112 S. Ct. 1245 (1992) [hereinafter
Baker I] (dissolving district court's injunction preventing Haitians' repatriation and
concluding that prevention of repatriation was not remedy for denial of attorney ac-
cess); Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, 950 F. 2d 685 (11th Cir. 1992) [hereinafter Baker
II] (staying and suspending district court's order preventing Haitians' repatriation);
Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, 953 F. 2d 1498 (lth Cir. 1992), cert. denied 112 S. Ct.
1245 (1992) [hereinafter Baker III] (specifically instructing district court to dismiss ac-
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der for repatriation of Haitians without any screening for asy-
lum;19 and President Clinton's support of Bush's policyafter he
became, president in 1993.196 U.S. government statistics demon-
strate that between 1981 and 1991, over 22,000 Haitians were
interdicted at sea, while only twenty-eight of these individuals
were permitted to enter into the United States. 19 7
Critics point out that not only was U.S. treatment of asylum
seekers from Haiti unfair, it was also discriminatory when com-
pared to the U.S. treatment of asylum seekers from Cuba.19 8
Critics argue that the U.S. government treated Cubans as refu-
tion enjoining repatriation). The Supreme Court denied certiorari of both cases after
the Solicitor General indicated that the United States would screen intercepted aliens
followed by full consideration of asylum rights. See McNay, 969 F.2d at 1357.
195. See Exec. Order No. 12,807, 57 FED. REG. 23133 (1992), reprinted in 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182 (1993) (providing for return of vessels and passengers to countries from which
they came and specifically foreclosing any procedures to determine whether person is
refugee); STATE OF THE WORLD's REFUGEES, supra note 171, at 176 (describing how in
May 1992, President Bush ordered that all interdicted Haitians be returned to Haiti,
without cursory refugee screening); Hughes & Crane, supra note 22, at 776-77 (describ-
ing impact of Bush's order). The Bush policy contributed to a decline in boat traffic
from Haiti to the United States. Id. at 777. The Second Circuit considered Bush's
policy in McNary and found that the President's power to order repatriation was lim-
ited. See McNay, 969 F.2d at 1326.
196. See Marvin H. Morse & Lucy M. Moran, Troubling the Waters: Human Cargos, 33
J. MAR. L. & COM. 1, 29 (stating that Clinton terminated Bush's direct return policy);
STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES, supra note 171, at 176 (relating how in June 1994,
President Clinton instituted new procedure, where United States carried out refugee
determination on board of USNS Comfort, anchored off coast of Jamaica). A record
number of Haitians processed on the Comfort received refugee status. Id. As a result,
the United States ended the on-board processing, sending those still on the Comfort and
the newly interdicted Haitians to Guatanamo. Id. The Haitians could remain in
Guatanamo as long as it was unsafe for them to return to Haiti, but they would not be
permitted to enter into the United States. Id. The policy of interdiction at sea remains
in force to this day. Id.
197. See STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES, supra note 171, at 176 (citing U.S. gov-
ernment statistics); Villiers, supra note 183, at 854 (claiming that approval rate for Hai-
tian asylum applicants remains among lowest of all applicants); Hughes & Crane, supra
note 22, at 765 (showing consistent discriminatory treatment of Haitian asylum seekers
which resulted in very few actual entrants into United States).
198. See Hughes & Crane, supra note 22, at 778-79 (stating that Cubans have been
beneficiaries of U.S. policies favoring their entry since Castro regime began). These
policies included favorable parole proceedings and Cuban Adjustment Act allowing Cu-
ban nations in the United States to achieve permanent resident status through a special
process. Id. at 779; Cavosie, supra note 172, at 412 (stating that refugees from countries
hostile to United States invariably receive protection while equally worthy refugees from
friendly countries have less success); Villiers, supra note 183, at 853-54 (asserting that
influx of Cuban refugees into United States shows preferential treatment toward that
group, as opposed to asylum seekers from Haiti).
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gees because they were fleeing a communist government. 199 At
the same time, the U.S. government viewed Haitians as eco-
nomic migrants, despite evidence of widespread persecution in
Haiti. 20
0
In the early 1990s, advocacy groups challenged the U.S. in-
terdiction policy in the federal courts, and the issue was ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court.20 1 In Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council
Inc., the Supreme Court ruled that U.S. obligations under Arti-
cle 33 of the Refugee Convention did not apply outside of the
United States territory, where Haitian asylum seekers were inter-
dicted.20 2 The Court made use of the concept of "entry"20 3 to
199. See GILBURT LOESCHER &JOHN A. SCANLAN, CALCULATED KINDNESS-REFUGEES
AND AMERICA'S HALF-OPEN DOOR, 1945 TO THE PREsENT 66 (1986) (referring to Cubans
as special favorites of United States); Lennox, supra note 176, at 697 (arguing that wel-
coming Cubans who fled communist country was politically advantageous); Hughes &
Crane, supra note 22, at 780 (remarking that opening door to Cubans while repelling
Haitians was arguably justified U.S. policy).
200. See Michael S. Teitelbaum, Asylum in Theory and Practice, 76 PUB. INT. 74, 77-78
(1984) (showing that many viewed asylum as growth industry and Haitians as savvy im-
migrants who sought short-cut to permanent residency); Villiers, supra note 183, at 847-
48 (arguing that many saw Haitian asylum seekers as economic migrants seeking to
misuse U.S. asylum procedure). Some experts emphasize that this perception has foun-
dations in racial prejudice. Id. at 853. See generally Meissner, supra note 180, at 59 (ar-
guing that over time refugee flows lose much of their refugee character and become
migration streams).
201. See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993). The case began
with a lawsuit filed in federal district court in New York, complaining, inter alia, that
Haitians were denied access to lawyers. See Haitian Ctrs. Council v. McNary, 969 F.2d
1326 (2d Cir. 1992), vacated sub. nom. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council Inc., 509 U.S. 918
(1993). In May, the complaint was amended to include challenge to the Bush Ken-
nebunkport Order. See Sale, 969 F.2d at 1354. In July 1992, the Second Circuit af-
firmed the district court injunction, holding that the obligation of nonrefoulement ap-
plied to Haitians on high seas. Id. It also affirmed a prohibition against repatriation of
.screened-in" Haitians unless they were given an opportunity to communicate with an
attorney. Id. It did not uphold the district court's injunction, which gave advocacy
organizations access to Haitians on Guatanamo. Id.
202. See Sale, 509 U.S. at 177-88 (determining that although return of refugees to
country from which they fled may violate international law, it does not violate U.S. law).
Justice Blackmun dissented, finding it extraordinary that the United States would inter-
cept fleeing refugees and force them to return to their persecutors. See Sale, 509 U.S. at
188-208.
203. See INA, § 101 (a) (13), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (13) (defining entry as "any coming
of an alien to the United States from a foreign port or place or from an outlying posses-
sion, whether voluntarily or otherwise"). See also Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185,
186-89 (1958) (holding that entry is not accomplished unless alien is free from official
restraint). Entry is an anomalous concept in U.S. law. See, e.g., In re Pierre, 14 I&N
Dec. 467 (BIA 1973) (finding that Haitian refugees on small boat which became dis-
tressed and then towed into U.S. port by American vessel had not "entered"). Cf In re
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hold that the nonrefoulement obligation did not apply to inter-
dicted Haitians, because they had not entered the United
States.204
c. The mid to late 1990s
As the number of asylum applications filed in the United
States increased, 2 5 the INA regulations underwent extensive
amendment in 19952.6 intended to speed up the immigration
Ching and Chen, 19 I&N Dec. 203 (BIA 1984) (finding that Chinese aliens who were
refused admission at airport, and who abandoned their passports and baggage and es-
caped from detention lounge into United States, had "entered" country). Under the
1980 Act, an alien who entered the United States legally and became removable had
significantly greater substantive and procedural rights than an alien who had not en-
tered and was therefore excludable. See AUSTIN T. FRANGOMEN, JR. & STEVEN C. BELL,
IMMIGRATION FUNDAMENTALS: A GUIDE TO LAW AND PRAcrICE § 1.5(b) (1992). IIRIRA
removed the long-standing distinction between removable and excludable aliens. See
Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, § 301, 110 Stat. 10009-546, 575 (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1182(a), 1227). Under IIRIRA, excludable aliens and aliens who have illegally en-
tered the country are termed "inadmissible" and, along with aliens who have legally
entered the United States, are subject to uniform removal proceedings. See id. § 304,
110 Stat. 3009-546, 587 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)).
204. See INA, § 243(h) (1), 8 U.S.C. § 1153.(h) (1) (prohibiting return of any alien
to country where she would be threatened). The Court concluded that INA
§ 243(h) (1) did not apply extraterritorially. See Sale, 509 U.S. at 183. Justice Blackmun
protested that to deny extraterritoriality was to read into the section's mandate the very
language Congress removed. See Sale, 509 U.S. at 188-208. This pronouncement re-
solved a conflict between the Second Circuit's decision in McNary and Eleventh Cir-
cuit's decision in Baker III, by vacating the Second Circuit's decision. See Sale, 509 U.S.
at 188.
205. See STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES, supra note 171, at 178 (citing increase
from 20,000 appplications in 1985 to 148,000 in 1995); see also Immigration Policy Hand-
book 2000, supra note 177, at 9 (stating that backlog of unadjudicated applications in
1990s reached overwhelming numbers); Fitzpatrick, supra note 146, at 27 (discussing
how early 1990s witnessed accelerated application rates and marked almost hysterical
perception of asylum seekers as out of control).
206. See Fed. Reg. Notices 1995, available at http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/lpbin/
lpext.dll/inserts/fr/fr-12559/fr-12574?f=templates&fn=document-frame.h tm#fr-fr-32-
95-32-final-32-regs (listing Federal Register notices, proposed, interim, and final regula-
tions issued during 1995). The Federal Register is a daily publication created by the
Federal Register Act of 1935, 44 U.S.C. chapter 15. See Federal Register Publication
System: What It Is and How to Use It, available at http://www.nara.gov/fedreg/frtu/
frtu000.pdf (explaining Federal Register). The Federal Register is a centralized means
of publishing important government documents such as regulations, presidential docu-
ments, and notices. Id. Most rules are published first as proposals and the public may
comment on them before they become final and have the force of law. Id. Interim and
final rules have the force of law. Id.; Immigration Policy Handbook 2000, supra note 177,
at 62-63 (presenting brief chronological overview of legislation from late 1700s to INA
to 1995 reforms); Costello, supra note 18, at 509-10 (describing significant laws prior to
1995, which restricted judicial review and procedural protections for aliens).
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process; decrease the backlog of unadjudicated applications; and
address the asylum system's increased vulnerability to fraud and
abuse.2 °7 Experts assert that the year 1996 became a turning
point in U.S. immigration history, because Congress passed legis-
lation, which dramatically limited asylum seekers' rights. 20 8
On April 24, 1996 the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") 2 9 became law, creating a process
by which the U.S. government could designate certain organiza-
tions as foreign terrorist organizations.2 1 Certain persons in-
volved in these organizations were ineligible for asylum or alter-
native remedies. 211 Meanwhile on September 30, 1996, Presi-
dent Clinton signed IIRIRA. 212  Among other provisions, 213
207. See Hughes & Crane, supra note 22, at 764-65 (commenting on changing atti-
tude of American public toward refugees and asylum seekers); Johnson, supra note 22,
at 5 (discussing how American public grew increasingly concerned about domestic is-
sues such as crime and sagging economy and developed fears about sharing scarce jobs
and other resources with new arrivals); Gloria Sandrino-Glasser, Los Confundidos: De-
Conflating Latinos/as' Race and Ethnicity, 19 CHIcANo-LATINo L.REv. 69, 74 (1998)
(describing how governmental agencies, scientific institutions and United States Census
can formalize negative stereotypes about immigrants); Delgado, supra note 17, at 1952
(1998) (reviewing range of books dealing with prevalent prejudicial attitudes toward
immigrants); Reisman, supra note 19, at 4, 20-30 (showing that fears of terrorism fuel
anti-immigrant sentiment).
208. See Dan Danilov, US. Courts Offer no Protection from Latest Immigration Law,
SEAT. POST-INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 17, 1996, at A19 (remarking that 1996 legislation po-
tentially involves most draconian measures enacted since late 1800s); David M. Grable,
Personhood Under the Due Process Clause: A Constitutional Analysis of the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 820, 821-22 (1998)
(remarking that expedited removal procedures under new legislation potentially vio-
lated aliens' due process rights); Chopin, supra note 166, at 1275-77 (analyzing histori-
cal foundation of 1996 immigration legislation). See also Immigration Policy Handbook
2000, supra note 177, at 164 (listing legislation aimed to mitigate 1996 legislation). This
legislation includes the Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act; the American Com-
petitiveness and the Workforce Improvement Act; and the Agricultural Research, Ex-
tension, and. Education Reform Act. Id.
209. See Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
amending various sections of 8 U.S.C. [hereinafter AEDPA].
210. See id. § 302, amending 8 U.S.C. § 1181.
211. See id. § 421, amending 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (providing that Attorney General
may not grant alien asylum if specific conditions are satisfied).
212. See IIRIRA, supra note 132. See also Montague, supra note 173, at 1443-44
(reviewing significant changes brought by IIRIRA); Costello, supra note 18, at 510 (ex-
plaining that IIRIRA was considered harshest immigration control measure in this cen-
tury); Schuck & Williams, supra note 173, at 371 (describing IIRIRA as policy failure).
213. See Immigration Officer Academy, Overview of the Asylum Process, supra note
129, at 12-13 (reviewing changes under IIRIRA); 64 FED. REG. 76121 (1996) (issuing
final rule amending 8 C.F.R. § 208 in response to IIRIRA).
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IIRIRA created new restrictions for applying for asylum,214 ad-
ded penalties for the filing of frivolous asylum applications,215
and established a process for expedited removal, which took ef-
fect on April 1, 1997.216
2. Grounds for Relief
INA distinguishes between two kinds of relief: straight asy-
lum 217 and withholding of removal. 21 8 Asylum is universal and
an alien cannot be deported while in valid asylum status.2 19
Moreover, asylum is converted into a legal permanent resident
("LPR") status after an alien has been in the country for one
year. 20 Withholding of removal, on the other hand, is country
214. SeeINA, §§ 208(a)(2), 207(a)(5); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(a)(2), 1157(a)(5). Under
INA § 208(a) (2), those aliens who have been in the United States more than one year
without filing; those who were denied asylum in the past; and those who can be re-
turned to a "safe" country may no longer apply for asylum. Id. Under INA § 207(a) (5),
no more than 1,000 persons who resist coercive population control programs may be
admitted as refugees or granted asylum in any fiscal year. Id.
215. See INA, § 208(d) (6), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d) (6) (stating that aliens who file frivo-
lous applications become permanently ineligible for benefits under INA); see also Immi-
gration Officer Academy, Asylum Officer Basic Training, Lesson: Mandatory Bars to Asylum
and Discretion, in REFUGEE ASSISTANCE TRAINING, COMMUNITY OUTREACH LAW PROGRAM,
Reader 1 (June 13-14, 2001) (reviewing changes under IIRIRA).
216. See INA, § 235(b) (1), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) (describing steps in expedited
removal proceeding). See also Michele R. Pistone and Philip G. Schrag, The New Asylum
Rule: Improved But Still Unfair, 16 CEO. IMMIOR. LJ. 1, 2 (2001) (maintaining that expe-
dited removal provision causes hardship to particularly vulnerable and deserving group
of would-be immigrants); Montague, supra note 173, at 1439 (stating that harsh deten-
tion policy led to riots and suicide attempts among detainees and prompted criticism
from international human rights community); Yvette M. Mastin, Sentenced to Purgatory:
The Indefinite Detention of Mariel Cubans, 2 SCHOLAR: ST. MARY'S L. REV. ON MINORITY
ISSUES 137, 152 (2000) (noting that indefinite detention has become form of exclusion
for asylum seekers in United States); White, supra note 164, at 1 (stating that policy of
expedited removal was implemented to deter illegal immigration, confront mounting
INS backlogs, and address fears of terrorism).
217. See INA, § 208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a).
218. See INA, § 241 (b) (3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (b) (3).
219. See INA, § 208(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c); see also von Sternberg, supra note 134,
at 2 (stating that valid asylum status restricts possibility of deportation); Matter of Pula,
19 I&N Dec. 467 (BIA 1987) (holding that grant of asylum is at discretion of immigra-
tion judge, who must take into account totality of circumstances and actions of alien in
his flight from country in which he fears persecution). See generally Immigration Officer
Academy, Eligibility Part I, supra note 125 (reviewing asylum proof requirements).
220. See INA, § 208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a). See also von Sternberg, supra note 134,
at 2 (explaining that asylee receives LPR status after one year); Helton, supra note 131,
at 256-57 (explaining that asylum is valid for indefinite period of time and immediate
family abroad may accompany or follow applicant).
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specific.2 ' Withholding of removal cannot be converted into
any kind of permanent residence.2 2 2 Both forms of relief are
premised on fear of future persecution 223 or a showing of past
persecution 224 on account of five enumerated statutory grounds:
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, and opinion. 225 In a 1987 decision, INS v. Cardoza-Fon-
seca, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that the "well-founded
fear" of future persecution standard requires only proof of a
"reasonable possibility of persecution."226
221. See INA, § 241(b) (3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3). See also von Sternberg, supra
note 134, at 2 (stating that under this type of relief, applicant can be deported to coun-
try other than one where persecution is claimed). To claim withholding of removal, an
alien must show a clear probability of future persecution and once proof is made, grant-
ing of withholding is mandatory. Id.
222. See INA, § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (b) (3).
223. See INA, §§ 208(a), 241 (b) (3); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(a), 1231 (b) (3). See also Mat-
ter of Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211 (BIA 1985) (defining standard for determining whether
fear is well founded); Mogharrabi, 19 I&N Dec. 439 (BIA 1987) (modifying standard set
forth in Matter ofAcosta). Under the current test, an applicant must show that he pos-
sesses a characteristic or belief, which the persecutor aims to overcome in others; the
persecutor knows or could know that applicant possesses this characteristic or belief;
the persecutor can punish the applicant and intends to do so. Id. See generally Immigra-
tion Officer Academy, Asylum Eligibility Part II, supra note 125, at 1-24 (presenting stan-
dard of proof needed to establish well-founded fear of future persecution and relevant
factors in this determination). The Regulations adopted in December 2000 supply fur-
ther specifics on establishing well-founded fear of future persecution. Id.
224. See INA, § 208 (b), 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (b); see also Matter of Chen, 20 I&N Dec. 16
(BIA 1989) (establishing requirements for proof of past persecution); von Sternberg,
supra note 134, at 4-5 (discussing proof of past persecution); Immigration Officer Acad-
emy, A.sylum Eligibility Part II, supra note 125, at 25-28 (asserting that past persecution
raises presumption of future persecution).
225. See INA § 101 (a) (42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). See generally von Sternberg,
supra note 134, at 11-26 (discussing issues that arise in practice in dealing with five
enumerated grounds); see also Immigration Officer Academy, Asylum Officer Basic Train-
ing, Eligibility Part III: Nexus and Five Protected Grounds, in REFUGEE ASSISTANCE TRAINING,
COMMUNITY OUTREACH LAw PROGRAM, Reader 1 (June 13-14, 2001) (discussing relevant
factors in determining whether persecution is on account of each of enumerated
grounds). The definition of persecution is a liberal one. Id. at 5. The definition in-
cludes violations of basic human rights, minimum standards of humanity in internal
and international conflicts established under Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949,
and deliberately inflicted physical and mental harm in violation of the Torture Conven-
tion. See Matter of T-, 20 I&N Dec. 571 (BIA 1992); Geneva Convention IV, 6 U.S.T.
3516, T.I.A.S. 3365, common art. 3; Torture Convention, supra note 43, art. 1.
-226. See 480 U.S. 421, 441 (1987) (noting that asylum applicant may have well-
founded fear of persecution even when he has only ten percent chance, of being shot,
tortured, or persecuted in another manner). See also Mogharrabi, 19 I&N Dec. at 445
(recognizing difficulty asylum applicants face in obtaining documentation supporting
their claims and holding that alien's testimony alone may be sufficient where it is con-
sistent, believable, and sufficiently detailed); In re Villalta, 20 I&N Dec. 142, 143, 147
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Another potential basis for relief for asylum seekers in the
United States is Article 3 of the Torture Convention.2 27 Relief
under the Torture Convention involves withholding 22 and
deferral of removal.229 While withholding of removal contem-
plates release from detention, deferral of removal does not.23 °
Thus, relief under the Torture Convention implies remaining in
the United States only so long as the threat of torture persists,
and the claimant can be removed to any country where such a
threat does not exist.23
1
3. The Asylum Determination Procedure
The most controversial aspect of the U.S. asylum determina-
tion procedure is expedited removal and mandatory deten-
232tion. 2 Detention center conditions are subject of especially
sharp criticisms. 23 3 Lack of a statutory right to government-ap-
(1990) (holding that asylum applicant met his burden of proof where he submitted
general documentation about human rights conditions in el Salvador, without produc-
ing evidence corroborating his specific claims of persecution).
227. See Torture Convention, supra note 43. See also INA, § 241(b) (3), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(b) (3) (listing persons ineligible for relief under Torture Convention). These
are persons who have participated in persecution of others; persons who have been
convicted of especially serious crimes that constitute danger to U.S. community; per-
sons who committed serious non-political crimes outside of the United States; persons
who can reasonably be regarded as security risks to the United States. Id. See also INA,
§ 208(b) (2) (A), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b) (2) (A) (precluding adjudicator from granting asy-
lum if sections substantially similar to INA § 241 (b) (3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b) (3) apply).
See generally von Sternberg, supra note 134, at 27-32 (discussing ineligible classes in fur-
ther detail).
228. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.16.
229. See id. § 208.17.
230. See id. §§ 208.16-208.17. See also von Sternberg, supra note 134, at 32-34
(maintaining that relief under Torture Convention does not involve claim for asylum
and does not lead to permanent status). See generally Helton, supra note 131, at 260-62
(discussing steps in obtaining relief under Torture Convention).
231. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16-208.17.
232. See Pistone & Schrag, supra note 216, at 1 (critiquing current system and pro-
posing changes); Costello, supra note 18, at 510 (critiquing INS harsh practices under
IIRIRA); Schuck & Williams, supra note 173, at 371 (describing IIRIRA as failing strat-
egy).
233. See Refugees Behind Bars, supra note 23 (examining violations of asylum seek-
ers' rights in detention); Human Rights Watch, Locked Away: Immigration Detainees in
Jails in the United States, 1-2 (Sept. 1998), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports98/us-
immig/Ins989 [hereinafter Locked Away] (discussing abhorrent detention center condi-
tions); Detainees Held in Prison-Like Conditions, EpiscoPAL LIFE, available at http://
www.episcopalchurch.org/episcopal-life/Detainee.html (describing how officials from
major religious organizations visited INS detention facilities, were shocked, and ap-
pealed to Congress to correct its immigration laws); Martha W. Barnett, President's Mes-
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pointed counsel is another frequently-cited criticism of the sys-
tem.
234
a. Application Process
There are two types of applications for asylum: affirmative
applications and applications by arriving aliens.235 An alien
makes an affirmative application for asylum before the Asylum
Office of the INS, subject to procedural barriers imposed by the
IIRIRA.2 3 6 If the Asylum Office cannot approve the case, it re-
fers it to the Office of the Immigration Judge, where the asylum
seeker becomes removable. 2
37
Applications by arriving asylum seekers usually involve indi-
viduals who present themselves for admission at a port of entry,
carrying false documents and no passports.238 Under IIRIRA, an
sage: Dark Discoveries, New Hope: The ABA Aids Immigrant Detainees Facing Uncertain Future
(Feb. 2001), available at http://www.abanet.org/scripts/PrintView.asp (presenting INS
detention statistics and critiquing INS detention practices).
234. See Christopher Nugent & Steven Schulman, Giving Voice to the Vulnerable: On
Representing Detained Immigrant and Refugee Children, 78 No. 39 INTER. REL. 1569, 1570
(Oct. 8, 2001) .(remarking on difficulty of obtaining lawyer); Refugees Behind Bars, supra
note 23, at 21-22 (discussing particular difficulty asylum seekers face in obtaining legal
representation); Locked Away, supra note 233, at 63-68 (discussing detainees' problems
in obtaining legal representation); Is This America, supra note 23, at 43 (discussing how
1993 law stripped asylum procedure of safeguard of legal representation).
235. See INA, §§ 208(d), 241 (b) (3); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(d), 1231(b)(3) (providing
guidelines regarding filing of asylum and withholding of removal applications); von
Sternberg, supra note 134, at 7-8 (overviewing asylum application process); Immigration
Officer Academy, Overview of the Asylum Process, supra note 129, at 18-22 (summarizing
application filing procedures and considerations). See generally Helton, supra note 131,
at 1275 (reviewing application filing requirements).
236. See INA, §§ 208(a)(2)(B)-(D); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(a)(2)(B)-(D). INA section
208(a) (2) (B) states that asylum application must be filed within one year of arrival in
United States. Id. INA section 208(a) (2) (C) provides that an application will not be
accepted if an alien previously applied for asylum and was denied. Id. INA section
208(a) (2) (D) lists exceptions to these limitations for refugees sur place-those refugees
who can show that circumstances in their home country have changed since their arri-
val in the United States and those who can prove extraordinary circumstances as
grounds for delay in filing application. Id. See generally Helton, supra note 131, at 1231-
50 (describing IIRIRA procedure).
237. See 8 C.F.R. § 108.14 (discussing approval, denial, referral, and dismissal of
asylum application); see also von Sternberg, supra note 134, at 7 (stating that asylum
seeker becomes removable either after Asylum Office conducts interview or concludes
that alien waived her right to interview, with special procedures established for
stowaways).
238. See von Sternberg, supra note 134, at 8 (stating that typical asylum seekers
carry false documents and no passports). See also SMYSER, supra note 10, at 87 (pointing
out that United States has rarely been country of first asylum). It is generally a resettle-
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INS officer has the power to summarily deport any individual
who enters the United States without valid documentation.
23 9
This power is subject to a perfunctory supervisory review and an
asylum seeker has no right to attorney representation or ap-
peal. 2 40
b. Expedited Removal and Mandatory Detention
In an expedited removal proceeding under IIRIRA, an indi-
vidual who expresses intent to apply for asylum or a fear of re-
turning to her country is referred for a "credible fear of persecu-
tion" interview. 241  An individual who is deemed not to have a
"credible fear" is summarily removed from the United States.2 42
An individual who shows a "credible fear" is subject to
mandatory detention before she presents her claim in a removal
proceeding under IIRIRA.2 4 3 She is fingerprinted, handcuffed
or shackled in most cases, and transported to a detention center
or prison.244 Commentators assert that although some asylum
ment country to which refugees come after screening by U.S. immigration officials in
another country through U.S. overseas program. Id.; Immigration Officer Academy,
Overview of the Asylum Process, supra note 129, at 15-16 (citing distinctions and differ-
ences between overseas refugee program and asylum process).
239. See INA, § 235(b) (1) (A) (i), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (1) (A) (i) (granting INS of-
ficers this power).
240. See INA, §§ 235(b)(1)(B) (iii) (III), 235(b)(1)(C); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b) (1) (B)
(iii) (III), 1225 (b) (1) (C) (outlining scope of supervisory review). See also Helton, supra
note 131, at 258-60 (discussing asylum seekers' right to appeal and review of immigra-
tion officer decision); Nugent & Schulman, supra note 234, at 1569-70 (remarking on
difficulty of obtaining lawyer). See generally White, supra note 164, at 1 (discussing short-
comings of asylum system).
241. See INA, § 235(b) (1) (B) (v), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (1) (B) (v) (determining that
credible fear standard involves significant possibility of persecution, taking into account
credibility of statements made by alien and any other facts known to immigration of-
ficer); see also Helton, supra note 131, at 251-60 (detailing steps in expedited removal
proceeding); Chopin, supra note 166, at 1267-69, 1278-82 (discussing mandatory deten-
tion policy and practices); Is This America?, supra note 23, at 18 (citing INS statistics
showing that in fiscal year 1999 only 0.6% of 89,035 people put into expedited removal
were referred for credible fear interview).
242. See INA § 235(b)(1)(B) (iii) (I), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B) (iii) (I).
243. See INA §§ 235(b) (1) (B) (iii) (III)-(IV), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (1) (B) (iii) (III)-
(IV). INA § 235(b) (1) (B) (iii) (III) states that an alien who does not pass the interview
can request a review, which must occur within seven days. Id. INA
§ 235(b) (1) (B) (iii) (IV) mandates that during this process, the alien must remain in
detention. Id.
244. See Refugees Behind Bars, supra note 23, at 9-12 (noting how asylum seekers
remain locked up for months or years in deplorable conditions); Is This America?, supra
note 23, at 27-29 (discussing abusive handcuffing and shackling INS practices);
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seekers qualify for parole, the parole guidelines are not effec-
tively administered and these people are often detained. 245
c. Critique of the System
Experts assert that the expedited removal process is inher-
ently unfair to refugees.246 Commentators further remark that
the U.S. system is flawed because of frequent mistaken deporta-
tions; abuse of discretionary shackling and handcuffing; use of
excessive physical force by INS officers; invasive body searches
and verbal abuse; and absence of adequate interpretation. 247
Moreover, INS mandatory detention costs U.S.$500 million per
year in taxpayer money.248
Conditions inside INS detention facilities are subject to ex-
Sigourney Weaver, Stop Treating Refugees Like Criminals, L.A. TIMEs, Apr. 27, 2000, at A3
(critiquing shackling and detention).
245. See INA §§ 235(b) (1) (B) (iii) (IV), 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (b) (1) (B) (iii) (IV) (stating
that once asylum seeker has established credible fear of persecution and is no longer
subject to expedited removal proceedings, she may be eligible for parole). An individ-
ual is eligible for parole if a U.S. citizen or other legal family members are willing to
house and support her and if she has means of legal representation in the United
States. Id. See also Elizabeth Llorente, Asylum Seekers Live in Jail-Like Conditions, REcoRD,
Apr. 11, 1999, available at http://199.173.2.7/news/ccanew19990411.htm (docu-
menting INS' failure to effectively implement parole procedure); White, supra note
164, at 112-13 (discussing experience of one asylum seeker who was eligible for parole,
but INS held him in detention).
246. See Is This America?, supra note 23, at 7 (stating that impact of IIRIRA has been
enormous, with majority of persons subject to expedited removal procedure being
turned away from United States without further review); White, supra note 164, at 1
(analyzing experiences of persons subject to expedited removal procedure); Refugees
Behind Bars, supra note 23, at 1 (stating that shackling, handcuffs, and imprisonment
greet people fleeing from persecution). See generally Barnett, supra note 233 (stating
that INS estimates that by end of year 2001, more than 23,000 individuals will be in
immigration detention). INS houses its detainees in more than 900 sites around the
country, 60% of which are local jails. Id.
247. See Is This America?, supra note 23, at 24-37 (citing number of human rights
violations); Refugees Behind Bars, supra note 23, at 9-13 (discussing abusive treatment of
detained asylum seekers); Montague, supra note 173, at 1439 (addressing indefinite
detention from legal and public policy perspectives and discussing negative effect of
indefinite detention practices on U.S. stance as global leader in human rights).
248. See Donald Kerwin & Charles Wheeler, The Detention Mandates of the 1996 Im-
migration Act: An Exercise in Overkill, 75 INT'L REL. 40, 1436 (Oct. 19, 1998) (advancing
proposition that by end of year 2001, approximately 23,000 persons will be detained at
cost. of U.S.$500 million). See also Vera Institute ofJustice, Testing Community Supervision
for the INS: An Evaluation of the Appearance Assistance Program, at iii, 27 (2000) (docu-
menting 93% appearance rate for asylum seekers paroled through supervised release
program). Supervised release programs in place of detention may result in tremendous
fiscal savings for American taxpayers. Id.; Refugees Behind Bars, supra note 23, at 20-21
(discussing tremendous costs of INS detention for U.S. taxpayers).
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tensive criticisms by human rights and religious group organiza-
tions.249  Detained asylum seekers are typically mixed with
criminals. 25" They sleep in large locked rooms with no windows,
and their only access to the outdoors often consists of a small
internal courtyard. 251 Detainees' only way to communicate with
relatives or friends is usually by phone, however phone card
rates are exorbitant.25 2 Furthermore, detainees are subject to re-
peated strip searches; segregation; use of tear gas and stun guns;
sexual violence; beatings; and other human rights violations.253
249. See Locked Away, supra note 233, at 11 (relating that 1995 and 1996 hunger
strikes at Queens, NY and Elizabeth, NJ facilities called attention to inhumane condi-
tions of INS mandatory detention); Refugees Behind Bars, supra note 23, at 3, 9 (showing
that during strikes in INS detention facilities, frustrations escalated to such extent that
several detainees attempted to kill themselves). Testimony of Fauziya Kassindja, a
nineteen-year old asylum seeker from Togo, fleeing female genital mutilation practices
("FGM") and detained for over one year, highlighted concerns about mistreatment of
asylum seekers and prompted investigations by various NGO groups. Id. at 10. See also
Chopin, supra note 166, at 1267-69, n. 220 (stating that since 1987, indefinite detainees
initiated prison riots and hostage crises, burned prison facilities, and murdered guards
in at least four separate prisons and INS holding facilities); Armando Villafranca, Jail
Standoff a Product of Cuban Detainees' Legal Limbo, Hous. CHRON., Dec. 18, 1999, at 1
(describing how in December 1999, seven indefinitely detained aliens took seven hos-
tages for nearly week at prison in St. Martinsville, Louisiana in exchange for their re-
lease from prison and country); EpiscoPAL LIw, supra note 233 (discussing religious
leaders' visit to INS detention facilities and their shock at detention conditions).
250. See Refugees Behind Bars, supra note 23, at 10 (attesting to asylum seekers being
mixed with criminals); Locked Away, supra note 233, part IV Findings, 4 (explaining that
some jails categorize INS detainees as maximum security prisoners); Allen S. Keller,
M.D., Written Testimony in Support of the Refugee Protection Act (2001), available at http://
www.phrusa.org/research/refugees/testimony.html (discussing faulty techniques INS
uses to distinguish children asylum seekers from adults, with result that children are
often intermixed with adults in maximum security prisons).
251. See Refugees Behind Bars, supra note 23, at 11 (discussing asylum seekers' sleep-
ing arrangements); Locked Away, supra note 233, part IV Findings, 6-10 (detailing INS
detainees' living conditions and recreation); Keller, supra note 250 (relating how many
INS detention centers are windowless warehouses with little or no opportunity for de-
tainees to see light of day).
252. See Refugees Behind Bars, supra note 23, at 11-12 (discussing detainees' inability
to make phone calls); Locked Away, supra note 233, part IV Findings, 15 (explaining that
most INS detention sites do not offer coin-operated phones).
253. See Refugees Behind Bars, supra note 23, at 11-12 (citing numerous human
rights violations); Locked Away, supra note 233, part IV Findings, 29-32 (reporting on
physical mistreatment of asylum seekers); Is This America?, supra note 23, at 35 (noting
that in 1999, UNHCR pointedly critiqued INS' interviewing techniques, accuracy of
information given to applicant about process, and failure to convey all options available
to applicant). Mandatory detention under IIRIRA violates the mandates of UNHCR
Executive Committee, of which United States is member. See UNHCR Executive Com-
mittee Conclusion on International Protection, No. 85 (1998). The UNHCR Executive
Committee concluded that detention practices are inconsistent with established human
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Commentators report that detainees lack sufficient food and ad-
equate healthcare, and that tuberculosis is common.254 Moreo-
ver, detention conditions may cause depression, nightmares,
feelings of isolation and hopelessness, prompting many detain-
ees to attempt suicide. 25 INS detainees have no right to govern-
ment-appointed counsel and many are held at local or county
jails in remote areas where they have difficulty obtaining a law-
yer.25 6
4. The USA PATRIOT Act
Six weeks after the September 11th terrorist attacks on the
World Trade Center and the Pentagon,257 the U.S. Congress ap
rights standards and urged State parties to explore all feasible alternatives to detention.
Id. Mandatory detention also violates the UNHCR Guidelines on the Detention of Asy-
lum Seekers, which urge presumption against detention and affirm that use of deten-
tion often conflicts with norms and principles of international law. Id.
254. See Refugees Behind Bars, supra note 23, at 11-12 (describing lack of health care
and spread of diseases in detention); Locked Away, supra note 233, 10-11, 16-19 (critiqu-
ing inhumane conditions in INS detention and proposing improvements to expedited
removal and mandatory detention procedures); Keller, supra note 250 (stating that de-
tained asylum seekers often have difficulty accessing health services, particularly mental
heath services).
255. See Locked Away, supra note 233, at 19-21 (discussing mental health complica-
tions asylum seekers face); Erin Eileen Gorman, Reno v. Flores: The INS'Automatic Deten-
tion Policy for Alien Children, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 435, 440 (1993) (stating that anxiety,
boredom, and depression overwhelm asylum seekers and they often opt for voluntary
deportation and abandon their asylum requests). See also Elizabeth Llorente, Dreams
Turn to Despair, BERGEN COUNTY REc., May 24, .1999 (commenting that detention is
particularly traumatizing for asylum seekers who are survivors of torture and may be
suffering from its psychological and physical after-effects); Nugent & Schulman, supra
note 234, at 1570 (stating that experience of being locked up can trigger panic attacks
and flashbacks and is particularly traumatic for survivors of torture).
256. See Nugent & Schulman, supra note 234, at 1569-70 (remarking on difficulty
of obtaining lawyer); Locked Away, supra note 233, at 21-24 (discussing difficulties asy-
lum seekers face in obtaining lawyer as well as difficulties lawyers face in traveling to
detention sites and gathering necessary documentation). Internal INS procedures re-
quire that detainees receive a list of legal service providers upon their initial detention.
Id. Human Rights Watch found that this rarely happened, while many detainees re-
ceived such a list only when brought to the immigration court-too late to make a
difference. Id. Even when detainees received this list in a timely manner, it was likely
to be outdated and full of incorrect, essentially useless leads and information. Id. at 23.
As many as 90% of detained asylum seekers never obtain legal representation and most
either opt for voluntary deportation or are forced to represent themselves pro se. Id. See
also Chopin, supra note 166, at 1269-75 (discussing aliens' due process rights); Helton,
supra note 131, at 255 (discussing role of counsel in expedited removal proceedings).
257. See September 11th Web Archive, available at http://septemberl .archive.org
(offering analysis and commentary on September 11 th events and world response since
then); ECONOMIST, supra note 25 (offering number of perspectives on September 11th
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proved the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Ap-
propriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism
Act ("USA PATRIOT Act") .25 The legislation was passed over
vigorous protests of human rights and civil liberty organiza-
tions.25 9 It came in the midst of an Anthrax scare in the Con-
gressional offices and warnings of forthcoming terrorist as-
saults. 2
60
a. A Suspected International Terrorist
Since 1987, the U.S. government has defined terrorism as
pre-meditated or politically motivated violence targeted against
events). See also Turner, supra note 25, at 78-79 (finding that mass tragedy like Septem-
ber I1th was foreseeable for some time).
258. See USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56.
259. See After the Terror, supra note 17, at 7 (expressing concerns regarding asylum
seekers' rights post-September l1th and cautioning against impulsive unilateral re-
sponses);Justice Not Revenge, supra note 27 (claiming that events of September l1th may
result in massive abuses of human rights around world); American Civil Liberties
Union, "Don't Let Terrorism Rewrite the Constitution" New ACLU Advertisement Urges, Oct. 1,
2002, available at http://www.aclu.org/news/2001/n00101a.html (reminding that ba-
sic freedoms must be protected even in times of national emergency). See also USA
PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 892, amending 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (creating new fed-
eral crime of domestic terrorism). The crime extends to acts dangerous to human life
that violate criminal laws and appear intended to influence government policy by intim-
idation or coercion, and occur primarily in the United States. Id. See also Chang, supra
note 3, at 4 (discussing critiques of this provision). The USA PATRIOT Act places First
Amendment rights to freedom of speech and political association in jeopardy because
the broad terms of this section can affect environmental activists, anti-globalization ac-
tivists, and other political dissenters with no connection to terrorists. Id. The legisla-
tion also reduces Fourth Amendment privacy protections. Id. at 5-9. The legislation
permits law enforcement agencies to circumvent the Fourth Amendment's requirement
of probable cause when conducting wiretaps and gathering of foreign intelligence. Id.
at 9-10. The USA PATRIOT Act also allows for the sharing of information between
criminal and intelligence operations and, experts assert, thereby opens the door to do-
mestic spying by the Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA"). Id. at 11. See also David L.
Sobel, Pen Registers, the Internet and Carnivore Under the USA PATRIOT Act, in RIGHTS ON
THE LINE: CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND OTHER
ANTI-TERRORISM MEASURES, Reader for Continuing Legal Education Program 1 (Jan. 26,
2002) (showing types of devices government may use to infiltrate privacy).
260. See Chang, supra note 3, at 2 (discussing panic connected to Anthrax and
Congress' hasty decision-making). The House vote was 356-to-66, and the Senate vote
was 98-to-1. Id. The legislation was unaccompanied by a conference or a committee
report and it spans 342 pages. Id. See also Adam Clymer, Bush Quickly Signs Measure
Aiding Antiterritorial Effort, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2001, at B5 (discussing hasty adoption of
new legislation); Adam Clymer, A Nation Challenged: The Mood; Cramped and Scattered,
Congress Resumes Work, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2001, at Al (discussing chaotic context of
Bill passage).
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civilians.26 ' Section 411 of the USA PATRIOT Act expands the
class of individuals that can be removed on terrorism grounds.2 62
Critics claim that this provision imposes guilt by association,
which is tantamount to a First Amendment violation.263
Under section 411, the term "terrorism" encompasses any
crime that involves the use of a weapon or a dangerous device,
other than for personal monetary gain.2 6 ' The phrase "to en-
gage in terrorist activity" now includes soliciting funds, member-
ship in, and providing material support for a terrorist organiza-
tion, even when the organization has legitimate ends and an in-
dividual only aims to support those ends.265 Furthermore, the
term "terrorist organization" is no longer limited to an organiza-
tion so officially designated,2 66 but includes any group of two or
more individuals, organized or not, engaging in specified terror-
ist activities.267
261. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 2000, Introduction
(2001) (defining terrorism as premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated
against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually in-
tended to influence audience); Reisman, supra note 19, at 6-13 (tracing various defini-
tions and uses of term "terrorism," particularly before U.S. Congress issued its own defi-
nition).
262. See USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 411, amending 8 U.S.C. § 1227
(a) (4) (A)-(B) (stating that non-citizens who have or are engaged in terrorist activities
or activities that threaten national security are subject to removal from United States).
263. See Chang, supra note 3, at 12 (claiming that USA PATRIOT Act violates basic
civil liberties); McGee, supra note 28 (contending that USA PATRIOT Act involves civil
liberties of U.S. citizens); Lancaster & Pincus, supra note 28 (discussing civil liberties
concerns resulting from USA PATRIOTAct). See also NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware
Co., 458 U.S. 886, 932 (1982) (holding that guilt by association contravenes democratic
traditions).
264. See USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 411(a), amending 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a) (3) (B) (iii) (V) (b). See also Chang, supra note 3, at 12 (stating that under this
definition immigrant who grabs knife in midst of heat of moment altercation, may be
subject to removal for being terrorist); Immigration Act of 1990, supra note 188, 8
U.S.C. § 1227 (a) (4) (B) (Supp. IV 1998) (providing that designation as terrorist group
has variety of consequences including that group members have restrictions on their
ability to obtain visas to enter United States).
265. See USA PATRIOT ACT, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 411(a), amending 8 U.S.C.
§1182(a) (3) (B) (iv) (IV) (bb)-(cc);(V) (bb)-(cc); (VI) (cc)-(dd).
266. See id., amending 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (3) (B) (vi) (I) (including as terrorist organ-
ization any foreign organization so designated by Secretary of State under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1189). See also Chang, supra note 3, at 12 (alleging that under prior law designated
terrorist organizations were published in Federal Register for public knowledge). In
order to qualify as a "foreign terrorist organization," the Secretary of State had to find
that an organization was a foreign organization that engaged in a terrorist activity and
this activity threatened U.S. nationals or national security. Id.
267. See USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 411(a), amending 8 U.S.C.
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b. Right to Seek Asylum
Section 411 of the USA Patriot Act restricts the entry of cer-
tain individuals into the United States. 268 These individuals in-
clude representatives of political or social groups whose public
endorsement of a terrorist activity is deemed by the U.S. Secre-
tary of State to undermine the U.S. efforts to reduce terrorist
activities.2 6 9 Individuals who have used their prominent position
to endorse terrorist activities in any country are also barred from
entry if the Secretary of State determines that their speech un-
dermines the U.S. anti-terrorism efforts.27 ° Critics claim that
these restrictions violate asylum seekers' due process and First
211Amendment guarantees.
c. Detention
Section 412 of the USA PATRIOT Act permits the Attorney
General to detain individuals who are removable on terrorist
grounds under section 41 1.272 Upon the Attorney General's cer-
tification establishing reasonable grounds to believe that an
alien is engaged in terrorist activities, that alien can be detained
for up to seven days'without charge of violation.273 If an alien is
§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III). See also 8 U.S.C. § 11882(a) (3) (B) (iv) (I)-(III) (describing
requisite terrorist activities).
268. See USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 411, amending 8 U.S.C. § 1182.
See generally Vargas, supra note 26, at 2 (discussing effect of this section on legal repre-
sentation of asylum seekers).
269. See USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L No. 107-56, § 411(a), amending 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182 (a) (3) (B) (I) (IV) (bb).
270. See id., amending 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (3) (B) (I) (VI).
271. See Chang, supra note 3, at 14 (alleging that Due Process Clause applies to all
persons within United States, including aliens, whether their presence is unlawful or
lawful). See generally McGee, supra note 28 (contending that USA PATRIOT Act threat-
ens civil liberties of U.S. citizens); Lancaster & Pincus, supra note 28 (discussing civil
liberties violations implicated by enactment of USA PATRIOT Act).
272. See USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 412(a), adding 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226A(a). See also President of the United States, Military Order of November 13, 2001,
66 FED. REG. 578333 (2001) (outlining U.S. government's new power to detain terrorist
suspects). See generally Costello, supra note 18, at 524-25 (emphasizing that Supreme
Court accepted practice of detaining U.S. citizens in interest of protecting public safety
as early as 1980s); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748 (1987) (holding that
government's regulatory interest in community safety can outweigh individual's liberty
interest).
273. See USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 412(a), adding 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226A(a) (3), (5). See also Chang, supra note 3, at 13-14 (alleging that this low level of
suspicion falls short of finding probable cause under Fourth Amendment). See also 66
FED. REG. 48334-35 (2001) (publicizing interim regulation permitting Attorney General
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charged with an immigration violation, she is subject to
mandatory detention, and is ineligible for release until removal
or the Attorney General's determination that she should no
longer be certified as a terrorist. 274 Even where an alien who is
found removable is eligible for asylum, section 412 forecloses
her release.275 Further, where'an alien is found removable but
removal in the near future is unlikely, she may be detained for
additional periods of six months. 276
d. Appeal
The USA PATRIOT Act requires the Attorney General to
review his certification of a suspected terrorist every six
months. 277 Under section 412 of the USA PATRIOT Act, the At-
torney General is not required to inform the individual of the
evidence on which he based the certification, nor to provide her
with an opportunity to contest that evidence at an administrative
review procedure.278 Rather, commentators explain that section
412 limits an individual's ability to seek review of the certifica-
tion to a habeas corpus proceeding filed in federal district
court.
2 7 9
B. United Kingdom Laws and Procedures Relevant to Asylum Seekers
In the UK, leave to enter or remain, removal, and deporta-
to detain non-citizens for extended periods of time). Congress denied the Attorney
General's request to codify this regulation in the USA PATRIOT Act. Id.
274. See USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 412(a), adding 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226A(a) (2).
275. See id., adding 8 U.S.C. § 1226A(a) (3),(5).
276. See id., adding 8 U.S.C. § 1226A(a) (6) (specifying that this section applies
when release of alien will threaten national security of United States). See also id., ad-
ding 8 U.S.C. § 1226A(b) (1) (specifying that only habeas review of this determination is
available). See also American Civil Liberties Union, Rights Groups Seek to Question Govt.
Officials on. "Incomplete and Inaccurate" Records of Detainees, available at http://
www.aclu.org/features/f012302a.html (critiquing government detention practices in af-
termath of September l1th).
277. See USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 412(a), adding 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226A(a) (7).
278. See id., adding 8 U.S.C. § 1226A(a)(7). See also Chang, supra note 3, at 14
(claiming that asylum seekers get no appeal rights).
279. See U.S. CONST. amend. vi. See also Chang, supra note 3, at 14 (stating that
these proceedings are civil, not criminal in nature, and Sixth Amendment does not
obligate government to provide non-citizens with free counsel in this instance); INS v.
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984) (holding that non-citizens are not entitled to
free counsel).
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tion are governed by the Immigration Act of 1971 ("1971 Act")
and the Immigration Rules under it.28° The 1971 Act was sub-
stantially amended and supplemented by subsequent legislation,
the most recent of which is the Immigration and Asylum Act
1999 ("1999 Act") .281 The Immigration Rules under the 1971
Act were recast and consolidated on numerous occasions, with
the most recent version being the Immigration and Asylum Ap-
peals (Procedure) Rules 2000 ("Immigration Rules 2000").282 A
vast body of case law accumulated from the decisions of the High
Court and the Immigration Appeal Tribunal provides guidance
on applying the law and the Rules.283
1. Domestic Legislation
Commentators opine that the evolution of asylum law and
policy in the UK is inseparable from the evolution of asylum in
280. See MACDONALD & BLAKE, supra note 4, at 1 (stating that 1971 Act is corner-
stone of UK immigration law). The 1971 Act, however, must yield preference to Euro-
pean Community ("EC") law whenever EC law is applicable. Id. at 33; SATV1NDER S.
Juss, IMMIGRATION, NATIONALITY, CITIZENSHIP 32-48 (Blackburn ed., 1993) (discussing
legislation leading up to 1971 Act and analyzing 1971 Act's aims and effects). Whether
the Immigration Rules are binding is a matter of frequent debate. Id. at 158. Gener-
ally, Immigration Rules are characterized by informality of approach and flexibility. Id.
at 161; Stevens, supra note 18, at 27 (discussing overhaul of immigration and asylum law
by 1971 Act).
281. See MACDONALD & BLAKE, supra note 4, at 1-19 (listing amendments to 1971
Act and providing comprehensive outline of 1971 Act's history). Amendments to.the
1971 Act include British Nationality Act 1981 (Eng.); Immigration (Carriers' Liability)
Act 1987 (Eng.); Immigration Act 1988 (Eng.); Immigration Act 1993, supra note 142;
Asylum and Immigration Act 1996 (Eng.); and most recently, Immigration Act 1999. Id.
at 1; Stevens, supra note 18, at 27-32 (analyzing legislation modifying 1971 Act and
presenting controversial issues regarding current asylum system and policy); Juss, supra
note 280, at 130 (discussing legislation modifying UK appeals system).
282. See MACDONALD & BLAKE, supra note 4, at 1-19 (describing change in rules
from 1971 Act on); see also Immigration and Asylum Appeals (Procedure) Rules 2000
(L. 21) (Eng.), available at http://www.hmso.gov.uk/si/si2000/20002333.htm (herein-
after Immigration Rules 2000].
283. See MACDONALD & BLAKE, supra note 4, at 1 (stating that these bodies' deci-
sions may be found in specialist reports, Immigration Appeal Reports). Further, the grow-
ing apparatus of domestic law is monitored by independent voluntary organizations,
such as the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants ("JCWI"), whose publications
are invaluable source of practical information. Id. at 1-2. The Immigration Appeals
and Advisory Service ("IAAS") and the Refugee Legal Centre ("RLC") are government-
funded bodies that hear appeals, and the RLC is the most important single representa-
tive in asylum appeals. Id. at 2;Juss, supra note 280, at 140-42 (reporting general lack
of interest in immigration law and discussing important role of voluntary organizations
like the Joint Council for Welfare of Immigrants ("JCWI") in promoting immigration
awareness).
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Europe as a whole. 284 After the initial influx of forty million ref-
ugees following the Second World War,285 the UK confronted
refugee movements from Hungary and Czechoslovakia in the
1950s and the 1960s,286 and from Latin America in the 1970s.28 v
In the 1980s, the number of asylum seekers from Asia, Africa,
Latin America and the Middle East increased dramatically, 288
while the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 heralded a
new wave of concerns about uncontrollable floods of people
pouring into Western Europe.289 The mass arrival of refugees
284. See STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES, supra note 171, at 156-72 (reviewing
significant developments in law and policy in Europe from Second World War to to-
day); MACDONALD & BLAKE, supra note 4, at 20 (stating that control of immigration in
UK occurs within framework of 1971 Act and EC law); Juss, supra note 280, at 102-20
(discussing EC legal order and its role in UK domestic laws); C.J. Harvey, Taking Human
Rights Seriously in the Asylum Context: A Perspective on the Development of Law and Policy, in
CURRENT ISSUES OF UK AsyWuM LAw AND PoLIcy 216 (Frances Nicholson & Patrick Two-
mey eds., 1998) (remarking that evolution of asylum law in UK is inherently interna-
tional phenomenon).
285. See STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES, supra note 171, at 13 (explaining that
displacement of over forty million people following Second World War was largest in
modem history); CLARK, supra note 9, at 40 (describing how ailing International Refu-
gee Organization, specialized agency, single-handedly grappled with massive refugee
problems left over from Second World War); Owers & Garlick, supra note 18, at 201
(explaining that in immediate post-war years, UK viewed nonrefoulement of displaced
persons and refugees as its positive responsibility).
286. See STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES, supra note 171, at 156 (analyzing refu-
gee flows in Europe. until 1980s); Owers & Garlick, supra note 18, at 201-02 (describing
how UK welcomed refugees fleeing from Hungarain uprising in 1956); SMYSER, supra
note 10, at 93 (discussing influx of asylum seekers in Europe in 1950s and 1960s).
287. See STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES, supra note 171, at 156 (showing that
refugees from Latin America fled to Europe as result of military coups in Chile and
Uruguay in 1973; and in Argentina in 1976). The asylum movements in the 1970s also
included those fleeing from Indochina. Id.; Owers & Garlick, supra note 18, at 203
(describing movements from Chile); SMYSER, supra note 10, at 52-64 (describing flight
of asylum seekers from Latin America).
288. See STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES, supra note 171, at 156 (citing increase in
application toll from under 70,000 in 1983 to over 200,000 in 1989). This increase was
due to a number of internal conflicts and serious human rights violations world-wide.
Id. The influx was also due to changes in immigration policy following the steep in-
crease in oil prices in the 1970s. Id.; Fitzpatrick, supra note 146, at 27-30 (discussing
factors that influenced erosion of access to asylum in Europe). The composition of the
pool of asylum applicants altered during the 1980s, as improved transport and the
emergence of organized smugglers facilitated arrival of asylum seekers from the devel-
oping world. Id. at 29; SMYSER, supra note 10, at 52-92 (detailing progressive increase in
numbers of asylum applicants from Third World countries).
289. See STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES, supra note 171, at 158 (stating that fall
of Berlin Wall put international refugee protection system in Western Europe under
more serious pressure than in 1980s). It was at this point that anti-refugee sentiments
in the UK and Europe at large began to grow. Id. at 157. Many European governments
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from former Yugoslavia, 290  combined with new arrivals from
Third World countries to overwhelm Western European asylum
systems. 29 1 The Western European governments responded by
establishing temporary protection regimes, known in shorthand
as "Fortress Europe".292 The four types of measures taken on the
suspected that the primary motivation of asylum seekers was economic. Id. In addition,
many European governments were no longer in need of migrant workers. Id. at 156.
See also Dummet & Nicol, supra note 18, at 260-61 (explaining that Western European
nations asserted that asylum seekers were really economic refugees seeking to misuse
European hospitality); Fitzpatrick, supra note 146, at 29 (explaining that disintegration
of former Soviet Union and crumbling of Berlin Wall signified that totalitarian regimes
were surprisingly fragile). Increasing number of refugees and asylum seekers height-
ented uncertainty about social impact of new arrivals, giving rise to racist and xenopho-
bic resistance to generous asylum policies. Id.; Chrisafis, supra note 17 (tracing UK anti-
immigrant sentiment in history).
290. See STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES, supra note 171, at 165-68 (describing
conflict in former Yugoslavia and new temporary protection approach taken toward
refugees fleeing from region). These refugee flows combined with chaotic exodus from
Albania to Italy. Id. at 158; Fitzpatrick, supra note 146, at 18 (explaining that sudden
popularity and codification of temporary protection in Western Europe is explained
almost entirely by shared impulse to avoid conferring asylum status on victims of events
in former Yugoslavia); Stephanie Grant, Refugees-The Dilemma, 143 NEw L.J. 608 (1993)
(discussing how refugee flow from Yugoslavia made Western European States recon-
sider balance between refugee protection and border control).
291. See STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES, supra note 171, at 158 (describing how
tens of thousands of asylum seekers from Ghana, Iraq, Iran, Sri Lanka, and other coun-
tries sought refuge in Western Europe). The Western European States were not pre-
pared for such large numbers of asylum seekers and their asylum systems were quickly
overwhelmed. Id.; Fitzpatrick, supra note 146, at 13-14 (discussing how following Cold
War, questions concerning immigration and asylum assumed increasingly prominent
place in political agenda of EU, sparking debate of growing intensity). See also Charles
B. Keely & Sharon S. Russell, Responses ofIndustrial Countries to Asylum-Seekers, 47J. INT'L
AFF. 399, 403 (1994) (discussing how European officials met on over one hundred occa-
sions in 1991 to discuss asylum and immigration issues in EU).
292. See STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES, supra note 171, at 165-68 (describing
temporary protection regimes in context of Yugoslavia). The term "Fortress Europe"
became the shorthand for the new restrictive policies in Western Europe aimed to com-
bat illegal immigration. Id. at 161. The effort of Western European States to control
asylum flows coincided with efforts to establish a closer economic and political market.
Id. at 162. Thus, EU members executed a number of binding conventions and non-
binding inter-governmental agreements, aimed to harmonize their policies in immigra-
tion and asylum, including the Dublin Convention, the Schengen Convention, the
Maastricht Treaty, and the Treaty of Amsterdam. Id.; Fitzpatrick, supra note 146, at 16
(discussing that one of most noteworthy international responses to asylum movements
in Europe is regularization of temporary protection practice). The most innovative
measures to provide safety for victims of mass repression or civil conflict are motivated
less by a desire to improve the system of protection, than by an imperative to deflect
large flows away from traditional asylum. Id. at 18. See also Report of the United Na-
tions High Commissioner for Refugees, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 12, at 7-10,
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Europe-wide level were non-arrival policies; 293 diversion poli-
cies;29 4 restrictive application of the "refugee" definition; 295 and
U.N. Doc. A/48/12 (1993) (advocating regime of preventitve protection but warning
against erosion of asylum procedures).
293. See STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES, supra note 171, at 161 (explaining that
non-arrival policies included visa requirements and carrier sanctions). As channels for
legal entry began to close, asylum seekers, along with other migrants, turned increas-
ingly to smugglers and traffickers to reach Western Europe. Id. at 160; Fitzpatrick,
supra note 146, at 33 (noting that Europe's response to its perceived asylum crisis in-
cluded barriers to entry and border exclusion measures); DANIELE JOLY ET AL., REFU-
GEES: ASYLUM IN EUROPE? 38-39 (1992) (discussing visa requirements imposed on refu-
gee-producing countries); Hans Ulrich Jessurun d'Oliveira, Fortress Europe and (Extra-
Communitarian) Refugees: Cooperation in Sealing Off the External Borders, in Free Movement of
Persons in Europe, in FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS IN EUROPE: LEGAL PROBLEMS AND Ex-
PERIENCES 166, 179-81 (Schermers et al. eds., 1993) (discussing imposition of carrier
sanctions). See also Nicholas Blake, Entitlement to Protection: A Human Rights-Based Ap-
proach to Refugee Protection in the United Kingdom, in CURRENT ISSUES IN THE UK ASYLUM
LAW AND POLICY 234-35 (Frances Nicholson & Patrick Twomey eds., 1990) (contending
that new regime created "catch 22" situation for asylum seekers, who could not apply
for visas until they left their country, but could not leave their country without visas).
The regime also spurned sophisticated networks of agents who provided false docu-
ments and routes for substantial sums of money. Id.; Randall, supra note 22, at 212-13
(noting that asylum seekers with false documents posed problem for receiving country
in terms of establishing identity and nationality). See generally SMYSER, supra note 10, at
94 (discussing how these policies resulted -in human trafficking and smuggling syndi-
cates); Katrin Corrigan, Note, Putting the Brakes on the Global Trafficking of Women for the
Sex Trade: An Analysis of Existing Regulatory Schemes to Stop the Row of Traffic, 25 FoRnHAM
INT'L. L.J. 151 (2001) (discussing international trafficking of women in sex trade).
294. See STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES, supra note 171, at 161 (showing that
these policies included "safe third countries" principle). The "safe third countries" pol-
icy permitted receiving States to send asylum seekers back to the first safe country in
which they landed, usually in Central and Eastern Europe. Id. These arrangements
rarely contained any guarantees for asylum seekers and created a risk of chain deporta-
tions or refoulement in violation of Refugee Convention guarantees. Id.; Blake, supra
note 293, at 235 (asserting that absence of harmonization for asylum criteria meant that
claims could be treated with significant differences in different countries, potentially
resulting in refoulement); Harvey, supra note 284, at 224 (stating that under "safe third
countries" doctrine, as applied, refoulement may be likely outcome). See generally Kay
Hailbronner, The Concept of "Safe Country" and Expeditious Asylum Procedures: A Western
European Perspective, 5 INT'LJ. REFUGEE L. 31 (1993) (presenting rationales and critiques
of "safe third countries" concept).
295. See STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES, supra note 171, at 162 (showing that
narrow interpretation of Refugee Convention's definition of "refugee" permitted Euro-
pean States to refoul individuals or to grant them immigration status with less guaran-
tees than that of asylum); Fitzpatrick, supra note 146, at 16 (emphasizing that circum-
stance of arriving as part of mass influx, rather than cause of flight, frequently deter-
mined whether asylum seekers received relief they deserved); James C. Hathaway,
Harmonization for Whom? The Devaluation of Refugee Protection in the Era of European Eco-
nomic Integration, 26 CORNELL INT'T L.J. 719 (1993) (critiquing erosion of Refugee Con-
vention system in Western Europe); Daniele Joly, The Porous Dam: European Harmoniza-
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various deterrent measures.296
The most recent amendment to the 1971 Act relevant to
asylum seekers in the UK is the 1999 Act.29 7 As part of the effort
to modernize and integrate the UK immigration and asylum sys-
tem,298 the 1999 Act introduced a system of dispersal of asylum
seekers on a no choice basis to areas with less pressure on ac-
commodation than in London and other parts of the South-
East.299 The 1999 Act also replaced cash support for asylum
seekers through the Income Support system or Social Services
tion on Asylum in the Nineties, 6 INT'LJ. REFUGEE L. 159 (1994) (criticizing effect Euro-
pean harmonization has on asylum seekers' rights).
296. See STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES, supra note 171, at 162 (demonstrating
that deterrent measures adopted Europe-wide included increased likelihood of deten-
tion and restricted access to employment); Fitzpatrick, supra note 146, at 31-40 (discuss-
ing various structural revisions in European asylum systems). See generally Immigration
Law Practitioners' Association, Borders and Discrimination in the European Union, Jan.
2002, available at http://www.ilpa.org.uk (analyzing shortcomings of Europeanization
of border control).
297. See Home Office, Immigration and Nationality Directorate, The Immigration
and Asylum Act 1999: Introduction (Eng.), available at http://www.ind.homeoffice.gov.
uk/default.asp?Pageld=353#Introduction.
298. See id. (explaining that Immigration Act 1999 was meant to implement key
ideas from Government's White Paper); Fairer, Faster and Firmer-A Modern Approach to
Immigration and Asylum, July 27, 1998, available at http://www.archive.official-docu
ments.co.uk/document/cm40/4018/4018.htm. See also White Paper, Secure Borders,
Safe Haven, Feb. 7, 2002, available at http://www.official-documents.co.uk/document/
cm53/5387/cm5387.pdf (describing UK government's most recent review of immigra-
tion policy); Shattered Homelands, Scattered Dreams, supra note 164, at 4 (asserting that in
2001 asylum seekers in UK were promoted by politicians and media as important elec-
tion issue).
299. See Sue Willman, Looking for Refuge-The Introduction of Dispersal of Asylum Seek-
ers Aimed to Spread the Burden Across the Country, but it has Caused More Problems than it has
Solved, 97 L. SOcIErv's GAZETrE 26 (2000) (discussing debate regarding dispersal proce-
dure and highlighting its failure to provide asylum seekers with adequate accommoda-
tion and support services); Harvey, supra note 284, at 213-14 (indicating that conviction
that economic migrants were seeking to misuse asylum determination procedure fueled
evolution of dispersal and voucher schemes); Alan Travis & Ian Traynor, Britain's Little
Refugee Problem, GUARDIAN (Oct. 22, 1997) (describing how disbelief in good faith of
asylum seekers' claims evolved into climate of fear and resulted in more restrictive legis-
lation); Stephen Moss, Mind Your Language: The Semantics of Asylum, GUARDIAN, May 22,
2001 (remarking that biased, inaccurate, and misleading reports of asylum seekers'
motivations and achievements in UK are particularly damaging when asylum seekers
are dispersed across UK, to areas that have little direct experience or knowledge of
asylum seekers and refugees). • See also Home Office, Radical Reform Unveiled for More
Robust Asylum System, Oct. 29, 2001, available at http://194.203.40.90/news.asp?New-
sld=102&SectionId=l [hereinafter Radical Reform Unveiled] (introducing plans to phase
out dispersal procedure and issue identification cards as alternative method of combat-
ing fraud in asylum system).
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Departments by a voucher scheme. 300
Experts contend that the "designated accommodation" pro-
vision of the 1999 Act permits asylum seekers to become "sitting
targets for racist violence" and a voucher-system enhances the
stigmatization of asylum seekers and the growth of xenopho-
bia.3 °1 Commentators refer to families and friends being arbi-
trarily split up and sent to towns in different parts of the country,
as well as families dispersed to estates of known and likely racial
abuse, hostility, and attacks. °2 The Home Secretary conceded
that the procedures under the Act are inadequate and that the
system is slow, vulnerable to fraud, and unfair to both asylum
300. See Shattered Homelands, Scattered Dreams, supra note 164, at 11-12 (alleging that
asylum seekers receive vouchers that are worth around 70% of current Income Support
levels and are exchangeable for essential goods in limited number of shops participat-
ing in scheme). As of January 2001 the amounts of weekly voucher support (Y10 of
which is redeemable for cash per person) were: a person aged 18-24 (128.95); a person
aged over 25 (36.54); a couple (L57.37); a single parent (36.54); a child under 16
(30.95); a child of 16 or 17 (31.75). Id. The value of vouchers is further reduced
because shops cannot give change. Id. The Government admits that the cost to taxpay-
ers of running a voucher scheme is greater than allowing asylum seekers ordinary In-
come Support. Id. See also Refugee Council, Voucher System to be Scrapped this April, Feb.
27, 2002 (asserting that starting April 8, 2002, asylum seekers will receive vouchers
which are exchangeable for cash, rather than goods); Radical Reform Unveiled, supra
note 299 (explaining that vouchers may be phased out of system by fall 2002).
301. See Institute of Race Relations, Lessons from Europe, available at http://www.
homebeats.co.uk/resources/lessons.htm (drawing on case studies from European
countries where governments had instituted similar measures). By denying social provi-
sions to rejected asylum seekers, the government is institutionalizing social exclusion
and creating Victorian-style conditions of poverty. Id. Structures of exclusion are er-
ected very quickly and are extremely difficult to remove. Id. See also Oxfam, Token
Gestures-The Effects of the Voucher Scheme on Asylum Seekers and Organisations in the UK,
available at http://www.oxfam.org.uk/policy/papers/vouchers/intro.htm (presenting
results of survey of views on voucher scheme by over fifty organizations working with
asylum seekers across UK). Since the introduction of the voucher scheme, all study
participants observed an increase in the number of asylum seekers experiencing
problems. Id. Thirty-five organizations noted that asylum seekers experienced hunger;
forty-one organizations mentioned that asylum seekers could not buy enough food; and
forty-nine organizations remarked that asylum seekers were unable to buy other essen-
tial items. Id.; Shattered Homelands, Scattered Dreams, supra note 164, at 11-12 (docu-
menting responses to voucher scheme by number of organizations).
302. See Grania Langdon-Down, Unsettled Issue-The Government's Dispersal Pro-
gramme for Asylum Seekers is Concerning Many Solicitors, who Believe that Refugees are Being
Denied Their Legal Rights, 98 L. SociEr's GAZETrE 24 (2001) (discussing chaotic nature
of government dispersal policy); Oxfam, supra note 301 (commenting on racist attacks
on asylum seekers); Shattered Homelands, Scattered Dreams, supra note 164, at 8-12 (critiqu-
ing dispersal and voucher schemes and presenting list of recommendations for better
approach).
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seekers and local communities. 3
Further, commentators note that the current Immigration
Rules significantly curtail asylum seekers' appeal rights.3 14
Under the Rules, the appellate authority no longer informs asy-
lum applicants directly of its decision, but instead, notifies the
Home Office. 0 5 This procedure enables the Immigration Ser-
vice to present the applicant with a negative appeal decision and
remove her immediately, or detain her for a short period before
removal.306
2. Grounds for Relief
In addition to the optimal grant of asylum, an asylee may be
granted "exceptional leave to remain" ("ELR") as an alternative
status.30 ' ELR is considered a humanitarian favor rather than a
right, conferring fewer entitlements. 308 A recognized refugee re-
ceives family reunion; access to tertiary education, social, hous-
ing and security services, and employment; and can settle after
four years; whereas a person with ELR faces, in practice, indefi-
nite separation from his family, inferior educational prospects,
303. See Radical Reform Unveiled, supra note 299 (quoting Home Secretary's state-
ments to House of Commons). The Home Secretary stated that the current system is
too slow, vulnerable to fraud, and unfair. Id. He proposed a list of changes to take
place in the coming months. Id. See also Shattered Homelands, Scattered Dreams, supra
note 164, at 1 (claiming that there are many people who are working illegally, while
claiming support, or sub-letting their accommodations). There have been social ten-
sions in neighborhoods across the country, and considerable pressure on local educa-
tion and social and government services. Id.
304. See Immigration Rules 2000, supra note 282. See also Shattered Homelands, Scat-
tered Dreams, supra note 164, at 54-56 (discussing that Immigration Rules 2000 severely
circumscribe asylum seekers' rights to appeal).
305. See Immigration Rules 2000, supra note 282, § V. See also Shattered Homelands,
Scattered Dreams, supra note 164, at 55 (discussing how asylum seekers do not receive
direct communication regarding outcomes of their appeals).
306. See Immigration Rules 2000, supra note 282. See also Shattered Homelands, Scat-
tered Dreams, supra note 164, at 10 (expressing concern that new law would deprive
asylum seekers of opportunity to seek legal advice or explore available legal avenues).
It cannot be right that asylum seekers are the last to know that their asylum applications
have been rejected. Id.
307. See MAcDONALD & BLAKE, supra note 4, at 417-18 (discussing grant of "excep-
tional leave to remain" ("ELR") status); Home Office, Asylum Applications-A Brief Guide
to Procedures in the UK, available at http://www.ind.homeoffice.gov.uk/default.asp?
Pageld=87 [hereinafter Asylum Applications] (discussing grant of ELR as alternative sta-
tus).
308. See MAcDONALD & BLAKE, supra note 4, at 418 (stating that grant of ELR is
discretionary); Asylum Applications, supra note 307 (showing that ELR may be granted
on humanitarian grounds).
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and a more uncertain future in the UK.3"9
Under the "safe third country" doctrine, asylum seekers in
the UK may be returned to the first country they entered, where
they might have sought protection. 1 0  The doctrine has come
under severe criticism because it does not ensure that asylum
seekers will have access to the necessary procedures or find basic
respect for human rights in the third State. 11 Critics claim that
the concept underlying the doctrine is of a morally questionable
nature, 12 eroding international asylum norms to the "lowest
common level. 313
309. See MACDONALD & BLAKE, supra note 4, at 401-02, 418 (stating that someone
granted asylum should be accorded most favorable treatment possible). By contrast,
someone with ELR receives no guarantees. Id. at 418; STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES,
supra note 171', at 162 (remarking that ELR grants limited protections, as compared to
formal refugee status); Asylum Applications, supra note 307 (discussing limited entitle-
ments under ELR status).
310. See Harvey, supra note 284, at 223 (stating that Immigration Act 1999 Section
11 applies to asylum seekers transferred to Member State under Dublin Convention's
standing EU arrangements). The Dublin Convention determines which State is respon-
sible for examining an application filed in one of the EC Member States. Id. The
Dublin Convention was signed in 1990 and came into force on September 1, 1997. Id.
Immigration Act 1999 Section 12 applies a similar procedure where an asylum seeker is
transferred to a safe third country other than under Section 11. See Immigration Act
1999, supra note 297, § 12. Under Section 11, if the Secretary of State certifies that an
asylum seeker is not a national of the receiving State, and the receiving State accepts
the responsibility for considering the asylum claim, nothing prevents the removal of the
asylum seeker. See id. § 11. Under Section 12, the Secretary of State must certify that
the asylum seeker is not a national of the receiving State; his life or liberty would not be
threatened on Refugee Convention grounds in that State; and that State would not
send him to another country in violation of the Refugee Convention. See id. § 12. An
asylum seeker may not be removed under Sections 11 or 12 if there is an outstanding
appeal, claiming that her transfer would breach the HRA. See id. §§ 11, 12.
311. See Harvey, supra note 284, at 224 (claiming that under doctrine, as applied
today, asylum seeker may be refouled in violation of UK obligations under international
human rights law); see also Blake, supra note 293, at 235 (asserting that lack of common
asylum criteria among EU States implies potential refoulement); STATE OF THE WORLD'S
REFUGEES, supra note 171, at 162 (discussing that "safe third country" doctrine may
often lead to refoulement); Fitzpatrick, supra note 146, at 33 (remarking that "safe third
country" doctrine, in line with other measures adopted in Western Europe in response
to increased asylum flows, undermines Refugee Convention guarantees).
312. See Harvey, supra note 284, at 225 (stating that morally questionable nature of
concept should not be ignored); STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES, supra note 171, at
161 (describing "safe third country" doctrine as clearly contrary to basic protection
principles); Hailbronner, supra note 294, at 31 (critiquing rationales underlying "safe
third countries" policy).
313. See Richard Dunstan, A Case of Ministers Behaving Badly: The Asylum and Immi-
gration Act 1996, in CURRENT ISSUES OF UK ASYLUM LAW AND POLICY 52, 66 (Frances
Nicholson & Patrick Twomey eds., 1998) (explaining that as result of European harmo-
nization process, standards of refugee protection are eroded to lowest common level);
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Further, the doctrine relies, in part, on the "safe countries
of origin" concept or belief that there are countries, which are
"objectively and verifiably" safe for the purposes of assessing asy-
lum applications. 14 To be designated as "safe," a country must
have no serious risk of persecution and generate a large number
of asylum claims in the UK, a high proportion of which prove
unfounded.31 5  Critics of this determination point out that it
does not mention assessment of the human rights situation or
the extent of refugee agencies' involvement in the designation
process. 3 16 In addition, the doctrine categorizes an individual by
virtue of the country from which.she came, not her application
on its own merits.
31 7
STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES, supra note 171, at 164 (claiming that "safe third coun-
tries" policy results in erosion of refugee protection to lowest common denominator).
See also Rachel Trost & Peter Billings, The Designation of Safe Countries and Individual
Assessment of Asylum Claims, in CURRENT ISSUES OF UK ASYLUM LAW AND POLICY 85 (Fran-
ces Nicholson & Patrick Twomey eds., 1998) (asserting that objectivity and openness of
"safe third country" certification process; reliability of information used; and ability of
officials to use information consistently are vital concerns in reinforcement of Refugee
Convention and ECHR Article 3 guarantees).
314. See Harvey, supra note 284, at 226 (asserting that while relatively novel in UK,
"safe countries of origin" concept has been part of law and practice of EU Member
States for some time). See also Trost & Billings, supra note 313, at 75-76 (explaining that
doctrine is based on "white list" mechanism, created in secret EU Resolution); Craig
Young, Political Representations of Geography and Place in the Introduction of the UK Asylum
and Immigration Act 1996, in CURRENT ISSUES OF UK ASYLUM LAw AND POLICY 34, 47-50
(Frances Nicholson & Patrick Twomey eds., 1998) (challenging proposition that coun-
tries designated as "safe" fit that definition).
315. See Harvey, supra note 284, at 226 (discussing criteria for designation of coun-
try as "safe"); Trost & Billings, supra note 313, at 87-89 (asserting that asylum seekers
arriving from "safe" countries must overcome double burden of proof and presumption
that their claims are not well founded). These asylum seekers' claims receive "short
procedure" treatment, which undercuts time for consultation with a lawyer, social work-
ers, or doctors as well as increases risk of detention. Id.; Fitzpatrick, supra note 146, at
39-40 (asserting that designation of specific countries as prima facie safe is problem-
atic).
316. See Trost & Billings, supra note 313, at 80-83 (stating that involvement of
UNHCR in process would make determination procedure more objective); Young,
supra note 314, at 48 (citing greater involvement by NGOs as possible solution); Fitzpat-
rick, supra note 146, at 39 (claiming that presumption of persecution is theoretically
rebuttable). Adjudicators in the current climate are likely to take the designation of a
country as "safe" very seriously, however, and use low rates of approval as evidence of
fraud and lack of persecution. Id.
317. See Harvey, supra note 284, at 227 (arguing that commitment to case-by-case
assessment of asylum claims is dubious under this procedure); Trost & Billings, supra
note 313, at 86-90 (describing additional hurdles asylum seekers from "safe countries of
origin" must overcome to prove their individual claims); STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFU-
2002] ALIENATING "HUMAN" FROM "RIGHT" 1399
3. The Asylum Determination Procedure
The UK has a three-tier asylum determination procedure. 318
After an individual makes an asylum application, the application
is subject to review by the Home Office.3 1' The Home Office's
determination is subject to an independent facts and merits re-
view and a second-stage appeal before the Immigration Appeal
Tribunal to identify errors of law and interpretation.
a. Application process
An individual may apply for asylum on arrival or at any time
after entry.3 21 Unless an application is rejected for non-compli-
ance or there is enough information on file for immediate refu-
gee status determination, an applicant undergoes a series of in-
terviews. 322 A preliminary interview with an Immigration Officer
("10") at the port establishes very basic personal details. 3 23 The
1999 Act also requires fingerprinting at this stage. 24
An asylum seeker then receives a "self-completion political
asylum questionnaire" ("PAQ"), and undergoes the PAQ inter-
GEES, supra note 171, at 161 (commenting on indiscriminately prejudicial treatment of
all refugees and asylum seekers).
318. See Owers & Garlick, supra note 18, at 207 (describing three steps of system);
J.M. EvANs, IMMIGRATION LAW, 110-58 (2d ed. 1983) (discussing regulation of immigra-
tion flow in UK). See also Sharon Persaud, Unaccompanied Refugee Children, 143 NEw LJ.
83 (1993) (claiming that although, under Refugee Convention, UK owes asylum seekers
duty of protection, it is ironic that Home Office, enforcement department of police,
prisons and deportation, considers asylum claims in first instance).
319. See Owers & Garlick, supra note 18, at 207 (stating that Home Secretary makes
initial determination); MAcDONALD & BLAKE, supra note 4, at 403-08 (discussing appli-
cation process).
320. See Owers & Garlick, supra note 18, at 207 (stating that appeals are third step
of three-tier system);Juss, supra note 280, at 130-31 (discussing function of immigration
appeals bodies).
321. See Immigration Act 1999, supra note 297, § 69, available at http://www.legis-
lation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/actsl999/90033-d.htm#69 (discussing application proce-
dures). See also Asylum Applications, supra note 307 (outlining steps of asylum applica-
tion process).
322. See MAcDONALD & BLAKE, supra note 4, at 403-07 (discussing interviewing pro-
cedures); Asylum Applications, supra note 307 (noting that asylum applicant must un-
dergo series of interviews).
323. See M.AcDoNALD & BIAKE, supra note 4, at 404 (describing initial interview
with 10); Asylum Applications, supra note 307 (outlining initial interviewing procedures);
Persaud, supra note 318, at 83 (summarizing interviewing procedure and noting that
interrogation can be unrecognized source of trauma).
324. See Immigration Act 1999, supra note 297, § 141, available at http://www.legis-
lation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/actsl999/90033-g.htm#141.
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view.325 The case is referred for determination by the Secretary
of State, who is solely authorized to rule on asylum applications
in compliance with UK obligations under the Refugee Conven-
tion.26 In accordance with its commitment to deliver a faster
and firmer asylum system, the UK government declared that it
aims to institute a processwhere claims and subsequent appeals
are dealt with in approximately four weeks. 327
An asylum applicant need not depart from the UK until the
Secretary of State's determination or a certificate is passed back
to the port.32 1 If the Secretary of State refuses asylum, an 10
resumes his examination to determine whether to grant leave to
enter under any other provision of the Immigration Rules.3 29 If
the asylum seeker is refused entry following the refusal of an asy-
lum application, she receives a notice informing her of the deci-
sion, the reasons for refusal, and any rights and means of ap-
peal. 33 0
While an asylum seeker's application remains under review,
an 10 may grant her temporary admission ("TA").331 Applicants
325. See Persaud, supra note 318, at 83 (describing interview steps); MACDONALD &
BLAKE, supra note 4, at 403-07 (summarizing interviewing procedures).
326. See Persaud, supra note 318, at 83 (discussing exclusive power of Secretary of
State to decide on asylum applications); MAcDONALD & BLAK, supra note 4, at 404
(commenting on Secretary of State's singular authority to decide asylum claims). See
also Stevens, supra note 18, at 21 (claiming that Secretary of State's discretionary power
is too broad).
327. See Maria Fernandez, Firm, but Hardly Fair or Fast-Serious Questions of Efficiency
and Fairness Hang over the Government's Latest Proposals for Reformed Immigration Legislation,
96 L. SOCIETY's GAZET-rE, 16 (1999) (questioning government's ability to strike right
balance between efficiency and fairness); Stevens, supra note 18, at 30 (claiming that
asylum system is seen by many as mechanical exercise in reducing numbers, not genu-
ine attempt to help asylum seekers); Young, supra note 314, at 38 (discussing that gov-
ernment sees asylum seekers as problem and all apparent attempts to assist them is
empty rhetoric).
328. See MACDONALD & BLAKE, supra note 4, at 403-07 (describing sequence of
procedures); Persaud, supra note 318, at 83 (detailing events at each step of process).
329. See MACDONALD & BLAKE, supra note 4, at 403-07 (explaining 10's duties in
such circumstances); Persaud, supra note 318, at 83 (stating that Immigration Officer
("1O") should consider all available remedies).
330. See Persaud, supra note 318, at 83 (noting that 10 must inform asylum seeker
of his appeal rights); Home Office, Immigration Rules 331-33, available at http://
www.ind.homeoffice.gov.uk/default.ahsp?PageId=1013 (providing that asylum seeker
will not be removed from UK while his appeal is pending).
331. See MACDONALD & BLAKE, supra note 4, at 404 (describing meaning of Tempo-
rary Admission ("TA") status); Asylum Applications, supra note 307 (discussing TA status
and what it means for asylum seeker); Fitzpatrick, supra note 146, at 16 (critiquing all
forms of temporary protection adopted under regionalized regime in Fortress Europe).
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with TA are "landed" or permitted entry and they are lawfully
present in the UK, provided that they adhere, to specific condi-
tions.3 32 These conditions include staying at a specific address
or mandatory reporting to an 10 or the police at specified inter-
vals. 33
3
The Immigration Service makes a decision to detain an asy-
lum applicant when there is no alternative and there are
grounds to believe that the person will not keep in touch volun-
tarily.3 4 The relevant factors in imposing detention include the
existence of a sponsor; satisfactory evidence of identification;
past immigration history; and availability of detention accommo-
dation.3 3 5 Asylum applicants may also be detained when they are
identified as illegal entrants; directions have been set to remove
them; their leave has been curtailed; or applications are filed fol-
lowing the commencement of a deportation action. 3 6
b. Critique of the System
Critics of the UK asylum system emphasize that it sees its
role as the prevention of abuse, not provision of protection to
332. See MAcDONALD & BLAKE, supra note 4, at 404 (describing conditions that
asylum seekers typically adhere to); Asylum Applications, supra note 307 (providing ex-
amples of conditions which asylum seekers may need to adhere to when they receive TA
status).
333. See MAcDONALD & BLAKE, supra note 4, at 404 (providing examples of condi-
tions asylum seekers with TA typically adhere to); Asylum Applications, supra note 307
(noting common conditions imposed on asylum seekers with TA status).
334. See Immigration Act 1999, supra note 297, § 140, available at http://www.legis-
lation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1999/90033-g.htm#140; see also MACDONALD & BLAKE,
supra note 4, at 538-47 (discussing power to detain and challenges to it); Shattered Home-
lands, Scattered Dreams, supra note 164, at 16-17 (remarking that although detention
should be used only in exceptional circumstances, in reality power to detain is often
subject to abuse).
335. See MAcDONALD & BLAKE, supra note 4, at 544-46 (discussing limits to power
to detain); Asylum Aid, Detention, available at http://asylumaid.org.uk/AA%20 pages/
detention.htm (discussing abuse of detention procedure); DAS, Outrageous Detention,
143 NEW L.J. 838 (1993) (describing detention in UK as harsh). See generally Amnesty
International, Cell Culture: Asylum Seekers in the UK (1996) [hereinafter Cell Culture],
available at http://www.amnesty.org.uk/journal-sept/uk.html (contending that deten-
tion of asylum seekers in UK is often arbitrary).
336. See MACDONALD & BLAKE, supra note 4, at 538-39 (discussing classes of people
subject to detention); Asylum Aid, supra note 335 (contrasting theoretical power to
detain with actual abuse of this power in asylum proceedings); Cell Culture, supra note
335 (discussing guidelines regarding detention proceedings and commenting that
these rules are often broken).
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those who really need it."' The system's focus on speed and
cost-cutting at the initial stage of decision-making paradoxically
increases length and expense because poorly reasoned decisions
are almost automatically challenged." 8 While appellants in
many cases are underrepresented or poorly represented, the ad-
judicators are under great pressure and their decisions are in-
consistent. 39 Furthermore, the piecemeal and partial attempts
to reform the system mean grafting on new layers of process
without adequate resources or coordination, restricting time
scales, or removing appeals or reviews.3 40 Experts agree that the
system operates as a series of processes to review other people's
often inconsistent and uninformed decisions.3 4 1
337. See Stevens, supra note 18, at 30 (claiming that asylum system is seen by many
as exercise in reducing numbers of applications, not genuine attempt to help claim-
ants). The law is unable to differentiate between genuine refugees and bogus claimants
and therefore tacitly accepts that some refugees will not be granted asylum. Id.; Young,
supra note 314, at 38 (referring to government's rhetoric which sees asylum seeking
itself as problem); Dunstan, supra note 313, at 67 (describing how government deliber-
ately links number of asylum seekers and misuse of system to create impression of sys-
tem abuse).
338. See Alison Harvey, Researching "The Risks of Getting it Wrong", in CURRENT ISSUES
OF UK ASYLUM LAW AND POLICY 176-98 (Frances Nicholson & Patrick Twomey eds.,
1998) (analyzing length of asylum determination procedure and backlog of cases);
Owers & Garlick, supra note 18, at 207 (describing that it takes average of two years to
resolve case). The system carries a backlog of approximately 70,000 cases, which under-
mines its efficacy in dealing with the current caseload. Id. It produces a 75% rate of
refusal of any form of protection and fuels procedures and attitudes known under the
rubric of "culture of disbelief." Id. See also Asylum Aid, Still No Reason at All: Home Office
Decisions on Asylum Claims, May 1999, available at http://www.asylumaid.org.uk/Publica
tions/Still%20No%20Reason%2At%20Al.PDF [hereinafter Still No Reason at All]
(describing system's pitfalls and problems).
339. See Owers & Garlick, supra note 18, at 207 (determining that system is uncoor-
dinated). The "culture of disbelief" instigates fundamental absence of trust between
adjudicators and lawyers: many decision-makers see lawyers and the existence of appel-
late structures as a problem; most asylum lawyers believe that decision-makers challenge
asylum seekers' claims. Id.; Still No Reason at All, supra note 338 (describing backlog of
asylum applications and inconsistent decision-making); Willman, supra note 299, at 26
(describing significant backlog of asylum claims in UK).
340. See Owers & Garlick, supra note 18, at 207-08 (remarking that system is not
effective mechanism for making decisions); Blake, supra note 293, at 235 (describing
inconsistencies in UK asylum procedure); Harvey, supra note 284, at 224 (remarking on
inconsistency and inefficiency of asylum system).
341. See Owers & Garlick, supra note 18, at 207-08 (remarking that UK asylum
system involves piling layers on layers of process); STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES,
supra note 171, at 161 (remarking that piecemeal, restrictive measures unilaterally
adopted cannot suffice for effective asylum management); Shattered Homelands, Scattered
Dreams, supra note 164, at 4 (questioning whether inefficiency is deliberate policy of
making life of asylum seekers in UK more difficult).
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The significant changes to the appeal right ushered in by
the Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993 created a ten-
dency to characterize asylum claims as not credible even though
they emanate from notorious human rights violator States.342
This "culture of disbelief' has been extensively critiqued for its
reliance on statistics of low recognition rates to. demonstrate that
most asylum claims are, indeed, unfounded.343 Critics assert that
while recognition rates have declined, a considerably higher
number of applicants obtained ELR, many of whom should have
received refugee status.3 " Others only failed to get refugee sta-
tus because of the Refugee Convention's narrow definition of a
"refugee," but were irremovable under other instruments of in-
ternational law. 45
342. See MAcDONALD & BLAKE, supra note 4, at 11-13 (reviewing history of appeal
right). The Immigration Act 1999 grants the right to appeal a refused application or a
grant of an ELR (rather than refugee) status before a special adjudicator, the Immigra-
tion Appeal Tribunal, and the Court of Appeal. Id. Appeal rights were abolished
under the 1996 Act and their reinstitution under the Immigration Act 1999 is a wel-
come sign as they are an important source of protection. Id. Theoretically at least,
once decision-makers know that their decisions are subject to scrutiny, they are more
careful in adhering to substantive and procedural rules, which, in turn, leads to more
rational and consistent decision-making. Id. See also Dunstan, supra note 313, at 63
(analyzing appeal rights in context of "safe third country" cases). The "culture of disbe-
lief" functions across and coexists with the rhetoric of "bogus" asylum seekers, under-
mining the decision-makers' objective review of asylum applications and placing them
in violation of UK's obligations under the Refugee Convention. Id.; Shattered Home-
lands, Scattered Dreams, supra note 164, at 5 (asserting that term "asylum seeker" is so
routinely associated with epithet "bogus" that it has become tainted with connotations
of fraudulence).
343. See Blake, supra note 293, at 236-37 (stating that it is meaningless to equate
unsuccessful applicants for refugee status with bogus claimants); Owers & Garlick, supra
note 18, at 207-11 (analyzing fallacies which guide "culture of disbelief"); Fitzpatrick,
supra note 146, at 39 (discussing that low rates of approval serve as evidence of high
rates of fraud and lack of persecution, without adjudicators being sensitive to solipsism
inherent in these assessments).
344. See Adan and Nooh v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [1997] Imm. A.R.
251 (suggesting that many ELR cases of Somali asylum seekers should be reclassified as
refugee cases); Blake, supra note 293, at 237 (claiming that many who received ELR
should have been granted refugee status).
345. See, e.g., Chahal v. UK, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 413 (1987) (showing that domestic
interpretation of term "refugee" is narrow); Blake, supra note 293, at 237 (demonstrat-
ing that narrow interpretation of term "refugee" is one reason for low asylum accept-
ance rates). Moreover, statistics of success on appeal can be misleading because compe-
tent legal representation plays a decisive role in winning asylum requests. Id. at 238;
Destination UK, supra note 24 (showing that stringent procedural requirements com-
bined with dispersal of asylum seekers to distant areas thwart competent legal represen-
tation). The Home Office is increasing the rate of refusals, permitting only ten days to
file an appeal. Id. Any "non-asylum" grounds of appeal, e.g., on the basis of marriage,
1404 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 25:1335
As for detention, experts describe the UK approach as the
worst in Europe. 4 6 Numerous critics emphasize the absence of
a time limit and the fact that asylum seekers do not.receive writ-
ten reasons for detainment. 347 Other critics point to the lack of
judicial review or presumption in favor of liberty.348 Although
many detainees suffer from anxiety, insomnia, and depression,
there is no evidence that psychiatric or psychological services are
health, or other factors, also have to be identified within ten days. Id. Appeals are then
listed for a hearing so-quickly that it is very difficult to collect the required documents
in time (fourteen days in advance), or to prepare the case properly; and appeal adjudi-
cators will not grant adjournments unless the client has only just approached the legal
representatives. Id. See also Dunstan, supra note 313, at 68 (citing another statistic
showing that unsuccessful applicants do not equate with bogus claimants). The per-
centage of applicants refused protection, whose appeals are dismissed and who are ac-
tually removed is very small. Id. For instance, in 1999, the Home Office ruled on fewer
than 17,000 cases, fifty-four percent of which were given permission to stay in the coun-
try. Id. Another statistic shows that between 1992 and 1996, the Home Office refused a
total of 90,350 asylum seekers and dismissed approximately eighty percent of all subse-
quent appeals. Id. Of the 72,000 applicants who reached the end of the asylum process
and became liable for removal, only 10,880 rejected asylum seekers were actually re-
moved. Id. at 69.
346. See DAS, supra note 335, at 838 (describing detention in UK as harsh); Cell
Culture, supra note 335 (contending that detention of asylum seekers in UK is often
arbitrary). See also National Civil Rights Movement, Campaign to Close Campsfield, availa-
ble at http://www.ncrm.org.uk/caravan (relating that there is big outcry against deten-
tion across England). On September 15-17, 2000, representatives from refugee organi-
zations, campaigners, and expert speakers from twenty-five countries attended a confer-
ence against immigration detention at Ruskin College, Oxford. Id. Participants
described the intensifying racist crackdown on asylum seekers and other migrants by
European governments and the spread of detention centers across Europe. Id. Work-
shops covered specific issues: racism in the media; the ECHR; the trauma of detention;
asylum from rape; organizing bail for detainees; direct actions at airports to stop depor-
tations and at detention centers to call for their closure; and the introduction of penal
regimes inside detention centers. Id. The conference ended with a list of resolutions,
with the basic goal of participating in a Europe-wide network of anti-detention and anti-
deportation campaigns. Id.
347. See Lisa Mitchell, Detention Centres Troubled By Unrest, BBC NEws ONLINE, Feb.
15, 2002, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/uk/england/newsid_1822000/
1822480.stm (describing how recent fire in Yarl's Wood detention center brought re-
newed attention to inhumane and outdated detention center conditions); Cell Culture,
supra note 335 (showing that although Home Office stated that it only detains in special
circumstances, Amnesty International found that 86% of 150 detainees were continu-
ously detained without receiving adequate explanation of what their "special circum-
stances" were); Destination UK, supra note 24 (showing that detention is unjust).
348. See Cell Culture, supra note 335 (discussing inadequate due process guarantees
in UK detention); National Civil Rights Movement, supra note 346 (asserting that due
process violations, in combination with other human rights abuses, make UK detention
practices unacceptable); National Civil Rights Movement, supra note 346 (discussing
procedural shortcomings of detention in UK).
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provided in detention."
4. The UK Anti-Terrorism Act
On December 13, 2001, in an effort to enhance interna-
tional security in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks on
the United States, the UK adopted new anti-terrorism legisla-
tion.3 50 The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill was pub-
lished on November 12, 2001, allotting only one month for par-
liamentary and public scrutiny.3 51 Although this legislation was
greeted with less public outcry than was the USA PATRIOT Act,
recent months witnessed increasing privacy concerns, especially
with regard to government's ability to scrutinize records of any
person's online activity. 352
349. See e.g. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, Rapid Assessment of Mental Health Needs
of Refugees, Displaced and Other Populations Affected by Conflict and Post-Conflict Situations,
Sept. 11, 2001, available at http://www.who.int/disasters/tg.cfm?doctypelD=21 (discuss-
ing traumas refugees experience and mental disorders common among refugees);
Health: Psychiatric Disorders Plague Refugees, BBC NEWS ONLINE, Aug. 3, 1999 (describing
high rates of psychiatric disorders among refugees). Moreover, medical care is inade-
quate. Id. Doctors often think detainees are pretending to be sick, resulting in delayed
treatment and the continued detention of those who eventually prove too sick to be
detained. See Destination UK, supra note 24.
350. See Anti-Terrorism Act 2001, supra note 7. See also Explanatory Notes, availa-
ble at http://www.hmso.gov.uk/cgi-bin/htm_hl3?URL=http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/
en/2001en24.htm&STEMMER=en&WORDS=antirmerror@rime§ecuriill+&COLOUR=
red&STYLE=s#muscat highlighter-firstmatch.
351. See Home Office, Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill, Passage Through Parlia-
ment, available at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/oicd/antiterrorism/billthrough-par-
liament.htm (showing Bill's progress before implementation).
352. See Anti-Terror Laws Raise Net Privacy Fears, BBC NEWS ONLINE, Nov. 11, 2001,
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/sci/tech/newsidI 647000/1647309.stm
(referencing emergency measure announced by Home Secretary David Blunkett, ena-
bling net service providers to keep records of what their customers are doing on-line for
longer than they do now). In response to Blankett's statements, civil liberties cam-
paigners prepare to challenge the new legislation in court. Id.; Terror Bill is "Snoopers'
Charter", BBC NEWS ONLINE, Nov. 28, 2001 available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/eng
lish/ukpolitics/newsid_1681000/1681131.stm (criticizing anti-terrorism legislation as
"snoopers' charter," which permits prosecutors to gain access to information retained
by public authorities on non-citizens as well as citizens); S.A. Mathieson, The Net's Eyes
are Watching: The New Anti-Terrorism Bill May Force Internet Firms to Spy on Us, GuARDIAN,
Nov. 15, 2001, at 1 (showing that new legislation will dramatically increase amount of
information internet service providers can keep on their customers); Martin Thomas,
An Assault on Freedom: The Anti-Terrorism Bill Undermines both the Human Rights Convention
and the Rule of Law, GuARDtAN, Nov. 26, 2001, at 15 (claiming that Anti-Terrorism Act
2001 undermines essential freedoms).
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a. Derogation
In enacting the Anti-Terrorism Act, the UK became the only
EU government to derogate from its international human rights
treaty obligations.353 The Order designating derogation stated:
"there exists a terrorist threat to the United Kingdom from per-
sons suspected of involvement in international terrorism. In par-
ticular, there are foreign nationals present in the United King-
dom who are suspected of being concerned in the commission,
preparation or instigation of acts of international terrorism. "1 4
After the Secretary of State laid the Order before Parliament,
human rights activists argued that the Secretary's statement did
not provide evidence of serious and immediate threats to the life
of the nation or the community required for effective deroga-
tion. 3 5 5
353. See Anti-Terrorism Act 2001, supra note 7, § 30. See also Home Office, Anti-
Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001 (ch. 24), available at http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/
en/01en24-a.htm [hereinafter Home Office, Anti-Terrorism] (summarizing sections of
Anti-Terrorism Act 2001). See generally Amnesty International, Creating a Shadow Crimi-
nal Justice System in the Name of "Fighting International Terrorism," Sept. 16, 2001, available
at http://web.amnesty.org/802568F7005C4453/O/EA5378E29D289D2D80256,
B060038D3AC?Open [hereinafter Shadow Justice System] (explaining that Section 30 of
Anti-Terrorism Act 2001 requires UK to derogate from ECHR, invoking Article 15 to
officially derogate from Article 5). Article 15 permits derogation in time of war or
other public emergency threatening the life of the nation, but such measures must be
time-limited and restricted to the extent strictly required. Id. The UK also derogated
from the ICCPR, invoking Article 4 to derogate officially from the provisions of Article
9. Id.
354. See Shadow Justice System, supra note 353 (quoting text of Order); Guardian,
Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Bill: Summary, available at http://image.guardian.co.
uk/sys-files/Politics/documents/2001/11/20/Antiterrorismbill.pdf (asserting that
Anti-Terrorism Act 2001 is not at odds with ECHR). The government's choice to dero-
gate from ECHR, moreover, is legitimate as is its aim of protecting liberties. Cf Charter
88, Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Bill, available at http://www.charter88.org.uk/pubs/
brief/0111terror.html (claiming that no derogation grounds exist). Human rights ac-
tivists pointed to the fact that when the Secretary of State announced the proposals for
emergency legislation on October 15, 2001 he stated that there was no immediate intel-
ligence of a specific threat to the UK. Id,
355. See Shadow Justice System, supra note 353 (discussing circumstances when dero-
gation is justified); ILPA, ILPA Submission on Forthcoming Emergency Anti-Terrorism Legisla-
tion, available at http://www.ilpa.org.uk/submissions/terrorism.htm (arguing against
derogation from ECHR, particularly with regard to ECHR Article 5 detention provi-
sion); Liberty, Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill 2001, Nov. 2001, available at http://
www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/mparl8.html [hereinafter Liberty, Anti-Terrorism] (an-.
alyzing provisions of new law); Human Rights Watch, UK: New Anti-Terror Bill Rolls Back
Rights, Dec. 14, 2001, available at http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/12/UKbiIl1214.htm
[hereinafter Anti-Terror Bill Rolls Back Rights] (discussing foreboding human rights viola-
tions under new law).
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b. A Suspected International Terrorist
Section 21 of the Act tasks the Home Secretary with certify-
ing a suspected international terrorist if he believes the person's
presence in the UK is a risk to national security, and he suspects
that the person is an international terrorist.3 56 Section 23 per-
mits indefinite detention of foreign nationals suspected of ter-
rorism-related activities, who cannot be returned to another
country because of practical problems such as lack of documen-
tation or because they might be subject to ECHR Article 3 viola-
tions. Under the UK's current immigration laws, detention
can only be used when there is an on-going removal proceeding
in progress and only for a "reasonable" amount of time.358
c. Appeal
Under Section 25(1) of the Anti-Terrorism Act 2001, a sus-
pected international terrorist may appeal to the Special Immi-
gration Appeals Commission ("SLAC") against his certification
within three months of its issue.359 SIAC has the powers to grant
bail to suspected national security risks and to review the certifi-
cations at six-monthly intervals. 6 ° It is permitted to receive se-
cret evidence, and to conduct proceedings without the detainee
356. See Anti-Terrorism Act 2001, supra note 7, §§ 21(2), 21(3) (a). Under Section
21(2), an "international terrorist" is a person who "is or has been concerned in commis-
sion, preparation or instigation of acts of international terrorism, is a member of or
belongs to an international terrorist group, or has links with a person who is a member
of or belongs to an international terrorist group." Id. Under section 21 (3) (a), an "in-
ternational terrorist group" is a group, which "is subject to the control or influence of
persons outside United Kingdom." Id. "Terrorism" is defined as the "use or threat of
action... designed to influence government or to intimidate the public or section of
the public, and use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing political, religious or
ideological cause." Id.
357. See Anti-Terrorism Act 2001, supra note 7, § 23. See also ECHR, supra note 45,
art. 3 (prohibiting ill-treatment absolutely in expulsion cases).
358. See Immigration Act 1999, supra note 297, § 140.
359. SeeAnti-Terrorism Act 2001, supra note 7, § 25(1). See also Home Office, Anti-
Terrorism, supra note 353 (summarizing Special Immigration Appeals Commission's
("SIAC") role); Shadow Justice System, supra note 353 (explaining that SIAC was set up in
response to judgment of European Court in case of Chahal in 1997 to hear appeals
where Home Secretary made decision to deport on national security grounds). The
SIAC's decision is binding on the Secretary of State although either party may appeal
on a point of law to the Court of Appeal. Id.; Anti-Terror Bill Rolls Back Rights, supra note
355 (discussing SIAC's role in proceedings under Anti-Terrorism Act 2001).
360. See Anti-Terrorism Act 2001, supra note 7, § 25(1); see also Shadow Justice Sys-
tem, supra note 353 (critiquing Anti-Terrorism Act 2001 Section 25(1)).
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or their counsel.3 61 Additionally, appeal of a SLAC decision must
be to the Court of Appeal, and is limited to points of law.36 2
However, experts contend that UK courts have already substan-
tially limited the authority of the SIAC to overrule Home Secre-
tary decisions in terrorist cases.363
d. Right to Seek Asylum
Sections 33 and 34 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 2001 empower
the Home Secretary to make a determination that an individual
does not have the right to substantive consideration of her asy-
lum application if Articles 1 (F) or 33(2) of the Refugee Conven-
tion apply.36 4 The Refugee Convention Article 1 (F) contains the
so-called "exclusion clauses" and ensures that perpetrators of
gross human rights violations are excluded from refugee sta-
tus.365 The Refugee Convention Article 33(2) states that a refu-
gee who can reasonably be regarded as dangerous to a country's
361. See Anti-Terrorism Act 2001, supra note 7, § 25(1); see also Shadow Justice Sys-
tem, supra note 353 (commenting on SIAC's ability to hear secret evidence and to con-
duct proceedings in secret).
362. See Anti-Terrorism Act 2001, supra note 7, §25(1); see also Shadow Justice System,
supra note 353 (analyzing limited nature of appeal of SIAC's decision).
363. See Shadow Justice System, supra note 353 (discussing that in May 2000, Court of
Appeal rejected decision by SIAC in case of Shafiq Ur Rehman, Pakistani national sub-
ject to deportation for involvement with alleged Islamic terrorist organization). The
SIAC ruled that the Home Secretary did not prove that Rehman's actions were directed
against the UK or its citizens. Id. The Court of Appeal overturned the SIAC's decision,
holding that in any national security case, the Home Secretary was entitled to make the
decision to deport not only on the basis that the person had in fact endangered na-
tional security, but that he presented a danger to national security, regardless of the
degree of probability. Id. In October 2001, the House of Lords upheld the Court of
Appeal decision. Id.; Patrick Wintour, Labor Revolt on Terror Bill, GUARDIAN, Nov. 22,
2001, available at http://politics.guardian.co.uk/attacks/story/O,1320,603486,00.html
(outlining claim that rules of evidence and representation before SIAC fall short of full
judicial review). See also ILPA, ILPA Briefing on Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill,
available at http://www.ilpa.org.uk/submissions/antiterrorism.html (contending that
appeal to SIAC is meaningless provision of Anti-Terrorism Act 2001); Liberty, Detentions
Under Anti-Terror Act "Utterly Unjust"-Liberty to Coordinate Legal Challenge, available at
http://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/mpress80.html (asserting that SIAC is not de-
signed to deal with indefinite detention appeals). See also Memorandum submitted 6y the
United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), available at http://
www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200102/cmselect/cmhaff/351/
351ap19.htm (urging for implementation of procedural guarantees in SIAC's decision-
making process).
364. See Anti-Terrorism Act 2001, supra note 7, §§ 33-34.
365. See Refugee Convention, supra note 12, art. I(F) (citing crimes against peace,
war crimes, crimes against humanity, serious non-political crimes outside country of
refuge, or acts contrary to purposes and principles of U.N.).
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security may not seek protection against refoulement from that
country.366
Human rights organizations allege that Article 1 (F) requires
commission of crimes by an individual and does not refer to any
perceived future threat as sufficient grounds for exclusion.367
Section 33(1), on the other hand, empowers the Home Secre-
tary to exclude a person from refugee status or to detain her for
association with a terrorist organization or for being a future na-
tional security threat.368 In effect, critics claim, the Act reverses
the Convention's "inclusion before exclusion" mandate and em-
powers the Home Secretary to deny protection as a matter of
369first course.
Human rights activists also argue that the Article 33(2) pro-
hibition against refoulement does not apply to a past political
crime that does not endanger the UK's current security.370 Sec-
tions 33 and 34 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 2001, on the other
hand, deny full determination of refugee status in favor of
refoulement, preventing the SIAC from balancing an individual's
fear of persecution upon refoulement against the government's
366. See id. art. 33(2).
367. See Shadow Justice System, supra note 353 (stating that definition of "suspected
international terrorist" is vague and over-inclusive). "Link" with member of terrorist
group is too tenuous to signify that the person has been involved in the commission of
terrorist activities. Id. Broad, undefined terms such as "links" could result in findings
of guilt by association for persons sharing the same political ideology, nationality,
ethnicity, social grouping, or even family, with persons who commit acts of terrorism.
Id.; Liberty, Anti-Terrorism, supra note 355 (stating that terminology of Anti-Terrorism
Act 2001 is over-inclusive and ambiguous); Charter 88, supra note 354 (critiquing vague
and over-inclusive terms of anti-terrorism laws).
368. See Shadow Justice System, supra note 353 (critiquing Secretary of State's broad
detention powers); Liberty, Anti-Terrorism, supra note 355 (making similar criticisms);
After the Terror, supra note 17, at 7 (remarking on increasing abuse of asylum seekers'
and refugees' rights world-wide); Justice Not Revenge, supra note 27 (claiming that events
of September 11 th are resulting in massive abuses of human rights around world); Am-
nesty International's Concerns, supra note 27 (expressing concern about increased deten-
tion of asylum seekers).
369. See Refugee Convention, supra note 12, art. 33; Shadow Justice System, supra
note 353 (arguing that fundamental principle guiding Refugee Convention's protec-
tion mandate is presumption of inclusion on basis of full and fair review). This ap-
proach is consistent with UNHCR guidelines on the application of the exclusion
clauses. Id. See generally UNHCR, Note on the Exclusion, Clauses, (EC/47/SC/CRP.29)
(discussing exclusion clauses and their rationale).
370. See Shadow Justice System, supra note 353 (claiming that past crime does not fall
under purview of Refugee Convention); Liberty, Anti-Terrorism, supra note 355 (assert-
ing that Refugee Convention does not account for past crimes); Charter 88, supra note
354 (claiming that Refugee Convention does not encompass past crimes).
1410 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 25:1335
perceived threat to national security.371 The SIAC does not have
the power to address asylum questions, thereby suspending Refu-
gee Convention guarantees.37 9 Moreover, human rights activists
assert that the system of indefinite detention of refugees estab-
lishes a shadow justice system without the safeguards or guaran-
tees of rights required in the formal system. 73 In effect, asylum
seekers can be deemed threats to national security and "sus-
pected international terrorists" and imprisoned indefinitely on
the basis of information, which is considered inadmissible in a
trial, and on a significantly lower standard of proof.3 74
III. A COMPREHENSIVE MULTILATERAL APPROACH IS
NECESSARY TO SAFEGUARD ASYLUM SEEKERS' RIGHTS IN
THE POST-SEPTEMBER 11 TH WORLD
From the time the United States and the UK signed onto
the major international human rights documents promising spe-
371. See Anti-Terrorism Act 2001, supra note 7, §§ 33-34.
372. See ShadowJustice System, supra note 353.(arguing that exclusion before inclu-
sion risks criminalizing refugees). Exclusion is exceptional and it is not appropriate to
consider exception first. Id. Further, Section 33(8) of the Anti-Terrorism Act 2001
restricts the right of appeal to a higher court for persons certified as threats to national
security when SIAC upholds that certification. Id. Appeal in such cases can only touch
on points of law, requiring the SIAC to accept the facts as presented by the Home
Secretary. Id. Moreover, the recent European Court decision in Chahal established
that certain Refugee Convention Article 32(2) procedural guarantees should also apply
to those potentially subject to refoulement under Article 33(2). See Chahal v. UK, 23 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 413.
373. See Shadow Justice System, supra note 353 (coining term "shadow justice sys-
tem"); John Wadham, Acting out for Human Rights-A Look at the Anti-Terrorism Act and
Whether Parliament Would Allow the Sun to Set on Areas of the Statute that Breach Human
Rights, 99 L. SocIETY GAZETrE 16 (2002) (arguing that powers UK government retains
under Anti-Terrorism Act 2001 run obviously contrary to fundamental human rights
law); Charter 88, supra note 354 (discussing unfairness of asylum proceedings under
Anti-Terrorism Act 2001).
374. See Shadow Justice System, supra note 353 (critiquing detention provisions
under Anti-Terrorism Act 2001); Liberty, Anti-Terrorism, supra note 355 (echoing con-
cerns that innocent people may be detained); Anti-Terror Act at-a-Glance, BBC NEws ON-
LINE, Dec. 14, 2001, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/ukpolitics/newsid-
1710000/1710435.stm (discussing main measures under Anti-Terrorism Act 2001, in-
cluding detention without trial); Liberty, European Torture Watchdog in Secret Visit to UK
Detention Without Charge or Trial Under New Anti-,Terrorism Powers Prompts Alarm, available
at http://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/mpress96.html (discussing secret investiga-
tion by European Committee for Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment ("CPT") into detention conditions under Anti-Terrorism Act
2001).
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cific rights to asylum seekers, 375 both countries struggled to bal-
ance compliance with these international obligations with do-
mestic policy and security concerns.3 7 6 Because international
law lacks effective enforcement mechanisms 3 77 and States are
free to adopt caveats to the international obligations they do un-
dertake,378 the United States and the UK managed to compro-
mise their obligations to asylum seekers in distinct ways.379 The
post-September 11th anti-terrorism legislation enacted by the
two countries skews the balance toward a unilateral approach
that further undermines these asylum obligations. 80 Only a
comprehensive multilateral approach will safeguard asylum seek-
ers' rights in the post-September 11th world.
A. U.S. and UK Non-Compliance with International Law
The U.S. and the UK asylum systems underwent similar cyc-
lical changes, with both countries opening their doors to asylum
seekers from the Second World War38  until the 1980s,32 and
tightening their immigration controls since then.383 The major
375. See supra notes 11-16 and accompanying text (listing first international human
rights documents and summarizing U.S. and UK obligations under these instruments).
See also supra notes 46-63 and accompanying text -(describing U.S. and UK obligations
under International Bill of Human Rights); notes 64-73 and accompanying text (defin-
ing basic U.S. and UK obligations under Refugee Convention and Refugee Protocol);
notes 74-80 and accompanying text (outlining U.S. and UK basic obligations under
Torture Convention).
376. See supra notes 171-216 and accompanying text (summarizing evolution of
U.S. asylum system from Second World War until today); notes 284-306 and accompany-
ing text (outlining evolution of UK asylum procedures during same time period).
377. See, e.g., supra note 55 and accompanying text (describing lack of enforce-
ment for breach of ICCPR); notes 61-63 and accompanying text (noting lack of en-
forcement for breach of ICESCR). See also supra notes 163-65 and accompanying text
(discussing lack of enforcement of asylum seekers' rights under international law).
378. See supra notes 112-16 and accompanying text (describing steps States may
undertake to opt out of international human rights obligations).
379. See supra notes 246-56 and accompanying text (illustrating some criticisms of
U.S. treatment of asylum seekers); notes 33749 and accompanying text (detailing some
criticisms of UK treatment of asylum seekers).
380. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text (remarking on criticisms aimed
at U.S. and UK anti-terrorism legislation and its effect on asylum seekers' rights).
381. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (reflecting on welcoming attitude of
United States and UK in immediate post-war years)'. .
382. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (remarking on common trend in
U.S. and UK asylum developments during 1980s); notes 180-200 and -accompanying
text (describing 1980s developments in U.S. asylum system); notes 288-96 and accompa-
nying text (outlining forces affecting UK asylum developments in 1980s).
383. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text (commenting on trend in U.S.
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international human rights documents played specific roles in
the development of domestic asylum law and policy in the
United States and the UK.3 s4 The Refugee Convention had key
significance in both countries because it provided the basic defi-
nitions of the terms "refugee" and "nonrefoulement."38 5 The U.S.
legislation expanded this "refugee" definition to include future
persecution, while adding absolute bars to refugee status.386 The
UK legislation left the Refugee Convention terminology unal-
tered.387
While other international documents played a minor role in
the UK asylum litigation,388 in the United States, the Torture
Convention provided an independent ground of asylum relief
and expanded the nonrefoulement principle to include threat of
torture. 389 As far as the regional treaties are concerned, the
American Convention played a nominal role in the U.S. asylum
litigation. 39 ' By contrast, the regional ECHR, as incorporated
into the UK domestic law by the HRA, became the document of
paramount importance. 391 Besides being one of the few human
rights documents widely known in the UK, the ECHR became
the only human rights document providing UK citizens with an
and UK developments since 1980s and reasons for these trends); notes 201-16 and ac-
companying text (detailing U.S. asylum developments since 1980s); notes 292-306 and
accompanying text (explaining regional and domestic developments affecting UK asy-
lum law and policy since 1980s).
384. See supra notes 117-25 and accompanying text (outlining application of inter-
national human rights law in U.S. courts generally); notes 126-40 and accompanying
text (discussing specific U.S. obligations to asylum seekers under international law). Cf
supra notes 141-46 and accompanying text (commenting on application of interna-
tional human rights law in UK courts generally); notes 147-62 and accompanying text
(reporting specific UK obligations to asylum seekers under international law).
385. See supra notes 64-73 and accompanying text (introducing and explaining
these Refugee Convention provisions).
386. See supra notes 131, 131-34 and accompanying text (describing alterations of
Refugee Convention definitions under U.S. domestic law).
387. See supra note 149 and accompanying text (attesting to unaltered definitions
of terms "refugee" and "nonrefoulement" under UK domestic law).
388. See supra note 153 and accompanying text (remarking that terms of most in-
ternational human rights treaties are not reflected in UK legislation or in court).
389. See supra notes 135-37, 227-31 and accompanying text (discussing role of Tor-
ture Convention in U.S. asylum legislation).
390. See supra note 140 and accompanying text (remarking on insignificant effect
of American Convention on U.S. domestic asylum laws).
391. See supra notes 152-59 and accompanying text (discussing central role ECHR
plays in UK asylum litigation).
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individual right of petition.392
The specific mechanisms the United States and the UK de-
veloped to address asylum movements were unique.393 The hall-
mark of the U.S. domestic asylum scheme is expedited removal
and mandatory detention procedures under -IIRJRA.394 Under
this process, asylum seekers are thrown in detention centers or
prisons, where they await adjudication of their claims.395 The
human rights violations that occur in detention centers are well
documented.396 Because detained asylum seekers rarely receive
attorney representation and unrepresented asylum seekers
rarely win their cases, a large number of these individuals are
refouled in violation of international guarantees.39 7
Under the UK 1999 Immigration Act, asylum seekers may
enter the UK, but only to be dispersed, on a no-choice basis, into
far-flung ends of the country, where they often become victims
of racism and xenophobia. 98 Asylum seekers in the UK are sub-
ject to additional prejudice due to the government-distributed
food coupons.399 A few asylum seekers end up in detention °°
and the UK detention sites are subject to criticisms comparable
to those targeting the U.S. detention practices.4"' The UK sys-
tem, at its worst, becomes an endless series of reviews of other
people's inconsistent decisions.40 2
392. See id.
393. See supra notes 217-45 and accompanying text (discussing grounds for relief
asylum seekers may claim and procedures they undergo under U.S. domestic law). Cf
supra notes 307-36 and accompanying text (discussing procedures asylum seekers in UK
undergo and outlining grounds for relief they may claim under UK domestic law).
394. See supra notes 212-16, 232-45 and accompanying text (introducing basic
IIRIRA provisions, including expedited removal and mandatory detention).
395. See supra notes 232-56 and accompanying text (discussing U.S. interviewing
and detention procedures and presenting critiques of system).
396. See supra notes 249-56 and accompanying text (pinpointing specific human
rights violations occurring in detention centers).
397. See supra note 256 and accompanying text (discussing asylum seekers' diffi-
culty obtaining legal representation).
398. See supra notes 297-306 and accompanying text (discussing Immigration Act
1999 provisions and criticisms of dispersal program under this law).
399. See supra note 301 and accompanying text (showing that voucher scheme
serves to stigmatize asylum seekers).
400. See supra notes 334-36 and accompanying text (analyzing contributing factors
in decision to detain asylum seekers).
401. See supra notes 337-49 and accompanying text (presenting critiques of UK
detention system and procedures).
402. See supra notes 337-41 and accompanying text (discussing UK system's ten-
dency to ignore its inconsistencies and graft on layers of process).
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The U.S. and the UK asylum systems operate in different
contexts.403 Where the U.S. domestic legislation only responds
to international norms, which it tends to ignore as needed, the
UK is subject to the regional EU norms.4 °4 The ongoing Euro-
peanization of UK asylum law and policy operates to both, pro-
mote and hinder the rights of asylum seekers in ways not present
in the United States' largely unilateral approach.40 5
The recent anti-terrorism measures bring the disparate U.S.
and UK asylum laws closer together.40 6 The USA PATRIOT Act
and the UK Anti-Terrorism Act threaten to undermine asylum
seekers' rights in fundamental ways,4 07 reinvigorating the debate
regarding the legality of indefinite detention, 40 but more im-
portantly, the propriety of a strong unilateral response to an in-
ternational problem, which will not soon disappear. 40 9 The U.S.
legislation is perhaps more extreme. Although there is contro-
versy surrounding UK's derogation from its regional obliga-
tions, 410 there is less controversy regarding the extent to which
the UK legislation endangers personal liberties of regular citi-
zens.4 11 In the United States, on the other hand, the USA PA-
TRIOT Act put a number of civil rights activists up in arms,
claiming numerous violations of constitutional guarantees.41 2
403. See supra note 140 and accompanying text (attesting to minor role regional
system plays in U.S. domestic approach). Cf supra notes 152-55 and accompanying text
(recognizing important role regional developments play in UK asylum litigation).
404. See id.
405. See id.
406. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text (demonstrating common con-
cerns raised by USA PATRIOT Act and Anti-Terrorism Act).
407. See id.
408. See supra notes 272-76, 357-58, 368 and accompanying text (detailing deten-
tion powers under USA PATRIOT Act and Anti-Terrorism Act, respectively).
409. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text (questioning whether USA PA-
TRIOT Act and Anti-Terrorism Act furnish appropriate responses to terrorism-related
concerns).
410. See supra notes 353-55 and accompanying text (discussing UK derogation
from international human rights treaties and human rights activists' reaction to this
move).
411. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (outlining concerns regarding regu-
lar citizens' rights under USA PATRIOT Act). Cf supra note 352 and accompanying
text (expressing privacy concerns Anti-Terrorism Act 2001 raises in UK).
412. See supra notes 28, 259 and accompanying text (discussing civil rights activists'
objections to USA PATRIOT Act).
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B. Suggested Improvements
Commentators contend that the international human rights
documents the Western nations drafted in the aftermath of the
Second World War reflected idealist values and humanitarian
principles ofjustice and peace.413 Experts remark, however, that
the law, which developed out of these early beginnings is
weak.414 After the events of September l1th, the capacity of the
international legal system to provide an effective framework for
protection of human, and specifically asylum seekers' rights, is
further undermined.4 1 The bottom line question becomes: Is
the concerted effort for universal cooperation regarding asylum
seekers' rights pointless given the ease with which States evade
or ignore their international obligations? The answer must be
no.
The integration of domestic refugee law into the global sys-
tem of refugee protection and care is one of the greatest
achievements of the past several decades.4 16 It expresses the les-
son gleaned from two world wars and the human experience
before then.417 These lessons should not be unilaterally aban-
doned by two States, which risk making clumsy decisions guided
by fear and the instinct of self-preservation. 41 ' Additionally, asy-
lum seekers are among the most vulnerable segments of the
world population-they should not again become scapegoats
through hasty decision-making. 41 9
What States do within their borders is a matter of interna-
tional concern because the effects can bleed into neighboring
States-today it is physically, economically, and politically impos-
413. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text (describing idealist climate that
accompanied drafting of international human rights documents).
414. See supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text (discussing incapacity of inter-
national law to effectively enforce asylum seekers' rights).
415. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text (discussing concerns regarding
asylum seekers' rights raised by new anti-terrorism legislation).
416. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text (summarizing this accomplish-
ment and highlighting its importance and effect on asylum systems throughout world).
417. See id.
418. See supra notes 258-60 and accompanying text (showing hasty enactment of
USA PATRIOT Act by U.S. Congress); notes 350-51 and accompanying text (demon-
strating that only one month passed between issuance of Anti-Terrorism Bill and enact-
ment of Anti-Terrorism Act in UK).
419. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text (showing that with advances in
technology, communications and travel, asylum seekers increasingly became scapegoats
for domestic problems).
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sible for any part of the world to shut itself off.4 20 Moreover, a
unilateral approach to the asylum issue would harm, rather than
benefit a nation with closed doors. Violations of asylum seekers'
rights are only a small step away from violations of rights of regu-
lar citizens.421
The United States and the UK must focus on developing a
program aimed at addressing terrorism concerns, while allowing
the Office of the UNHCR to continue bridging the gap between
domestic asylum systems. The current laws dealing with asylum
seekers, including the anti-terrorism legislation, arrest asylum
seekers in their tracks either by not letting them into the coun-
try, locking them in detention, or dispersing them into areas of
prejudice and abuse.4 22 The new program must focus on long-
term anti-terrorism and: asylum-friendly objectives and not be-
come a clumsy fix of today's problems alone.
The United States and the UK should bring their anti-ter-
rorism legislation into compliance with the Refugee Convention
by most immediately, narrowing the scope of the terms "terror-
ist," "terrorist organization," and "terrorist activity. '' 422 The new
definitions should lead the two countries to reexamine the new
limitations on the right to seek asylum, as well as the extensive
detention powers granted to the U.S. Secretary of State and the
UK Home Secretary.4 24 One way to implement this idea is by
developing a body of terrorism-related definitions and principles
under international law. The new international system would
face the old enforcement problems and should set up enforce-
ment mechanisms that actually work and on which the United
States and the UK can rely.
Another solution may involve developing stronger regional
systems. Closer cooperation among neighboring countries may
420. See id.
421. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (expressing concerns that anti-ter-
rorism measures are becoming pretext for rights violations of regular citizens).
422. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text (discussing generally deterrent
effect of current asylum law and policy in United States and UK); notes 218-34 and
accompanying text (reflecting on U.S. asylum determination procedure and grounds
for relief); notes 307-20 and accompanying text (outlining UK asylum determination
process and relief possibilities).
423. See supra notes 261-67, 356-58 and accompanying text (presenting definitions
of these terms under USA PATRIOT Act and Anti-Terrorism Act, respectively).
424. See supra notes 272-76, 357-58, 368 and accompanying text (outlining these
powers under USA PATRIOT Act and Anti-Terrorism Act, respectively).
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incite a better understanding of common security concerns,
while reducing the threat of a terrorist organization using a
neighboring country as base for its operations. To that end, the
existing European regime should aim to maintain a better bal-
ance between regional safety concerns and borders that are
open to genuine asylum seekers. The Inter-American system
should strive toward the same goal, with an emphasis on the
clearly enunciated right to seek asylum under the American
Convention.425
CONCLUSION
A multilateral policy is the only solution that can ensure
that the U.S. and the UK domestic considerations do not topple
the global structure of refugee protection. U.S. Attorney Gen-
eral John D. Ashcroft highlighted the dubious role the law can
play in the asylum context.4 26 "Some will ask," he said at a recent
conference, "whether a civilized nation, a nation of laws and not
of men, can use the law to defend itself from barbarians and
remain civilized. '427 In crafting their civilized response, both the
United States and the UK must not lose perspective of the con-
text within which their domestic laws operate. International
guarantees to asylum seekers must remain binding rules of law,
which civilized nations respect.
425. See supra note 87 and accompanying text (quoting' definition of right to seek
asylum under American Convention).
426. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text (quoting Ashcroft's speech at U.S.
Conference of Mayors on October 25, 2001).
427. See id.
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